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ABSTRACT 
In 2011, National Treasury proposed the introduction of the Twin Peaks regulatory model for 
the South African financial sector. The adoption of this model will significantly change the 
regulatory landscape in South Africa. A growing body of mainly government generated 
literature focuses predominantly on the introduction of the Twin Peaks regulatory model and 
concentrates on the structure of this model rather than on the details of the model’s two 
peaks: prudential and market conduct. Market conduct regulation is understood in broad 
terms, however only limited studies are available as to the details of this peak. The study 
provides discourse as to the history and the role of the state (with specific reference to the 
Lockean framework) and further examines the various economic theories of regulation which 
provide the justifications for regulation. A brief discussion of the Twin Peaks system 
provides the necessary background and contextualisation. The purpose of this study is to 
establish the origins, development and nature of market conduct regulation in four insurance 
markets, including the United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU), United States (US) and 
South Africa, with specific reference to the South African short term insurance market. This 
is achieved by providing a narrative of the development of insurance regulation in the four 
markets. From this narrative, the development of market conduct regulation is specifically 
distilled and the applicability of the various economic theories of regulation is sporadically 
assessed. The findings indicate that traces of market conduct issues can be detected at various 
periods in the nearly 500 year history of the global insurance market. However contemporary 
market conduct regulation evolved in the mid-1900s in the US and between 1986 and 2000 in 
the UK. In this regard, market conduct regulation was pioneered in these two markets. 
Furthermore, the study argues that contemporary regulatory developments in the UK have 
seen the market gradually transition away from regulation that historically was underpinned 
by the Lockean framework to a new framework. The study does not define or critiqued this 
new framework. This may be an avenue for further and more focused research. 
Keywords: development, European Union, history, insurance, market conduct regulation, 
origins, regulation, South Africa, Twin Peaks, United Kingdom, United States. 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The study discusses the history and the role of the state with reference to the Lockean 
framework and further examines the various economic theories of regulation which are often 
cited as a rationale for regulation. A brief discussion of the Twin Peaks system (including 
prudential regulation and market conduct regulation) is necessary in order to place the 
proceeding discussions into context. These early discussions lay the foundations from which 
the primary research objectives are achieved. The objectives of this research are to establish 
the origins, development and nature of market conduct regulation in four pre-selected 
insurance markets. In doing so, this study adds to the limited body of knowledge on the 
subject matter at hand.  
This dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part seeks to plot a history of insurance 
regulation in the United Kingdom, European Union, Unites States and South Africa. The 
famous English historian, Edward Hallett Carr (1961), pointed out that there is no single 
history. Histories are written for a purpose. In this case, the history is written to discover the 
origins, development and nature of market conduct regulation. The history set out in this 
study will be, of necessity, unique.  
The first part sets the scene for the second. In terms of the second phase in the research, the 
dissertation details the development of market conduct regulation in these markets. This 
facilitates the identification of the origins of market conduct regulation. The third part of this 
research determines the nature of market conduct regulation with specific reference to the 
British insurance market. The Lockean framework is taken as the benchmark in order to 
perform this evaluation. The research evaluates if market conduct aspects during a particular 
period, fit into the Lockean model. There is a fourth, albeit secondary, dimension to this 
research. In terms of this final part, the dissertation sporadically evaluates the applicability of 
two central theories of regulation to various historical periods that are reviewed in the study.  
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METHODOLOGY 
The methodology which is to be applied to achieve the research objectives noted above is as 
follows: 
i. The thesis sets out a detailed historical account of the regulatory systems in four 
insurance markets, namely the United Kingdom, European Union, Unites States and 
South Africa; 
ii. In each period, the history is examined in order to isolate market conduct aspects (the 
origins of market conduct regulation can then be identified); 
iii. As an interlude, various historical periods are examined in order to determine the 
nature of market conduct regulation in that period; 
iv. As an interlude, various periods are examined in order to discuss the applicability of 
economic theories of regulation during that period. 
There is a large body of literature which documents various regulatory systems and 
developments in isolation. The research therefore compiles and consolidates existing 
literature in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the history of insurance market 
regulation in the four pre-selected markets. In doing so, the research is able to distil and plot 
the development of market conduct regulation in the aforementioned four markets and further 
lays the foundations for the concluding parts of the study. In view of this, a historical 
approach is justifiable. 
In addition to existing literature, the study relies on various Acts of Parliament, Hansard 
Parliamentary debates, Commission reports, government reports and case law in order to 
construct a thorough historical outline and assessment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the recent global financial crisis, the regulation of financial markets has received 
renewed attention and focus. As such, the imposition, monitoring and enforcement of rules 
and standards of best practice have become far more acute. In February 2011, National 
Treasury published a policy document entitled “A safer financial sector to serve South Africa 
better” in terms of which Treasury announced the proposed introduction of the Twin Peaks 
regulatory model for South Africa. In doing so, National Treasury is following the lead given 
earlier by the United Kingdom’s government which announced that it was abandoning the 
discredited single regulator model that had been introduced in 2000, in favour of the Twin 
Peaks model. The implementation of this regulatory model will likely be the impetus for 
regulatory reform of the South African financial services landscape. The Twin Peaks model 
has therefore become relevant and topical.  
In terms of this model, the two regulatory peaks include prudential regulation and market 
conduct regulation, each of which has a designated regulator. There is a growing body of 
mainly government generated literature which focuses predominantly on the introduction of 
the Twin Peaks. However, most of this literature concentrates on the structure of the model 
rather than on the details of the peaks. This is not a problem in terms of prudential regulation 
since a large amount of literature can be found which exclusively discusses this peak. This is 
owing to the fact that prudential regulation has existed since 1870, following the passing of 
the British Life Assurance Act and accordingly, this has been subject to over a century’s 
worth of research.  
On the other hand, literature, and again, predominantly government reports, focuses primarily 
on the structure of market conduct regulation in terms of the Twin Peaks model. As such, 
from the existing literature, what is meant by market conduct is understood in broad terms. 
However, limited studies are available which document the details of market conduct 
regulation. Accordingly, the first peak, prudential regulation, is well-known but what the 
second peak, market conduct, entails is less clear. 
It therefore follows that the research problem at hand is the absence of similar studies to the 
one proposed in this research proposal and consequently, the absence of knowledge regarding 
the origins, development and nature of market conduct regulation. Since the proposed 
introduction of the Twin Peaks system, an understanding of market conduct regulation has 
14 
 
become particularly relevant and newsworthy. Accordingly, research is necessary in order to 
add to the limited body of knowledge on the subject matter at hand. 
The thesis therefore provides greater clarity as to what the second peak encompasses. In view 
of that, the purpose of the research is to establish the origins, development and nature of 
market conduct regulation in four insurance markets, including the United Kingdom (UK), 
European Union (EU), United States (US) and South African, with specific reference to the 
South African short term insurance market. 
The thesis is qualitative in nature and is underpinned by historical analysis, documentary 
analysis and descriptive design. The thesis traces the origins and development of market 
conduct regulation through the 500 year history of insurance regulation and does so in four 
parts. To begin with, the historical role of the state is discussed with specific reference to the 
Lockean framework. Since regulation is the focal point of this thesis, the latter is followed by 
a discussion of the various economic theories of regulation which attempt to explain the 
rationale for regulation. Thirdly, the focus then shifts to the Twin Peaks model and its 
intended implementation in the South African financial sector. This chapter provides a brief 
overview of prudential regulation and discusses market conduct regulation in greater depth. 
These early discussions provide the necessary context upon which proceeding discussions are 
based. It is in part four of the study that the main objectives are achieved. 
The thesis then progresses to discuss the development of insurance regulation in the UK, EU, 
US and South Africa. In terms of this historical record and as an interlude, each historical 
period is examined further in order to isolate the market conduct aspects. In other words, the 
broader historical account of the regulatory systems is filtered further in order to trace the 
development of market conduct regulation in these markets. This is performed 
retrospectively. In doing so, the thesis is able to identify the origins of market conduct 
regulation - this is the main objective of the paper.  
The next, albeit secondary, element of this research is to determine the nature of various 
market conduct regulatory developments. Since no other research has attempted to undertake 
such an assessment, determining the nature of various market conduct regulatory 
developments will be done sporadically where such an assessment is appropriate. From this, 
more general inferences and conclusions are drawn. Market conduct ostensibly has to do with 
consumer protection. It deals with the legal relationship between an institution and a 
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customer. Legally, this relationship historically has been governed almost exclusively by the 
law of contract. The law of contract itself has not been static but to the extent that this has 
developed, it has been on an incremental basis under the control of the judiciary. A number of 
consumer protection safeguards have evolved such as those dealing with unfair contract 
terms. Parliament has generally not found it necessary to intervene in the contractual 
relationship. As such, the rule of law (encompassing contract law and the due process of the 
law) historically has governed the relationship between the insurer and their consumers. 
These ideals were articulated by John Locke and accordingly the Lockean framework is taken 
as the benchmark in order to perform this phase of the research. The research therefore 
sporadically evaluates whether the market conduct aspects during a particular period fit into 
the Lockean model.  
As noted above, since regulation and the development thereof is the primary focus of this 
study, an understanding of these historical developments ought to be aided by an assessment 
of the applicability of the economic theories of regulation to the respective market event at 
hand. This is a secondary dimension of the research. The economic theories of regulation are 
well-known. This phase of the research shall therefore evaluate the applicability of the 
theories of public interest and regulatory capture to the various historical periods that are 
under consideration. Again, this is done intermittently where such an evaluation is 
appropriate to undertake. Yet again, the absence of studies in this regard limits this aim to a 
secondary objective. The research will not attempt to assess the validity of these theories; the 
tenants that underpin these theories are accepted for purposes of this study. 
It is anticipated that although traces of market conduct issues can be detected at various 
periods in the nearly 500 year history of the global insurance market, contemporary market 
conduct regulation evolved in the US during the 1980s as per the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) Constitution and in the UK between 1986 and 2000, 
following the establishment of the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  The research findings 
also suggest that the development of market conduct regulation in the aforementioned four 
markets historically has been in response to various corporate failures and/or market 
scandals. In this view, market conduct regulation, traditionally, has been promulgated for the 
public interest in general, however, evidence of regulatory capture during these times is 
referred to.  
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More recent market conduct regulatory changes however have not been influenced by a 
particular market event. The research thus suggests that contemporary regulatory changes are 
supported by the theoretical tenets of regulatory capture and more specifically, what this 
research refers to as legislative capture. The research further demonstrates that historically 
the Lockean framework has been upheld and applied. However, since the birth of market 
conduct regulation in the late 20th century, a transition has begun to take place away from the 
Lockean framework to a new framework, although the new framework cannot at this point be 
defined, assessed or critiqued. 
This research provides an original and theoretical contribution by establishing the origins, 
plotting the development and assessing the nature of market conduct regulation, specifically 
with reference to the Lockean framework since limited evidence can be located in this regard. 
This research thus provides a valuable contribution to National Treasury, policymakers, 
academics and all other interested parties in the countries included in this study. 
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PART I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REGULATION 
2 THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
John Locke (1632-1704) produced the most well-known and enduring thesis on the function 
of government. He advanced a number of fundamental tenets of both political and natural 
rights philosophy. Such rhetoric can be found in three important works including: A Letter 
Concerning Toleration (1689), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) and Two 
Treaties of Government (1689). It is the latter work that is of particular significance to this 
research and as such, forms the point of departure with respect to understanding the role of 
the state in terms of regulation. 
In Chapter II ‘of the State of Nature’, Locke (1689/2005) argues that in order to understand 
the role of government and political power in society, one ought to start at the beginning of 
the evolutionary process of society; man in nature without a formal form of government. In 
this state, Locke (1689/2005 as cited in Mack, 2013) holds that each individual possesses 
natural rights to life, liberty and property. These are not given; they are possessed. This view 
is echoed in the United States’ Declaration of Independence (1776), in terms of which ‘all 
men are endowed with unalienable rights; rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. 
Locke (1689/2005) however accepts that such natural rights do not exist merely 
metaphysically. They can be infringed upon or trespassed against by others, just as soon as 
these other persons enter into the natural state of nature. These rights can be invaded by 
others and thus need protection. It is this idea that informs Locke’s rationale for the existence 
of a political society and the need for a government. Locke (1690 para 123-126) asserts that: 
…though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is 
very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being 
kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict 
observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this 
state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him [the person in a State of 
Nature] willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and 
continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing 
to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, 
for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by 
the general name, property. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's 
uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the 
preservation of their property. To which in the State of Nature there are many 
things wanting. First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received 
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and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and 
the common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the 
law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being 
biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt 
to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular 
cases. Secondly, in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent 
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established 
law: for everyone in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of 
nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to 
carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as 
negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.  
Thirdly, in the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the 
sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice 
offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their 
injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and 
frequently destructive, to those who attempt it. 
That is, Locke (1689/2005) argues that men are willing to give up a certain amount of 
autonomy and unite into commonwealths for the mutual preservation of their (natural) rights, 
i.e. their lives and property (Reekie, 1997). More specifically, humankind forfeits the 
absolute rights (within a state of nature) in return for the security that can be provided by a 
government since a state of nature lacks the ability to protect the very rights that it confers 
(Locke, 1689/2005; Bunnin & Yu, 2004). It therefore follows, that laws ought to exist or be 
passed for i) the protection of natural rights including life, liberty and property ii) from others 
and thus iii) such laws are for the  public good, or as is nowadays said, in the public interest. 
Locke (1690: para 3) summarised this position as follows: 
Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of 
death.'  and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of 
property, and of, employing the force of the community, in the execution of 
such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and 
all this only for the public good. 
The state of nature is unable to protect one’s natural rights since it lacks i) established laws 
intended to protect rights (by prohibiting other persons from infringing on these rights); ii) an 
impartial judge with the authority to settle differences in an established court following the 
due process of law and; iii) a power to impose and enforce the appropriate remedy (Locke, 
1689/2005). Accordingly, the function of government is to articulate and protect the life, 
liberty and property of an individual via the rule of law1 and the due process of the law 
                                                 
1 Former president Nelson Mandela (as cited in Louw, 2013) asserted that the rule of law refers to “a structural 
exercise of rule as opposed to the idiosyncratic will of kings and princes. Even where the latter may express 
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(Mack, 2013). This may be achieved through the establishment of a police force, prosecuting 
authority, judiciary, corrective services and in many cases, an army (Vivian, 2014). Thus 
within the Lockean framework, the role of the state is to protect natural rights via the rule of 
law. This does not include intervention within the economy. However, centuries after Locke 
detailed his ideas, there was pressure to expand the role of government beyond the Lockean 
framework. This was done particularly by socialist thinking, as developed further by Karl 
Marxs and Friedrich Engels, who together developed Marxism theory and who advocated the 
principles of communism. 
Acceptance of state intervention received support from other sources. Economies were 
mobilised as they were placed on a War footing involving massive central planning (Saaler & 
Szpilman, 2011). Germany embarked on a programme of massive public works to counter 
unemployment which was followed by the US with its New Deal (Bendersky, 2007). These 
programmes received credibility through the ideas of English economist John Maynard 
Keynes (1883-1946) which contributed to the notion of state intervention in the economy. 
Throughout the Great Depression (1929-1939) when unemployment was the order of the day, 
Keynes “inspired new thinking about how government intervention could promote recovery” 
by stimulating aggregate demand (Eckes, 2011:94). Keynes’ theoretical contributions 
acknowledge governments’ influence on national economies and further asserted that 
macroeconomic tools can be employed by government to control aggregate demand for 
labour and thus increase employment during those periods of recession (Eckes, 2011:94). 
Keynes therefore concluded that the establishment of a semi-autonomous state enterprise is 
ideal in order to resuscitate the economy when it is experiencing difficulty (McCann, 
1998:9). Although the Great Depression seemed to indicate that government intervention 
could correct market shortcomings, it took some time before Keynes’ case for government 
intervention in the economy became well established in economic theory (Barnett, 2013). 
It therefore follows that regulation can be justified primarily in terms of the Lockean 
framework. That is, action can be taken, or more correctly, laws can be passed and applied to 
protect life and property. However, government action may be influenced also by broader 
                                                                                                                                                        
itself benevolently the former is morally and politically superior. Where the rule of law does not apply, rulers 
assume entitlement to rule; the rule of law, on the other hand, places the emphasis upon structured responsibility 
and obligation". 
20 
 
interventionist tendencies. The clear Lockean line has become blurred in recent times by 
other interventionist tendencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
3 THEORIES OF REGULATION 
A major challenge in economic and political science has been to explain government 
intervention, more often than not in the form of regulations in various markets. The focus of 
this investigation entails an understanding of what ought to be the intervention (or regulation) 
or why does the intervention or regulation exist.  As such, for at least a half a century, 
commentators have been engaged in a debate as to what drives or explains the regulatory 
process. Various theories for regulation have emerged on the one hand to justify the existence 
of regulation and on the other hand to explain or provide a rationalisation for regulation, 
especially regulation of financial markets. Each theory or paradigm has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. The most relevant theories are, firstly, the public interest theory which can be 
used to justify the passing of regulations and, secondly, the capture theory which can be used 
to explain the existence of regulation. Some may argue that regulatory capture is but one of 
the economic theories of regulation giving a broader economic framework for regulation.  A 
discussion of the theories of regulation is necessary to inform one’s understanding of the 
potential influences on government intervention and regulation in a market. 
3.1 Public interest theory 
The oldest and most widely cited basis for the passing of regulation is public interest.  
Regulation is passed, so the argument goes, because the regulation is in the public interest.  
The concept of public interest is said to be as old as the political philosophy of government 
intervention and accordingly forms the point of departure (Hantke-Domas, 2003). 2 Having 
said that regulations are introduced because they are in the public interest, is not in and of 
itself useful, unless the meaning of public interest is also known.   A wide range of views 
exist as to the meaning of ‘in the public interest’.  One view that is prevalent in economic 
literature, especially American literature, postulates that government’s role is primarily to 
correct various market imperfections. The government is therefore a benevolent maximiser of 
social welfare, particularly when faced with a corporate failure (Posner, 1974; Laffont & 
Tirole, 1991). 3   More specifically, financial market activities (and, in particular, market 
                                                 
2 In fact, the concept of public interest appears in the works of political philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and 
Hobbes (Held, 1970 as cited in Hantke-Domas, 2003). 
3 Why this view is prevalent in American writing becomes clear when the American history is taken into 
consideration.  Towards the end of the 1800s and extending into the early 1900s, American political thought was 
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failures) can often generate externalities that impose heavy social costs on society and which 
are generally not easily addressed by private agents (Botha & Makina, 2011). These market 
problems can, in turn, harm the public interest (Klein, 2005). As a result of this, regulatory 
bodies attempt to intervene to correct, lessen or eliminate these inefficiencies engineered by a 
market failure (Peltzman, Levine & Noll, 1989; Botha & Makina, 2011).  A more extreme 
form of market failure within an insurance context occurred where consumers wished to 
purchase insurance but there were no suppliers. The Redlining problem in the US throughout 
the late twentieth century is one such example (Badain, 1980). The government intervention 
in this case was the introduction of Fair Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) Plans 
(Joskow, 1973).  Another was the absence of medical health insurance to persons over the 
age of 65 (Akerlof, 1970).  The government intervention in this case was the introduction of 
Medi-Care (Akerlof, 1970). 
The statutory regulation of insurance companies has historically been rooted in public interest 
theory and accordingly, is an exercise to safeguard public interest (Adams & Tower, 1994). 
Insurance regulation has traditionally targeted the excessive risk of insolvency and more 
recently the market abuse of consumers (Klein, 2005).  Solvency regulation of an insurance 
firm is underpinned by arguments of market inefficiencies and principal-agent problems 
(Munch & Smallwood, 1981). Accordingly, in the absence of such regulation, imperfect 
consumer information and principal-agent problems would cause a number of market 
problems which would consequently harm public interest (Klein, 2005). 
In addition to this, insurance consumers often lack the mental models needed to understand 
the insurance market and further may possess inadequate information necessary to appreciate 
an insurance transaction (Botha & Makina, 2011).  Consumers therefore may be vulnerable to 
abusive marketing and claims practices of insurers and agents (Klein, 2005). For this reason, 
it has been contended that regulation is required in order to correct these information 
imbalances or asymmetries where the insurer possesses greater information than the insured 
                                                                                                                                                        
dominated by the Progressive Movement.   America became obsessed with confronting big business; the 
railways, the oil business and the like.  This culminated in the passing of legislation such as the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act to be discussed in chapter 7 below.  Big business was seen as evil. The free market, left to itself, 
created these evils and the duty of the state was to remedy these evils.  Hence the dominant view of regulation 
was to correct market imperfections. 
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or where the industry purposefully suppresses the production of unfavourable information 
(Beaver, 1981).  
Thus, regulators are said to have five main objectives when it comes to the statutory 
regulation of insurance companies (Meier, 1991: 701).  These include: 
i) To monitor corporate solvency 
ii) To ensure fair trading 
iii) To regulate entry into the market 
iv) To promote price stability 
v) To satisfy social objectives 
3.2 Economic theory of regulation 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Economists began to examine regulation in terms of the application of economic theories to 
the regulatory phenomena.  Under the heading of the economic theory of regulations, a 
number of specific theories have evolved, such as the theory of regulatory capture.  Economic 
theory of regulation should thus not be seen as a separate explanation for the justification or 
existence of regulation but rather as the application of economic theory to explain these other 
observed phenomena. 
Some have argued for limited regulation and government intervention on the basis that in the 
free market, markets are efficiently self-regulated by Adam Smith’s invisible hand.  It can be 
argued that the unregulated market is undermined by principal-agent problems in terms of 
which individuals, acting as agents, operate out of self-love and in their own self-interest. 
This ideal is reflected in Adam Smith’s (1790/2007: 27) profound statement as seen in his 
work entitled An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes on the Wealth of Nations that:  
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
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ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of 
our own necessities, but of their advantages.   
When the agent works for his own interests and not his principal’s, this can give rise to 
problems.   This problem is compounded when agents propose laws which are claimed 
to be in the public interest.  As Smith (1790/2007:267) warns, laws proposed in the 
public interest may not be in the public interest but rather in the interests of the 
proposers: 
The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from 
this order [specific markets], ought always to be listened to with great 
precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and 
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most 
suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never 
exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to 
deceive and even oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many 
occasions, both deceived and oppressed it. 
Numerous authors have suggested that regulations that are often proposed under the guise of 
‘public interest’ may in fact be in the interest of some other group (Stigler, 1971).  In short 
regulatory capture can take place.  Levine and Forrence (1990:168) note that when regulators 
exercise public power in markets that allow individuals to make their own choices freely, 
naturally such governments need to find justification in their coercion. In many instances, 
justification is found in the so-called public interest to ‘cure market failures’, ‘to protect the 
market from the evils of monopoly powers’ or from ‘destructive competition’ but the real 
motives are intentionally disregarded. It therefore follows, that regulations proposed to be in 
the public interest are not necessarily always in the public interest. A factual examination is 
required to determine if the regulations are in the public interest even if they only indirectly 
serve the interests of the public in the form of consumers.4 
In 1971, this line of thought received a boost when Stigler published his research which has 
had a lasting impact on the understanding of the economics of regulation.  He introduced the 
                                                 
4 In addition to this, two assumptions have historically typified the public interest theory. One assumption is that 
economic markets are extremely fragile and apt to operate very inefficiently (or inequitably) if left alone 
(Posner, 1974:336). The other assumption is that government regulation is virtually costless and therefore there 
is no need for a cost-to-benefit analysis (Posner, 1974). Evidence suggests however, the regulation is not 
costless. The cost of regulation is ultimately borne by the consumer as there is most certainly a cost of 
complying with the regulation. Furthermore, regulatory agencies themselves require remuneration. It therefore 
follows that regulation cannot be costless. 
25 
 
world to the concept of regulatory capture.  Stigler (1971) suggested, after factually 
examining much of the regulation that existed in the US, that very little evidence exists 
showing that regulations are in fact passed in the public interest.  When Stigler (1971) 
examined the empirical evidence, it pointed clearly to regulation being in the interest of the 
regulated industry. The regulated industry, so the argument goes, captured the regulator for 
its own interests. 
3.2.2 Capture theory of regulation 
That regulations were not being passed in the public interest was illustrated by earlier 
empirical research on regulation, as mentioned above. Stigler and Friedland’s (1962) analysis 
of the effects of regulation on electricity rates which were supposed to lower electricity prices 
in the public interest, noted that restricting entry into the market and imposing maximum 
rates (in the ‘public interest’) had not resulted in lower electricity rates and were therefore 
contrary to public interest (Peltzman et al., 1989). A pattern of similar results continued to 
emerge during this time which empirically demonstrated that outcomes were incongruent to 
the public interest. In 1972, following Stigler’s (1971) seminal work, William Jordan, after 
studying the plethora of literature on the effects of regulation, provided a summary of the new 
paradigm which had emerged therefrom (Peltzman et al., 1989). He concluded that the 
correct generalisation is that regulation serves the producer’s interest ( Peltzman et al., 
1989) .  The capture theory of regulation thus began to emerge from empirical research into 
existing regulation. 
The capture theory postulates that regulation is a “partisan political process conferring 
benefits on politically effective groups which capture and dominate the regulatory process” 
(Noll & Owen, 1983 and Reagan, 1987 as cited in Adams & Tower, 1994: 167).  In other 
words, the regulatory process may be the outcome of opportunistic capture by groups who 
have an interest in the industry (Adams & Tower, 1994). A historical review reveals instances 
when laws have been passed, neither in response to an identified problem nor in the public 
interest, but rather for the benefit of a specific class of persons. Once again, Adam Smith’s 
(1790) statement maintained the idea that individuals operate in their own self-interest, even 
when laws are proposed.  
In general, it may well be the regulated industry itself which is dominant in capturing the 
regulator since they possess the economic resources, organisational capabilities and industry-
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specific knowledge required to be a “politically effective group” (Ferox, 1987). Consumers 
seldom possess the attributes to become a “politically effective group”. Accordingly, 
regulation is demanded by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit 
(Stigler, 1971: 3). Stigler (1971:5) suggests that among other things, industry players may 
seek to capture the regulator in order to (a) protect their market(s) from outside competition 
and the entry of new firms and; (b) to obtain state subsidies.  
The capture theory however received its own criticism since like the public interest theory, it 
too was based on empirical findings and had no theoretical foundation (Peltzman et al., 
1989). The economic theory of regulation therefore emerged to address the theoretical void 
that was characteristic of the capture theory. 
In order to provide a rational explanation for the capture theory, Stigler (1971) later refined 
and extended the tenets of the capture theory into a reformulated theory of economic 
regulation5 (Adams & Tower, 1994). In particular, Stigler (1971) approached the question of 
regulation from a perspective of economics. It had been suggested by Samuelson (1954) that 
the government can be viewed as a supplier of goods; public goods in this case. As such, 
regulation should be viewed as a public good which is subject to the economic laws of 
demand and supply. On this basis, Stigler (1971) argued that regulation should be seen as an 
economic good and specifically a public good in terms of state regulation. Accordingly, 
regulation is a good, the allocation of which is governed by the laws of supply and demand 
(Posner, 1974). Stigler (1971) reasoned that regulation was demanded by the regulated 
entities themselves.  Thus, he argued that the regulated had captured the regulator – the idea 
of regulatory capture was maintained. 
 
On the supply side, it became clear that the government was the supplier of the good 
(regulation). However, although regulation may be demanded and captured, an elusive 
question is why would such regulation be supplied? In other words, what incentives does the 
                                                 
5 A number of sub-theories have developed under the banner of ‘Economic Regulation’. Generally these 
theories can be categorised as either positive theories of regulation or normative theories of regulation. The 
latter includes theories of market power, interest group theories and theories of government opportunism while 
the former generally concludes that regulators should encourage competition where possible, minimise the costs 
of information asymmetries and provide operators with incentives to improve their performance.  
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regulator have to supply regulation? What incentive does the regulator have to be captured?  
One can argue that regulators are content to supply regulation since their own livelihood 
depends on the continued existence of the regulatory agency. Furthermore, the creation of a 
regulatory agency and the role of other professionals in the regulatory field creates statutory 
protected employment, which in itself is a policy objective of any government. Lastly, 
regulation may be supplied by politicians who are seeking campaign money, votes, re-
election and political power (Peltzman, 1976). In this regard, regulation may in fact be 
demanded by politicians and once they gain political power, is then supplied. The latter is 
extensively investigated more generally in terms of the economics of Public Choice.  
In summary and on the supply side,  Levine and Forrence (1990:169) point out that there are 
actors, bureaucrats and professionals in the regulatory universe who process narrow, self-
interested goals; principally job retention. There are also politicians who are in the pursuit of 
re-election, self-gratification from the exercise of power, or perhaps who are in search of 
post-office-holding personal wealth. In terms of this perspective, government regulation is 
therefore created and operated for their advantage (Levine & Forrence, 1990:169). The idea 
of self-interest in terms of which political actors are self-interested maximisers, underpins the 
idea and was the basic premise of Stigler’s formulation of regulatory capture (Peltzman et al., 
1989). As such, regulators may both demand and supply regulation in pursuit of their own 
interests whilst proclaiming a public interest justification. The latter is an example of the 
broader principle-agent problem, one of the most pervasive economic problems worldwide. 
Accordingly, the application of the economic theory of regulation to explain regulatory 
capture, recognises that state intervention serves the interests of politically effective groups 
and that all groups seek to serve their own interests while at the same time proclaiming that 
they are acting in the public interest (Stigler, 1971). Stigler’s paper attracted widespread 
support, contributed towards him being awarded the Nobel Prize and he is now accepted as a 
leading authority on regulatory capture and the economic explanation for regulatory capture 
(Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976). 
3.3 Conclusion 
For the purposes of this research, two broad rationales for regulation of the financial market 
are advanced. Firstly, the earliest theories to be put forward are that government intervention, 
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including regulation, is because it is in the public interest. In terms of this theory, regulation 
is a tool used to ensure adequate consumer protection even if it is in the form of more obscure 
and complex concepts such as compensating for market imperfections and increasing total 
economic welfare. On the other hand, empirical evidence led to the capture theory which is 
explained by standard economic theory of supply and demand in terms of which regulation is 
demanded by the industry itself, primarily for its own benefit and does not exist for the public 
interest in general.  Accordingly, regulation factually may not be in the interest of the public 
at large but rather for the benefit of a specific class of agents whom capture the regulatory 
process. This was anticipated by Adam Smith’s (1790) statement that individuals operate in 
their own self-interest, including the demand for legislation. The latter forms the linchpin to 
this ideal. Economic theory of regulation recognises that state intervention serves the interests 
of politically effective groups and that all groups seek to serve their own interests. 
Furthermore, the economic theory highlights that human behaviour, and specifically 
regulatory agencies and politicians seek to maximise their own self-interest and it is this idea 
which may explain why regulators supply regulation. The capture theory can be generalised 
as a rule that if it is possible to capture legislation (including regulation) it would be for the 
benefit of those who have the power to make the capture, rather than regulations existing for 
the public interest. 
Notwithstanding the above theories, in practice, regulators have recognised two principal 
strands for the regulation of financial markets. These include the need to mitigate the problem 
of systemic risk and the necessity to regulate market conduct activities in the financial market 
which together encompass the Twin Peaks regulatory model to be discussed below. 
In the sections that follow later on, each period is examined in line with the theories 
discussed above. The research thus assesses whether the regulatory changes made during a 
particular period were in the public interest or whether the evidence suggests that regulatory 
capture took place. 
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4  TWIN PEAKS OF REGULATION 
Mitnick’s (1980) definition of regulation is accepted as the point of departure. Mitnick (1980: 
5) defines regulation as "... the intentional restriction of a subject's choice of activity by an 
entity not directly party to or involved in the activity”. It therefore follows that regulation is 
imposed. In addition to this, regulation and supervision collectively denote the establishment 
of rules and the monitoring and enforcement thereof (Botha & Makina, 2011). Insurance 
regulation encompasses two facets, namely prudential regulation and market conduct (or 
conduct-of-business) regulation. These taken together comprise the Twin Peaks of regulation. 
The distinction between the two classes is however and in most cases, largely illusionary as is 
illustrated by the near collapse of the Equitable Life, as discussed in succeeding chapters. 
According to Llewellyn (1999:9), the three core objectives of financial regulation are: 
i. to sustain systemic stability; 
ii. to maintain the safety and soundness of financial institutions; and 
iii. to protect the consumer. 
Naturally, both points i and ii endeavour to ensure consumer protection, however regulators 
have recently eyed out ‘consumer protection’ as its own separate policy objective. More 
specifically, in light of the 2008 global financial crisis, attention has increasingly been 
focused on consumer protection, encompassing not just financial supervision but also market 
regulation and oversight of company conduct (NAIC, 2014b). Accordingly, consumer 
protection has become the cornerstone of regulation and has arisen for two main reasons: (1) 
because of the possibility that a financial institution which holds clients’ money may fail and 
become insolvent and (2) because of the possibility of adverse and unsatisfactory conduct on 
behalf of a firm to its customers (Chatterjee, 2011; Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn, Rojas-
Suarez & Weisbrod, 2013). For these reasons, insurance regulation seeks to ensure not only 
that insurers have sufficient assets to make good on the promises they are making but also 
that insurers treat their policyholders and claimants fairly (NAIC, 2011). As a result of this, 
regulators are concerned with the liquidity, solvency and conduct of insurance firms and are 
inevitably bound to regulate their respective activities.  
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From the above, two generic types of regulation can be identified. These include: i) 
prudential regulation and ii) market conduct regulation which as mentioned above, comprise 
the Twin Peaks model of regulation as recently adopted in the UK and worldwide alike. 
Notwithstanding this, the Twin Peaks regulatory system, as it is known today, is not a new 
idea as some authors have described it. Although market conduct regulation is a relatively 
new phenomenon, prudential regulation has a long history after having evolved since the 
1870s. Accordingly, although the constitution of the Twin Peaks system may be new, the two 
regulatory frameworks or peaks are not. 
The Twin Peaks system is a form of regulation by objective and one in which there is a 
separation of regulatory functions between two regulators: one that performs the safety and 
soundness supervisory function (a prudential regulator) and the other that focuses on conduct-
of-business regulation (a market conduct regulator) (G30 Report, 2008: 185). Although 
prudential regulation and market conduct regulation are regulated separately, they are in fact 
two related and overlapping regulatory categories since consumer protection objectives 
underpin both pillars.  An overview of prudential regulation and a comprehensive discussion 
of market conduct regulation are provided below. 
4.1 Prudential Regulation 
Recently, prudential regulation has sparked renewed interest following a number of events. In 
particular, recent experience has revealed that financial crises can have a debilitating effect 
on national economies and this realisation has “reinforced interest in improving financial 
sector regulation and supervision” (Brownbridge, Kirkpatrick & Maimbo, 2002:1). Following 
the global financial crisis, it became clear that there was a serious malfunction in the global 
financial regulatory architecture which prompted a number of national regulators to reflect on 
their own regulatory bodies and their functioning (Davies & Green, 2008; Goodhart, 2011; 
Black, 2012). Furthermore, following the global financial crisis, the parameters of prudential 
regulation have been redefined with a greater focus on financial stability and macro-
prudential regulation (Tarullo, 2014). As such, Solvency II and the various Basel agreements 
seem to be buzz words when it comes to prudential regulation today. 
It has been cited that “a stable financial system provides a favorable environment for 
economic growth” (Davies & Green, 2008:20). However, when such markets are left 
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unregulated, they may experience bouts of instability and contagion (Davies & Green, 2008; 
Goodhart et al., 2013). The latter is supported by the fact that financial meltdowns have 
tended to escalate in more liberalised markets (Davies & Green, 2008). As such, if regulation 
can reduce the likelihood of systematic failures, without unreasonably constraining the 
market, then there is a strong case for such regulation which aims to promote a stable 
financial system (Davies & Green, 2008; Botha & Makina, 2011). 
The objective of prudential regulation is thus to promote the liquidity, solvency, safety and 
soundness of the general financial system in addition to delivering an appropriate degree of 
protection to policyholders (Llewellyn, 1999; Adams, 2013). In other words, with specific 
reference to the insurance market, the aim of prudential regulation is to prevent insurers from 
incurring excessive financial risk that may result in insolvency (Skipper & Klein, 2000). This 
is done by ensuring that insurance firms have sufficient assets to cover their liabilities and 
that a firm’s risks are adequately and appropriately managed (Ford, 2011:252).  
Prudential regulation further aims to ensure that prevention measures and intervention 
mechanisms are in place to keep insolvency costs at a minimum when an insurance firm 
experiences financial difficulty and in doing so safeguards policyholder protection (Skipper 
& Klein, 2000). The latter is undertaken by ensuring that insurance companies are capable of 
meeting their obligations to customers in terms of legitimate claims payments in addition to 
ensuring that firms are soundly organized and hence capable of paying said claims (KPMG, 
2013; Adams, 2013). This is accomplished through the imposition of minimum financial 
standards and risk based capital requirements in addition to the effective monitoring of a 
firm’s internal controls and overall financial condition (Skipper & Klein, 2000; Daykin & 
Cresswell, 2001).   
In summary and according to KPMG (2013:7), the objective of prudential regulation is to: 
• Create and monitor an effective regulatory environment  
• Ensure that financial institutions are licenced and registered 
• Promote financial stability and combat financial crises 
• Supervise financial institutions  
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• Prescribe good practice standards and monitor and enforce compliance thereto 
• Identify, evaluate, control and mitigate excessive risks and deregister those high risk 
firms to minimise losses 
• Implement policies, systems and procedures to mitigate excessive risk taking 
• Monitor reserve fund allocations to ensure that firms retain adequate reserves 
• Implement early warning systems to identify excessive systematic risks 
Within the insurance context, the argument for prudential regulation is founded on the fact 
that the failure of an insurance company can create a whole host of potential externalities that 
are not easily internalised (Davies & Green, 2008). In other words, the failure of a large 
insurance company that offers a retirement annuity can have widespread ramifications and 
may leave the elderly in a vulnerable position. In addition to this, the basis upon which 
prudential regulation is necessitated is that consumers often lack the mental models required 
to judge the safety and soundness of a financial institution. This means that consumers are at 
a comparative disadvantage to expert professionals in the insurance market who are presumed 
to have greater knowledge of insurance products and terminology (Goodhart, 2011). The 
problem of ‘imperfect consumer information’ is further aggravated by the lack of relevant 
information, the inability to assess the information that is available and the high transactions 
costs involved in doing so which makes it difficult in practice for consumers to judge the 
financial condition of the respective institution (Llewellyn, 1999:18). In addition to this, 
where consumers may in fact be able to make informed decisions, fraudulent financial 
reporting may nonetheless warrant the need for a financial watchdog to prevent subsequent 
exploitation of policyholders and customers alike (Llewellyn, 1999). 
4.2 Market conduct regulation 
Although no definition exists in legislation, the terms ‘conduct of business regulation’, 
‘market conduct regulation’ and occasionally ‘retail regulation’ which are used in various 
jurisdictions, refer to the way in which firms and their intermediaries should interact with 
their customers in terms of product distribution and sales, advertising, advice and claims 
handling (Chatterjee, 2011; Ford, 2011; The World Bank, 2013).  
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The objective of such regulation is to prevent abusive market practices, including the making 
of false sales illustrations and advertising, the failure to pay legitimate claims on a timely 
basis and the unfair taking advantage of consumers (Klein, 1995: 374). As such, regulators 
view market conduct as being critical to ensuring the welfare of consumers and maintaining 
public confidence in the insurance industry (NAIC, 2014b). Market conduct regulation 
therefore endeavours to establish internal controls, codes of conduct, rules and guidelines 
about appropriate behaviours and business practices when dealing with customers (Goodhart 
et al., 2013). As such, market conduct regulation is generally restricted to the relationship 
between a firm and its client and is therefore subject to both the rules derived from insurance 
contract law and the rules pertaining to market conduct (Smethurst et al., 2011). Modal 
regulatory strategies include mandatory information and commission disclosures, anti-fraud 
measures, the duties of care, skill, diligence, fair dealing and best execution and the honesty, 
integrity and the level of competence of firms and their employees (Llewellyn, 1999; Tuch, 
2014). 
In addition to this, market conduct regulation is aimed at mitigating principal-agent conflicts 
of interest thereby raising the quality of information provided and ensuring that customers 
receive ‘best advice’ and the most suitable product (Pacces, 2000; Smethurt et al., 2011). In 
fact, Pacces (2000:482) notes that without such protection, quality uncertainty would 
inevitably characterise the market and accordingly consumers would lack the confidence 
needed to enter into financial transactions. The objective of market conduct regulation is 
therefore to improve insurer, intermediary and consumer relationships and in doing so, 
strengthen consumer confidence and protection, facilitate cross border business, encourage 
competition and protect the integrity of the market (International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors, 1999 as cited in Smethurst et al., 2011). As such, the development of “equitable, 
sustainable and transparent insurance markets is an important goal of customer protection 
laws and regulations” (Chatterjee, 2011: 508). 
Furthermore, consumers often lack a comprehensive knowledge of insurance products and 
jargon in order to appreciate the nature of such a transaction. In fact, the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (2009 as cited in Smethurst et al., 2011) noted that: 
Consumers may not be able to detect contracts which could be biased in 
favour of insurers, which may be unreasonably interpreted to favour the 
insurer or which simply fail to meet their needs. Marketing methods could 
34 
 
place potential policyholders under pressure. There could be other anti-
consumer practices that support the need for sound market conduct principles. 
In other words, since consumers are imperfectly informed, this may give rise to the potential 
for insurer misrepresentations and manipulation (Chatterjee, 2011: 508). As a result of this, 
market conduct regulation is also justified on the basis of asymmetric information and 
accordingly seeks to rectify any unfairness and imbalances which may arise from a greater 
knowledge of insurance products by both insurers and intermediaries (Pacces, 2000; Mishkin, 
2004; Smethurst et al., 2011). Governments therefore address these issues through regulation 
that, among other things, requires insurers to disclose certain information to the public (Botha 
& Makina, 2011:29). 
Consumer protection as part of the broader market conduct regulatory approach has only 
recently emerged as a distinct regulatory category separate from prudential regulation6 and 
further encompasses i) the regulation of policy forms and premium rates to ensure consumers 
are charged fair and reasonable insurance prices, ii) the provision of consumer education, iii) 
the administration and monitoring of market conduct examinations, iv) the investigation of 
specific concerns or consumer complaints and v) the review and resolution of consumer 
disputes7 which collectively attempt to ensure that consumers have access to beneficial and 
compliant insurance products, and are protected against insurers that fail to operate in ways 
that are legal and fair to consumers (Kochenburger & Salve, 2011; NAIC, 2011: 3). In this 
regard, “the object of market conduct regulation is to ensure that an insurance company 
discharges its obligations to its [policyholders] in terms of the contract between the company 
and the insured for all valid claims reported to the company” (Vivian, 2014: 2). Accordingly, 
regulators police insurers' and agents' sales and underwriting activities to ensure that they 
adhere to certain standards and that claims are handled fairly (Klein, 1995: 374). 
The content of market conduct rules, in any jurisdiction, is driven by national policy 
directives mostly with due regard to the protection of customers and the maintenance of 
appropriate standards of conduct (Smethurst et al., 2011:359). Nonetheless, market conduct 
regulation has increasingly taken on a wider meaning and no longer only encompasses long 
established consumer protection measures and compliance with traditional conduct rules 
                                                 
6 In fact, market conduct regulation is said to have been evolving since the late 1980s (Vivian, 2015a). 
7 The regulatory oversight and monitoring of market practices involving sales, advertising, underwriting and 
claims is an important aspect of any modern regulatory structure. 
35 
 
(Norton Rose Fulbright, 2014). Nowadays, ‘fit and proper’ requirements, corporate 
governance, systems and controls, board competence and oversight, minimum ethical 
standards and product governance are all characteristic of market conduct regulation (Norton 
Rose Fulbright, 2014). At the very least however, market conduct regulation generally 
requires that firms conduct their business with integrity, due care, skill and diligence, observe 
proper standards of market conduct, pay due regard to the interests of customers, 
communicate information in a clear, fair and non-misleading manner and most importantly, 
treat customers fairly8 (Davies, 2001:282).  Notwithstanding this, the term ‘market conduct 
regulation’ has a fluid meaning which means that a number of new issues and regulated 
activities often fall under the banner of conduct regulation (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2014).  
4.3 Market Conduct and the Lockean Model 
Traditionally there has been no need for market conduct regulation since the relationship 
between a service provider and a consumer has always been regulated by virtue of the law of 
contract. Furthermore, the courts have historically played the role of enforcing such contracts 
in order to ensure that each party fulfils their respective obligations. Regulators therefore 
need to be cautioned against applying market conduct regulation too rigidly and should 
further acknowledge the role of the law of contract in the market. In fact, Vivian (2015c) 
argues that there can be no substitute for governing the relationship between a client and the 
service provider other than the law of contract.  
Since it has been argued that the relationship between two contracting parties should only be 
regulated by virtue of the law of contract, it therefore becomes necessary to explore what is 
meant by this idea. For purposes of this thesis, the South African Common Law will be 
explored. Since the South African common law is Roman-Dutch in origin, this ought to be 
the point of departure. The common law however is far more Roman than Dutch (Vivian, 
2006b: 42). One may argue that this is owing to the fact that historically judges had difficulty 
                                                 
8 This is now widely known as the TCF principle. Such a principle seems to have existed for more than a century 
in what was called the “Advice to Bankers of 1863”. The latter, a letter addressed to all national banks from 
Hugh McCulloch (then Controller of the Currency and later Secretary of the Treasury), asserts that banks should 
“treat [their] customers liberally, bearing in mind the fact that a bank prospers as its customers prosper”.  As 
such, the principle of ‘treating customers fairly’ is not a new phenomenon but has merely attracted greater 
attention in recent times. 
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applying Dutch law, largely because of the unavailability of sources and the language 
barriers. As a result of this, an examination of Dutch law therefore becomes trite. An 
understanding of the historic Roman law position thus becomes more relevant. 
Historically, Roman law did not have a general doctrine of contract but rather recognised a 
number of specific types of contracts and was therefore referred to as the law of contracts 
(Buckland & McNair, 1965). These contracts were either nominate (or named) contracts or 
innominate (or unnamed) contracts (Van Niekerk, 1999). In particular, four nominate 
contracts existed. Each of these contracts had their own causa or “formal positive act” that 
ought to have been performed in order for a valid contract to come into existence (Lorenzen, 
1919). In addition to this, a number of innominate contracts existed which could not be 
classified by a particular name.  
Historically, the status of each party to the contract determined each of their respective rights 
and obligations (Vivian, 2006b). More specifically, although not widely understood by many 
academic writers9, the rights and obligations that underpinned each contract were determined 
by the nature of the relationship between the two contracting parties and not by what they 
specifically agreed to.10 Conversely, the type of contract determined each party’s status and 
their status in turn determined the party’s obligations.  Contract names thus reflected the type 
of relationship that existed between the two parties. Examples of this include the tenant-
landlord contract (akin to the modern day lease agreement), the master-servant contract 
(similar to the modern employment contract) and the purchaser-seller contract (which today 
is known as a sale agreement).  
The person’s status in terms of the contract would thus determine their rights and duties. 
More specifically, if an individual was a tenant, by virtue of this status, the law of Landlord 
                                                 
9 It can be argued that Graveson (1941), like many, interpreted status as the class of persons to which the 
contracting party belonged. 
10 This approach challenges the well noted interpretation, which as noted above, argues that status rather 
reflected the class of persons to which you belonged. In terms of this approach, depending to which class-based 
social structure the individual belonged, their rights and obligations were derived therefrom. The question then 
arises as to whether or not a person belonging to a class of pecus would have received less protection under the 
law of contracts. This does not appear to be the case and accordingly, the interpretation provided by this author 
appears to be more conceivable. Furthermore, since the contract name reflected the relationship between the two 
contracting parties, this further serves to strengthen the latter interpretation.   
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and Tenant would regulate the relationship. If the individual had been engaging in a sale, by 
virtue of said status, the law of Purchase and Sale would spell out each respective party’s 
rights and obligations.  The respective law (and not the actual contractual wordings) would 
therefore define each party’s rights and obligations. The rights and obligations which 
reinforced each contract type largely became understood by the community at large and 
hence over time, parties knew their rights and obligations without independently reaching 
consensus on the naturale of the contract. 
Over time however, there was a growing recognition that a general doctrine of contract 
should exist so as to allow contracting parties to consent to specific contractual terms and 
thereby voluntarily expand or limit the scope of their own liability. This was largely owing to 
the number of problems which were inherent in the system of status and by virtue of this, a 
system of specific contracts. Recall that the insurance contract was unknown in Roman law 
and accordingly matters concerning insurance would need to be “forced” (by analogy) into 
one of the existing and specific contracts in order to find a workable solution (Vivian, 2006). 
It became increasingly difficult to do so through the law of analogy as specific problems and 
specific cases often could not be “forced” into one of the specific contracts and related laws 
(Vivian, 2006b). The system therefore became unworkable and fell into disuse more than 200 
years ago. 
As a result of this, a transition took place from the law of contracts to the law of contract in 
terms of which the basis of contract is consent (Vivian, 2006b; Coote, 2016). This movement 
is reflected in Sir Henry Summer Maine’s (1861) famous, albeit misinterpreted, statement 
where he pointed out that society has evolved and through this evolution there has been a 
movement “from status to contract”.  Rights and duties are therefore no longer defined by law 
as a consequence of one’s status, but rather depend on the will of the parties who effect them 
(Graveson, 1941: 261). 
In terms of this modern law approach, today all contracts are therefore consensual contracts 
(Coote, 2016). That is, the parties to the contract ought to reach consensus (agreement) on the 
specific points, objects or essential elements of the contract (Van Niekerk, 1999). This is 
often referred to as the essentialia which in turn, determines the classification of the specific 
contract (Sharrock, 2011). It therefore follows that without consensus, a valid and 
enforceable contract cannot arise. Consensus also implies a degree of freedom in terms of 
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which parties can freely and voluntarily reach agreement as to the particulars of the contract. 
The latter forms the starting point of the works of a number of jurists, philosophers and 
natural law advocates.  
In particular and as discussed above, individuals have, amongst other natural rights, the right 
to liberty. As a result of this, individuals can act with absolute freedom as long as they do not 
infringe upon the natural rights of others. It therefore follows that individuals can assume 
obligations freely and voluntarily through the law of contract (provided that doing so does not 
violate the life, liberty or property of others). Locke (1689/2005) emphasised these natural 
law ideas in order to promote the concept of freedom of contract. The freedom of contract 
ideals were viewed by Locke as “a fundamental human freedom, in which man [is] free to 
regulate his own conduct” and which is “free from any interference” (Lerm, 2008: 367). This 
philosophy was further reinforced by Hobbes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centaury. 
Hobbes (1588–1679) noted that  
The right of nature, which writers commonly call the jus naturale, is the 
liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the 
preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of doing anything, which in his 
own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means 
thereunto. 
According to Atiyah (1985 as cited in Lerm, 2008: 367) the natural law ideas of both Locke 
and Hobbes, as expressed above, can be summarised as follows:  
i. Human beings are free from control by others; what men do, they do freely 
ii. Relationships with other human beings are voluntarily entered into out of motives of 
self-interest 
iii. The individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities; he can 
alienate his own labour by a contract which is perceived as a disposal of something 
belonging to the individual in much the same way as alienation of his land or his 
goods 
iv. Human society consists of a series of market relations 
It therefore follows that when the state imposes certain regulations on the market, it is 
infringing upon the liberty of others; it is not taking the law of contract into consideration. It 
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was thus the writings of Locke and Hobbes which popularised the concept of freedom to 
contract and which highlighted the importance of the law of contract. Thereafter, during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, Adam Smith advocated the laissez-faire economy in terms 
of which he supported “a free political economy, free of state interference and the 
enhancement of freedom of contract” 11  (Lerm, 2008: 377). He did so by emphasising the 
freedom of an individual and in doing so, stressed the value of the doctrine of freedom of 
contract.  
The freedom of contract doctrine, as it is known today, therefore entails that individuals be 
able to decide with whom they wish to contract, negotiate freely the terms of their agreement, 
and of particular significance is the notion that full legal effect should be given to such 
agreements with little scope for judicial interference (Chrenkoff, 1996; van der Sijde, 
2012:10). Accordingly, individuals have “exclusive control over their private domain of 
autonomy in which the role of the state is limited and in which legal relationships are defined 
by free consent on the assumption that consent is a manifestation of individual autonomy” 
(Stoop, 2015:191-192). Individuals can contract freely provided that the requirements for a 
valid contract are upheld. A consequence of the freedom to contract is therefore to maintain 
the sanctity of the contract in terms of which contracts should be upheld and the terms should 
not be altered by the courts.  
The courts have thus traditionally enforced contracts as expressed in the rule pacta sunt 
servanda in terms of which the agreements and stipulations of the contracting parties must be 
observed. The latter was recognised by the judgement made in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank 
ZASCA 2010 075. Although a banking case, the court’s interpretation of contract law is 
nonetheless important. It was held that the terms of the contract ought to be upheld provided 
that these terms do not undermine any Constitutional norm or public policy. In doing so, the 
court held that an assessment of the reasonableness and fairness of the contract terms is 
trite.12  
Sir George Jessel MR recognised this notion and remarked over a century ago that 
                                                 
11 The doctrine of freedom of contract is also rooted in Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations.  
12 The views held in this case are in stark contrast to those expressed in in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 ZACC 5. 
In terms of this case, the judge held that a policy should be adjudicated with fairness and reasonableness in 
mind. This judgment has not been beyond criticism. 
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It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which 
say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there 
is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of 
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily 
shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you 
have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to 
interfere with this freedom of contract.13 
The ethos of the law of contract, the doctrine of freedom of contract and the due process of 
the law nonetheless seems to be overlooked specifically following the advent of market 
conduct rules and regulations, the promotion of consumerism and the introduction of 
standardised contracts and policy wordings (Lerm, 2008). In particular, legislation that 
implements fairness, welfarism and consumer protection has increasingly impacted on the 
traditional basis of contract law (Stoop, 2015: 193). Furthermore, consumer protection 
legislation has led to more equitable considerations in terms of which greater weight is now 
attached to considerations of fairness and justice (van der Sijde, 2012). This has resulted in a 
number of adverse effects since an individual’s autonomy, personal liberty and freedom to 
contract have been impeded.  The array of new market conduct regulations and the birth of 
new quasi-judicial institutions have also largely replaced the rule of law and law based 
decisions respectively (Vivian, 2012). In many instances, these regulations and decisions are 
incompatible with existing law which means that the historical system of the law and the 
courts is being rejected (Vivian, 2012). As such, it can be argued that the plethora of 
consumer protection laws and regulations may undermine the rule of law and an individual’s 
freedom since the rule of law makes freedom more probable14 (Hayek, 1960 as cited in 
Louw, 2015; Vivian, 2015d).  
Consumer protection legislation and regulation (that is usually in favour of the policyholder) 
has also meant that commercial and contractual certainty has been hindered (Stoop, 2015). 
That is, firms and companies are no longer certain of the obligations to be fulfilled since 
market conduct regulations may move the proverbial goal posts. A firm and in particular, an 
insurance company, can only survive if it knows the potential liabilities that it may face in the 
                                                 
13 This view was further reinforced by the Appellate Division in Wells v SA Alumenite Co 1927 AD 69. 
14 The rule of law is particularly important since according to section one of the Bills Of Rights, South Africa 
shall be founded on, amongst other things, “supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law”. Furthermore, 
article 39 of the Magna Carta re-affirmed the Rule of Law in terms of which only judgements by an independent 
court in terms of the law of the land and the common law are permitted (Vivian, 2015g). 
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future by holding certain reserves. It cannot do so when its obligations are reinterpreted 
beyond the scope of the contract. The application of market conduct regulation and 
accordingly, the non-application of contract law, can itself result in the demise of a financial 
institution (Vivian, 2015c). Accordingly, market conduct regulation has been criticised for its 
destructive nature. The near collapse of the Lloyd’s market in the 1990s illustrates this point. 
The latter is discussed in section 5.1.1.2 below. Within the South African context, the 
downfall of the Auction Alliance, although not an insurance matter, is illustrative of this 
point. 
In December 2011, Auction Alliance conducted the auction of Quoin Rock Winery on behalf 
of the liquidators of Dave King’s estate who at the time was embroiled in a dispute with the 
South African Revenue Service. The highest bidder at the auction was Wendy Appelbaum 
who later disputed the auction process on the grounds that Auction Alliance (and the then 
CEO Rael Levitt) used a vendor bidder15 to bid against her and in doing so, artificially drove 
up the price of the wine estate. Appelbaum thereafter lodged a complaint with the National 
Consumer Commission (NCC) after alleging that the auction did not comply with the 
Consumer Protection Act of 2000. After its investigation, the commission imposed a R32 
million fine on Auction Alliance. It is important to note however that the NCC at no point 
had either the power or the authority to make judgments or impose fines. It is merely an 
investigative body. Furthermore, the NCC seemingly ignored the crux of the problem; that 
which is formally known as vendor bidding. In terms of the common law, vendor bidding has 
always been lawful (Vivian, 2015d). Furthermore, according to Section 45 of the Consumer 
Protection Act of 2000, vendor bidding is legal as long as the bidder is notified beforehand. 
More specifically, Section 45(5) of the Act states that  
unless notice is given that a sale by auction is subject to a right to bid by, or on 
behalf of, the owner or auctioneer: (a) the owner or auctioneer must not bid or 
employ any person to bid at the sale; (b) the auctioneer must not knowingly 
accept any bid from any such person, and; (c) the consumer may approach a 
court to declare the transaction fraudulent if this undertaking has been 
violated.  
Despite the fact that Auction Alliance maintained that it had made such a disclosure and 
accordingly complied with the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, the Commissioner 
of the NCC, Mohlala Mulaudzi, maintained her position and imposed a fine equivalent to 
                                                 
15 Also known as “ghost bidding” 
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10% of Auction Alliance’s annual turnover. In addition to this, the commission approached 
the Estate Agency Affairs Board to withdraw Auction Alliance’s fidelity fund certificate. The 
net result was the destruction of Auction Alliance when a perfectly valid contract had existed. 
The rule of law had been singlehandedly obliterated. 
On the other hand, the rule of law was correctly applied in the recent case of Ichikowitz v 
High Street Auction Company ZASCA 2015 54 which exhibits a number of similar features 
to the Auction Alliance case. In November 2011, Ivor Ichikowitz had similarly accused the 
High Street Auction Company of faking bids to inflate the price of a property he was buying. 
However in this case, the matter was correctly taken to the High Court (and eventually the 
Supreme Court of Appeal) and not to the consumer protection watchdog. In fact, it was the 
first time that the courts were tasked with dealing with the idea of vendor bidding.  The court 
approached the matter via the law of contract and in doing so applied centuries-old common 
law, thereby resolving the matter efficiently and equitably. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
stated that the High Street Auction Company had not transgressed since it was clear on the 
sale advertisements and the registration form that the High Street Auction Company would be 
acting for the sellers and making bids on their behalf.   
The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that Ichikowitz had not been induced to enter into the 
contract through a material misrepresentation and had “only himself to blame for ignorance 
of the possibility of vendor bidding by the auctioneer" (SA Commercial Prop News, 2015). 
This notion is embedded in Babington’s (1826) “Treatise on the Law of Auctions” in terms of 
which it was noted that:  
But there is no doubt that the owner may appoint one person to 
bid for him, for the purpose of guarding against a sale of his 
property taking place at less than its value, and that a purchaser 
at such sale, will be bound to complete his purchase, whether 
notice of the appointment of such bidder was given or not. This 
is a rule founded in reason and equity, for by it the seller is 
enabled to protect himself against the tricks, which might 
otherwise be practised upon him by bidders. 
In addition to this, the court observed that since Ichikowitz took a deliberate decision to raise 
his bid in order to meet the reduced reserve price of R20 million, any prior misrepresentation 
did not induce the agreement of sale. Furthermore, since there was an offer which was 
accepted, in terms of the law of contract stretching back to the Roman era, a valid contract 
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had thus came into existence. The Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the 
High Court that a binding contract was concluded at the auction.   
Resolving the matter via the age-old laws and the courts (through the Lockean framework) 
resulted in a “non-event” for the High Street Action Company (Vivian, 2015d). Resolution 
was via a court of law following the due process of law by learned judges in the law as 
envisaged by John Locke. The courts took all the same statutory provisions into consideration 
as the commissioner did but these were only relevant to the extent that they impacted on the 
contractual arrangement. Resolving the matter in terms of a regulatory body that had no 
regard for the legal and procedural frameworks in which to operate, conversely had amounted 
to the destruction of the Auction Alliance. Modern rules and regulations which attempt to 
treat customers fairly, simply undermined and confused the clear common law of auctions. It 
is therefore imperative that the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary 
is restored and that the application of the rule of law is reclaimed (Vivian, 2015d).   
In summary, the two cases discussed above therefore highlight two pertinent issues as 
emphasised by Vivian (2015d): 
i) If the law of contract is undermined, virtually all commercial transactions become 
uncertain and thus the importance of upholding the law of contract cannot be 
overemphasised. 
ii) Market-conduct regulators, such as the NCC, can destroy businesses as well as the 
rule of law.  
The law of contract is increasingly becoming irrelevant and therefore they have pointed to the 
‘death of contract’ (Vivian, 2012). It is for this reason that it has been argued that there is a 
move back to the impractical and problematic doctrine of status. In particular, where judicial 
interpretations (although this was not the case in the above mentioned matter), legislation, 
rules and regulations begin to impose obligations beyond the bounds of the contract, one can 
argue that the law is reverting back to a system as defined by status. In other words, where 
contracting parties are no longer consenting to the essentialia of the contract but are forced to 
transact by virtue of the nature of their relationship, they are doing so under a system of 
status. It would then appear that legislatures and regulators are forgetting why society 
developed “from status to contract” and policymakers may therefore be reverting back to a 
system of specific contracts which as pointed out above is unworkable (Vivian, 2006b). This 
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concept has been understood by few but appears to be the case particularly in the broker 
market. Three cases can be used to illustrate this.  
In Stander v Raubenheimer 1996 2 SA 670, an insured sued a broker alleging that the broker 
should have inquired and thus disclosed the fact that the insured house had a thatched roof. 
Prior to this, the insured had requested his broker to inform his insurer of his change of 
address since he had recently built a new house. The broker did so and the household 
contents insurance cover was renewed. Subsequent to this, the house and its contents were 
destroyed by fire after which time the insurance company (SA Eagle) repudiated the claim on 
the basis of a material non-disclosure, although the insurer did make an ex-gratia payment of 
R30 000. Notwithstanding this, the insured sued the broker for the difference, alleging that 
the broker should have asked if the house had a thatched roof, after which time he ought to 
have disclosed the fact to the insurer. The broker had not. The court of first hearing ruled in 
favour of the broker, however, on appeal, the broker was held liable. The question therefore 
arose as to how the duty of disclosure that has been imposed on the insured party for 
centuries had passed on to the broker. In arriving at their ruling, the courts relied on the 
testimony of an expert witness who pointed out that “brokers always check these things” 
(Vivian 2006b: 42). Despite the fact that the broker did not agree in contract nor consent to 
such an undertaking, he was held liable simply because of his status (Vivian 2006b: 42). His 
status as a broker and not his contractual undertaking, had therefore determined his rights and 
duties.  
In Lenaerts v JSN Motors (Pty) Ltd and another 2001 4 SA 1100 W, the insured sued the 
broker alleging that the broker should have notified him of the territorial limitation clause, on 
the basis of which the insurance company repudiated the insured’s claim. The courts, with the 
aid of an industry expert once again, adopted the view that brokers are required to advise 
their clients about contractual terms and accordingly, by consequence, the territorial 
exclusion ought to have been highlighted. Despite this, no evidence existed which suggested 
that the broker had agreed do so in terms of a contract. The broker was held liable because 
that was what was expected of a broker. The broker’s status had dictated his obligations 
(Vivian 2006b: 42). 
The most recent case involving broker liability, considered the application of average for 
underinsurance and a broker’s duties. In terms of this matter that went before the FAIS 
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ombud, an insured complained that he was underinsured and was therefore subject to the 
average clause, that which his broker had not discussed with him. Shockingly, the FAIS 
Ombud noted that the broker should be liable since he had failed to explain to his client that 
in the event that he had underinsured that he would be deemed his own insurer for the 
uninsured balance. The broker subsequently accepted liability and made a settlement. The 
broker was therefore liable to pay a large portion of the insured’s uninsured portion of the 
loss although no obligation existed which compelled him to do so. That is, in terms of the 
modern day law of contract, the broker would only be held liable if i) he had agreed to such 
an undertaking and agreed that such an obligation was material and ii) breach of the material 
term should therefore attract liability. No such contractual agreement existed between the 
broker and the insured and thus the broker did not breach any obligation to which he ought to 
be held liable. The broker’s liability therefore did not stem from any contractual breach but 
rather from what the FAIS ombud had expected of him, by virtue of his status alone (Vivian, 
2012). The contract therefore became irrelevant. 
The three cases noted above16 all serve to illustrate the transition from contract back to status. 
That is, in all three cases, the basis of liability was founded upon the broker’s position (status) 
as a broker and not on any contractual agreement. It is at this point, that the great Roman 
jurist, Gaius, is worth mentioning. One of the great truths is encapsulated in his statement 
where he states: “Let us now proceed to obligations. These are divided into two main species: 
for every obligation arises either from contract or from delict”. Accordingly, obligations can 
only arise from contract or delict and not from another source. Since the law of delict did not 
apply in any of the three cases discussed above, the only other basis on which the broker 
ought to have been held liable is contract. This was not so.  
Therefore, as the contract becomes less important, as it dies, the system moves ever closer to 
a system of status which as mentioned above was deemed to be unworkable almost 200 years 
ago. Furthermore, as this approach is restored, a broker faces ever increasing liabilities of 
which he is unaware, and which certainly do not comply with Gaius’s great statement 
(Vivian, 2006b). This in turn will have all sorts of implications on the broker market since all 
transactions become uncertain. As such, both the judicial system and regulators who are 
impinging on the correct application of the law of contract, be it through similar judgements, 
                                                 
16 Similarly, the UK case of McNealy v West Lanc Insurance Brokers Ltd 1978 2 Lloyd’s LLR 18 CA has also 
seen the courts holding brokers liable without any evidence of a contractual breach. 
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or the imposition of market conduct regulations (which may expand obligations beyond 
contract), appear to have not learnt from history. For this reason, history will indeed repeat 
itself. 
Since the law of contract and the freedom to contract underpin and make possible the many 
private and voluntary agreements by which the exchange of goods and services are 
accomplished, without contract law such voluntary agreements would become impractical 
and unworkable (Markham, 2002). It therefore follows that since such agreements support 
both society and the economy, and since they depend upon contract law, “contract law lies at 
the heart of our system of laws and serves as the foundation of our entire society” (Markham, 
2002: para 4). As a result of this, the application of the law of contract is paramount and 
should never be undermined by consumer protection rules and regulations that reinforce the 
market conduct regulation ideals.17 
4.4 Conclusion 
Historically regulation has focused on consumer protection, encompassing both financial 
supervision and market conduct regulation. Accordingly, regulation has endeavoured to 
ensure that insurers i) have sufficient assets to meet future obligations and ii) treat their 
policyholders and claimants fairly. The latter is known as market conduct regulation whilst 
the former is referred to as prudential regulation.  
Following the global financial crisis, greater attention has been directed toward the separation 
of prudential regulation and market conduct regulation in order to enhance consumer 
protection by separately focusing on customer treatment objectives and financial stability 
                                                 
17 Notwithstanding this, the law of contract and the doctrine of freedom of contract have themselves attracted 
criticism. In particular, the doctrine assumes that contracting parties have the necessary knowledge and 
information to his or her avail and are able to protect their own interests. In many instances, as has been 
discussed in earlier chapters, consumers lack the technical knowledge, mental models, legal understanding and 
resources that are required to make discerning decisions and to appreciate an insurance transaction. As a result 
of this, a lack of informed consent may arise. In addition to this, the traditional contractual ideologies and 
freedom-orientated approach have been criticised further since it is purportedly non-contextual and may not 
necessarily take social realities into account (Edwards, 2009; Stoop, 2015). Regulation is accordingly applied to 
address the various shortcomings inherent in the freedom of contract approach (Stoop, 2015). 
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goals. An endeavour has been made to achieve both the latter and the former through the 
creation of two separate regulatory agencies who are responsible for regulating a single 
policy directive by virtue of the Twin Peaks regulatory model. In particular, one regulator is 
concerned with ensuring the financial viability of the market whilst the other is concerned 
with regulating the market conduct or conduct of business of the market. The various policy 
objectives and mandates of each regulator have been outlined above. 
Although it has been emphasised that only the law of contract can govern the relationship 
between a consumer and the service provider, market conduct regulation continues to evolve 
and today is the ‘buzz word’ in financial regulation. The impact of this is that market conduct 
regulation is increasingly ignoring the role of contract law in the market and in doing so can 
become devastatingly destructive. In particular, the destructive nature of market conduct 
regulation can be seen particularly where it expands the obligations of a financial institution 
beyond that which was voluntarily assumed in a contract. The potential for such ruin is 
becoming increasingly more apparent as the application of market conduct regulation 
expands. 
In addition to ensuring the strict application of the rule of law and the law of contract, 
regulators should be cognisant of the potential adverse outcomes when a regulatory system is 
too complex. As noted above, an intricate regulatory system can be very destructive and the 
cost of this is ultimately borne by the consumer. Regulators should therefore be cautioned 
against implementing a regulatory system that stifles innovation, elevates product pricing and 
marginalises the lower end of the market from accessing financial products. Regulation is 
therefore a tricky balancing act which requires a careful equilibrium between adequate 
consumer protection and complex regulatory rules and provisions. Notwithstanding this, and 
worth emphasising again, no system should ever substitute the long standing rule of law and 
specifically the ever important law of contract. 
Now that regulation and its various facets have been explored, the following section 
examines the history of insurance regulation in the UK and in doing so, maps out the role of 
government in terms of their involvement in the regulation of the industry. 
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PART II: UNITED KINGDOM 
5 UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK is the oldest insurance market and historically is the most influential, especially in 
South Africa. Accordingly, it is useful to start with a discussion of the insurance market and 
its regulation in the UK since these developments had a strong bearing on the development of 
the insurance market and related regulation in South Africa. It is for this reason that an in-
depth discussion is provided on this particular market. This development lends itself to a 
series of different periods as discussed below. This chapter therefore traces the history of 
insurance regulation in the UK with a specific focus on market conduct. As such, market 
conduct issues for each period which are under review are discussed.  This chapter examines 
the key regulatory developments that have taken place in the UK insurance market and 
explores the various market events, scandals and failures which are said to have been the 
impetus for regulatory reform. These have also been set out in a series of articles published 
for the insurance industry. See Vivian, MacGregor, van Vuuren (2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 
2015d; 2015e; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c) . 
In recent years, the UK has enacted a large quantity of legislation including subordinate 
legislation and rules.18 Historically, changes to regulation were generally driven by country-
specific factors (Ferran, 2003:259). The latter theory applies to the UK where some of the 
impetus for change came from “local financial scandals and collapses that were attributed, in 
part, to failings in the old system” (Ferran, 2003: 259). Some of these developments are set 
out below, however a broader, umbrella approach is taken and as such, this section aims to 
cover the main insurance regulatory developments in the UK. The following sections 
examine the various incidents that may have given rise to regulation and specifically, market 
conduct regulation. It is necessary to discuss the regulation of insurance as far back as 1601 
in order to provide a complete and coherent account of insurance regulation. However it 
becomes clear that market conduct regulation, as it is currently understood, has a more recent 
origin, starting in the UK in the 2000s. 
 
                                                 
18 Up until the passing of the Financial Services Act of 1986 the UK market was essentially self-regulated. 
Notwithstanding this, the 1986 Act was itself also designed with self-regulation in mind. 
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5.1 British Insurance Market 
5.1.1  Regulation of the insurance market up to 1720 
5.1.1.1 Elizabethan era (1558-1603) 
No substantive investigation has been undertaken into the history of insurance in England, 
prior to 1601 which includes the Elizabethan Chamber of Assurances (Ibbetson, 2008:291). A 
review of literature on the subject, or the lack thereof, bears testament to this. Investigations 
into the early history of insurance in England were conducted during the period of war during 
which much useful material had been removed from London (Raynes, 1948). In addition to 
this, the early records of the Office of Assurances, the earliest period of the English insurance 
market, were destroyed by the Great Fire of London in 1666 (Walford, 1885). For this reason, 
the historical work on the history of the Office has not done it justice. Thus, the chapter in 
Raynes’ (1948) ‘History of British Insurance’, augmented recently by others is an immensely 
valuable piece of research and accordingly lays the foundation for the following section.  
It appears that at first (1576) “insurance was in the hands of the Italian merchants meeting in 
Lombard Street in London” (Ibbetson, 2008: 292). The English word ‘policy’ is derived from 
the Italian polizza which refers to a promise or undertaking (Longnaker, 1962).  Evidence 
suggests that by the 1540s, policies of assurance were being made by English merchants, 
although they were still written in Italian (Van Niekerk, 2011).  
It is therefore accepted that in the UK, insurance started to develop in the late 1500s and soon 
attracted regulatory attention. Over time, marine assurance “as being part of the machinery of 
commerce, came within its [the Privy Council’s] careful purview and became subject to 
regulation” (Raynes, 1948:41). This may have been the result of a series of complaints 
received by the Privy Council in the early 1570s about difficulties that foreign assureds (and 
some English assureds) were having in securing payments from underwriting merchants who 
allegedly were not keeping their promises (Purvis, 2000). The Privy Council was determined 
to foster the health of marine insurance in the City of London in order to maintain and 
promote its standing as an emerging insurance market19 (van Niekerk, 2011). Accordingly, 
matters of trade were regarded as of the highest importance (Raynes, 1948: 44). The Privy 
                                                 
19 It was during the 16th century that London rapidly started to become the centre of the commercial world, 
especially as a leading insurance market (Lloyd’s, 2010).  
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Council responded in writing and surviving letters to the Lord Mayor further emphasised 
their concerns over such “dealings [that] tended to discredit the City” (Raynes, 1948:45).  It 
is clear that the earliest complaints fall within the domain of what is today called Market 
Conduct. 
At this time, it appears that insurance disputes were dealt with by merchants themselves, a 
form of self-regulation since it was the view that they knew the insurance practice, customs 
and traditions (Ibbeston, 2008; Van Niekerk, 2011). A number of early policies therefore 
contained a type of ‘arbitration clause’ which stated that any dispute arising from said policy 
should be referred to a group of merchants without going to law (i.e. the judicial system) 
(Raynes, 1948). However, by the 1550s, court involvement in some claims arising out of 
policies was on the rise. The view began to form that the system in general was not working 
well and again the Privy Council felt constrained to intervene (Ibbestson, 2008). The impetus 
behind this was three-fold, according to Ibbestson (2008). 
Firstly, individuals, involved in policy disputes, may have felt that their interests were better 
served through law than through merchant arbitrators. Secondly, as the insurance market 
began to grow and insurance policies became more complex, some cases raised a number of 
difficult issues. The sentiment at the time was that where there was no settled practice or 
custom, the advice of merchants was of little value since they could do no more than say 
which party they thought should win. The latter may have further resulted in a conflict of 
interest since merchants doing business could also be arbitrators for disputes arising from the 
business. Accordingly, it has been cited that merchant arbitrators were not thought to be 
doing the job well which may have warranted the need for more independent court 
adjudication. The Privy Council established an arbitration court to handle disputes arising 
from policies of assurance and accordingly, over time, cases were increasingly “steered 
towards the Admiralty [court] rather than leaving it to the perhaps capricious decision of a 
group of merchants” (Ibbestson, 2008: 294).  
The Privy Council also instituted a number of administrative procedures which could be 
regarded as regulating the London marine market (Raynes, 1948). On the 15th of June, 1575, 
a letter was sent by the Privy Council to the Lord Mayor of London asking him to “certify 
their Lordships what had been done for setting down some orders for matters of assurance…” 
(Raynes, 1948: 45). The Privy Council was therefore looking to codify insurance law. It is 
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important to understand the issues of concern and how they were addressed. Disputes arose 
regarding the existence and terms of insurance contracts. Furthermore, multiple policies were 
being taken out on the same risks. Owing to the unawareness (by certain merchants) as to the 
existence of these other contracts, it was possible to affect multiple policies on the same risk.  
Similar problems had arisen in Spain and Antwerp (Raynes, 1948).  These issues are clearly 
market conduct type issues.  As a result of these problems, it fell to the Lord Mayor to come 
up with some solutions.  Although no full record of practices or insurance orders was given in 
reply to the Privy Council, it is accepted that, “a step was taken towards organizing the 
market therein, which had gravitated to the Royal Exchange… by making the registration of 
all insurances compulsory and the erection of the Office or Chamber of Assurance20 in the 
Royal Exchange…” (Raynes, 1948:46; Daykin, 1992). Thus, at least three regulatory steps 
can be discerned as follows: i) physically, an office was established, ii) all insurance contracts 
were to be registered at the Office and, iii) a Registrar (Richard Candeler) was appointed to 
make (i.e. draft) and register insurance contracts and to oversee the functions assigned to the 
Office. Thus the office of Registrar was born. As such, the Office of Assurance was 
established to coordinate and control the writing of insurance and the registration of policies 
would prevent double insurance (Lewin, 1988 as cited in Daykin & Cresswell, 2001; Ford, 
2011).  
In February 1576, a letters patent was issued to Richard Candeler, a factor of Sir Thomas 
Gresham, the founding father of the Royal Exchange (Walford, 1885; Van Niekerk, 1999; 
Sibbert, 1997, as cited in Sullivan, 2002). The letters patent gave Candeler the exclusive right 
to not only register policies, but also to make them (Walford, 1885). Thus a consequence of 
the appointment of Candeler was the genesis of standard policy forms or wordings. 
The preamble to the letters patent read: 
For as much as it is credibly given us to understand that for want of good and 
orderly keeping in registers the assurances made within the Realm of England 
among merchants… the trade of merchandise have been and yet be often times 
greatly abused by evil disposed people who for their private gain and 
advantage have assured one thing in sundry places thereby intending any loss 
should happen, to recover in all said places, and so often times have done, to 
the great loss and hindrance of divers such honest merchants as did assure the 
same. And the ancient custom of merchants in Lombard Street and now in the 
                                                 
20 The Chamber, as its name suggests, was established during the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603).   
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Royal Exchange by that means almost grown out of estimation which 
heretofore as we are informed hath been the chief foundation of all assurances.  
From the above an understanding of the problems being addressed can be determined. As 
mentioned earlier, these include the “evils of double or over-insurance of ships and 
merchandise” (Raynes, 1948:46). That is, assureds were insuring the same ship several times 
in different places and recovering in respect of the same loss several times over (Ibbestson, 
2008). The obvious remedy was the compulsory registration of policies of assurance so that 
underwriters could see if multiple insurance occurred and the terms and amounts of assurance 
placed on any insured venture (Raynes, 1948).  In addition to this, and of paramount 
importance, was the fact that that the registration of contracts of assurance was also to record 
its terms for reference in cases of dispute (Walford, 1885). That is, the registration of 
insurance policies would document the content of insurance contracts and in the process, 
prevent the perpetration of fraud (van Niekerk, 1999). This step would also reduce 
uncertainty as to the policy terms therefore minimising disputes.  
In hindsight, the letters patent appears to have been an early form of market conduct 
regulation in terms of policy enforcement, since the recording of the terms of assurance 
would attempt to ensure that merchants discharged their due obligations to the assured based 
on the terms of the contract.  Such regulation found expression only in the letters patent 
granted to Candeler, since the system had no footing in legislation and accordingly, custom 
trumpeted the law (Ibbestson, 2008:296). Furthermore, since policies of assurance were 
generally being drawn by one person, over time, clauses became standardised, a notion that 
persists in the modern insurance arena today (Raynes, 1948).   
The letters patent clearly put Candeler, economically, in a favoured position.  This was 
something quickly understood by other interested parties who stood to lose financially as he 
acquired their business. The letters patent therefore was not without protest as underwriters, 
brokers and scriveners petitioned to the Lord Mayor alleging that such a practice would take 
profitable work away from them (Ibbestson, 2008). In fact, they pointed out that: 
It would also be an infringement upon the liberty of every good citizen… that 
it would be a great bondage to merchants to be held to one particular person 
who might either favour or award dispatch one man and for displeasure or ill 
will delay another, that merchants who intended some secret yet lawful voyage 
would be glad to pass their writings privately to such notaries and brokers as 
they know would be secret. 
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In response to the aforesaid opposition, Candeler voluntarily abandoned his claim for the 
exclusive right to draw up policies and retained only the right to register contracts of 
insurance (Ibbetson, 2008: 296). In one proclamation published at the Royal Exchange, it was 
enunciated that those policies not registered were to be null and void (Raynes, 1948). The 
fact that Candeler could financially benefit from the regulatory system is an early example of 
what later became the idea of regulatory capture. Recall, regulatory capture refers to the 
process in terms of which legislation could be sought and passed for those who benefit from 
the legislation. In this regard, Candeler stood to gain from said system as explained by the 
theory of regulatory capture. 
5.1.1.1.1 Forum to resolve disputes and insurance law 
A second problem to be addressed at this time was the establishment of an appropriate forum 
for dispute resolution and the identification of a set of rules and customs relating to insurance 
(Ibbestson, 2008). Although an arbitration court had been established, by the last quarter of 
the sixteenth century, the status of insurance litigation and law in London was quite 
problematic and uncertain and over time competing courts began to vie for the 
business21 (van Niekerk, 2011: 155).   
Specifically, there was no permanent tribunal for the resolution of insurance disputes. Four or 
even five different fora can be identified; merchants themselves, Alderman’s Court, 
Admiralty court, Common law courts and Court of equity. The problem was further 
exacerbated by the fact that arbitral awards were often not obeyed and furthermore could not 
be enforced (van Niekerk, 1999). The latter problem is highlighted in a number of letters 
addressed to the Lord Mayor by the Privy Council, the last of which is dated the 30th of July 
1576. Six months thereafter, London’s Court of Alderman produced “certain good orders 
concerning matters of assurance” (Raynes, 1948:50). These documents have been described 
                                                 
21 It was at this time that the King’s Bench asserted that it had jurisdiction over insurance disputes arising from 
contracts made in England and indeed the first known common law case of Mayne and Poyn vs De Gozi arose in 
the King’s Bench in 1538. Furthermore, Dr Lewis, as judge of the Admiralty Court, was desperately competing 
for jurisdiction of insurance disputes, whilst complaining that his court was being squeezed out by a number of 
prohibitions. At the same time, a number of cases were being referred to the court of Chancery. In fact, a bill 
was later tabled which envisaged the wholesale transfer of jurisdiction to the court of Chancery. This however 
never came into fruition following significant opposition since the court of Chancery was not familiar with the 
intricacies of insurance (see van Niekerk, 1999; Ibbetson, 2008) 
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as “unfinished”, “never properly finalised” and “not perfected” and as such, no author has 
attempted to dissect their contents.22  
Fierce competition existed to acquire jurisdiction over insurance disputes. There was the 
merchant’s arbitration “court”, the Mayor’s Court of the Alderman, the Admiralty court, the 
Chancery with its concept of equity and the King’s Courts of Law, each with a vested interest 
in diverting all insurance matters to their court. In January 1577, an ordinance was passed by 
the Court of Alderman, which established a special court, a Commission Court, to deal with 
matters of insurance.23 In terms of this Commission, seven merchants (appointed annually) 
were to meet twice weekly at the Office of Assurance on the west side of the Royal Exchange 
“to deal rightly and indifferently between party and party” (Walford, 1885:123; Ibbestson, 
2008: 297). Two observations are appropriate: i) disputes were to be resolved judicially and 
not by a registrar, and ii) the volume of disputes must have been significant enough to 
warrant meeting twice a week. 
The Council thereafter undertook to strengthen the jurisdiction of the Commissioners by 
giving them statutory authority (van Niekerk, 1999). This did not resolve the dispute of 
jurisdiction and in 1601, the first piece of legislation was passed involving the resolution of 
insurance disputes24 (Daykin, 1992). In this matter, Dr Lewis had considerable influence. The 
Act of Parliament (34 Elizabeth I, c 12) sought to address only the procedural aspects of 
insurance disputes arising from registered policies (van Niekerk, 2011). The summary 
resolution set out a general or standing panel of Commissioners (often referred to as a hybrid 
court)  to hear and determine disputes under insurance contracts, which consisted of a Judge 
of the Admiralty (Dr David Lewis), the Recorder, two doctors of Civil Law, two common 
law lawyers and “eights grave and discreet merchants” (Raynes, 1948:57). Dr Lewis, as a 
member of the court, once again reveals his vested interests in the court system. In addition to 
this, no commissioner was permitted to intermeddle in any dispute where he himself was 
cited a party to the matter (Raynes, 1948).  
                                                 
22 These documents exist today in archival form in the shape of two lengthy and detailed, undated, handwritten 
manuscripts (See van Niekerk, 2011). 
23 At this time, the court was given the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with insurance disputes arising out of 
policies that were registered in the Chamber. This however did not put an end to the problem of competing 
jurisdictions since unregistered policies could be pursued elsewhere (Ibbetson, 2008). 
24 The Merchants’ Assurance Bill was in fact the first statute passed by the English Parliament that recognises 
the practice of insurance (Vance, 1904). 
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The Act of 1601 did not deal substantively with insurance law and as a result of this, 
insurance customs reigned supreme by the end of the sixteenth century (Martin, 2004; van 
Niekerk, 2011). Furthermore, there were too many holes in the legislation to make it an 
effective regulatory system and substantively, it achieved very little (Ibbestson, 2008:307). In 
other words, the 1601 Act was in its final form a compromise piece of legislation trying to 
appease all factions to the controversy of jurisdiction (Ibbestson, 2008; Vivian, MacGregor & 
van Vuuren, 2015a). Accordingly, although the Office of Assurance endeavoured to ensure 
appropriate policy enforcement by acting as a registration bureau, over time its existence 
acted as a catalyst in focusing attention on problems in the insurance market thereby enabling 
a more holistic approach to resolving insurance problems (van Niekerk, 1999).  
Over time, the system of registration of policies was too easily by-passed and as such the 
Office “[was] probably much less resorted to than previously” (Walford, 1885:124; Ibbetson, 
2008:307; Ford, 2011). More specifically, both the administrative and judicial functions of 
the Office “became first optional and finally fell into desuetude” (Raynes, 1948: 97). 
Furthermore, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the number of policies sold became 
so large that comprehensive registration of policies became increasingly impossible and as 
such the Office declined in importance and was eventually dissolved (Denzel, 2014). It has 
also been cited that the South Sea Bubble saga which resulted in the prohibition against the 
formation of any new companies “probably gave a final quietus to this formerly most useful 
institution” (Walford, 1885:124). Ibbetson (2008: 307) puts it succinctly that: 
 after the squabbles of merchants, common [law] lawyers and civil lawyers – 
all concerned to protect their own jurisdiction against competitors – the 
situation in the early seventeenth century was hardly an improvement on the 
near-anarchy of half a century earlier.  
Notwithstanding this, the establishment of the Office of Assurance marks the beginning of 
UK insurance regulation. 
5.1.1.1.2 Comments on the regulatory position of the Elizabethan era  
It can be said that the issues during this stage were market conduct in nature.  The question of 
multiple policies was resolved by having a central place where all contracts were entered into 
and recorded.  This was needed to protect the underwriters from fraud committed by insureds.  
Lloyd’s would adopt a similar practice.  All policies had to be entered into in the Room and 
56 
 
issued by the Policy Signing Office. Disputes and the enforcement of decisions were resolved 
via the law of contract, the rule of law and due process of law; the system advocated by 
Locke, as indicated above. Not even the slighted suggestion existed that a regulator could 
resolve these issues. The idea that a regulator can resolve disputes is a fundamental issue 
inherent in the market conduct regulatory system; this was absent during the Elizabethan era. 
It should be noted that the personal interests of the parties responsible for the regulatory 
system played an important role; Sir Thomas Gresham and his factor, Richard Candeler, and 
Dr David Lewis all had vested personal interests in the regulatory system. All three had a 
vested interest in the outcomes and benefited from the regulatory system that was put into 
place. Recall towards the end of the Elizabethan period, the Chamber of Assurances was 
established at the behest of Sir Thomas Gresham and the main beneficiary was Richard 
Candeler who was granted the monopoly power on drafting and registering policies.   Clearly 
Candeler benefitted from this “legislation” since he was placed in an economically favourable 
position. This was realised by many.  Notwithstanding this, it can also be argued that the 
arrangement was also for the general benefit of the public since fraud was being committed 
against underwriters by insureds who were soliciting double insurance. It is therefore possible 
for regulation to be both for the benefit of individuals and in the public interest. 
In recounting the history set out above, it was noted that during the Elizabethan era, state 
intervention endeavoured to establish which court had jurisdiction over insurance disputes. It 
can be argued that this was not done in the public interest but rather in response to pressure 
by Dr David Lewis who as mentioned earlier, was desperately competing for the jurisdiction 
of insurance disputes. It was also at this time that the Common Law King’s Courts also 
wanted the business as did the Court of the Chancellery. Soon thereafter, a Bill was quickly 
placed before parliament which sought to give jurisdiction to Dr Lewis’s court. Although 
there was a swift reaction against the Bill, the Act was nonetheless passed, however, a 
compromise was made in terms of which Dr Lewis was to be appointed as the member of the 
new court. It is therefore clear that this legislation was not passed solely in the interests of the 
public but for the interests of others. More specifically, such state intervention was an attempt 
to further the interests of the president of the court, Dr Lewis. He stood to gain from the 
regulatory system that was put into place. 
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The importance of this would only be partly recognised in the 1970s by Stigler as regulatory 
capture, as mentioned above, and academically formalised in the discipline of the economics 
of Public Choice by Tulloch and Buchanan, as noted earlier. The measures which were 
adopted during this period, despite Ibbestson’s (2008) scepticism, were largely positive. It 
can be said of this period that the regulation benefitted both the regulators and was in the 
public interest. 
5.1.1.2 Rise of the Lloyd’s market (1688) 
The regulatory system pertaining to Lloyd’s is now discussed, since Lloyd’s started 
operations after the Elizabethan Era. The Lloyd’s system has been successful and continues 
to this day. Lloyd’s thus transverses the ages. For this reason, it is convenient to deal 
comprehensively with the history of Lloyd’s regulation at this point. It so to speak, becomes a 
complete story within the story. In order to understand the laws, legal arrangements and 
regulations governing the Lloyd’s market, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of its 
development. 
The Lloyd’s market was given life in the coffee shop of Edward Lloyd in Tower Street, 
London in the late seventeenth century (Wright & Fayle, 1928; Gibb, 1957; Raphael, 1995). 
This is the age before the modern office block complex and in London, business tended to be 
transacted in coffee shops. The Lloyd’s coffee shop was initially the meeting place for ship 
captains, merchants and ship owners who would exchange shipping news and intelligence 
(Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). As mentioned above, the city of London was intent on 
acquiring and maintaining its standing as a leading financial market and endeavoured to be a 
trade centre (Raynes, 1948). As a result of this, there was an increasing demand for ship and 
cargo insurance (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). Accordingly, Edward Lloyd’s coffee shop 
became the hub for wealthy merchants looking to conduct business specifically involving 
shipping and international trade (Lazarus, 2011). From this, one of the most important marine 
insurance markets was born. 
In particular, merchants would instruct an office-keeper25 to acquire insurance for a particular 
vessel or for a proposed voyage (Lazarus, 2011). Office-keepers who worked as the agents 
                                                 
25 An office-keeper is the equivalent of the modern day broker. The term office-keeper was however preferred as 
the word broker had over time acquired a negative connotation. This may be owing to the fact that brokers were 
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for the merchants and ship-owners would approach private individuals, believed to be of 
reliable means, to cover a share of the risk (Lazarus, 2011). An individual would become an 
underwriter after accepting a line of risk (Raynes, 1950). The latter, over time, constituted the 
traditional Lloyd’s Name. If a deal was agreed, the agreement was documented in terms of a 
slip where the name of the underwriter and his share of the risk was recorded, the terms for 
both parties were detailed and the signatures of both parties were obtained (Lazarus, 2011).  
Over time, “the rise of the greater institution - Lloyd’s” operated with a self-regulatory focus. 
This was later formalised in terms of its internal byelaws (Raynes, 1948:63; Daykin & 
Cresswell, 2001; Ford, 2011). It is for this reason that the history of Lloyd’s supervision is 
unequivocally characterised by self-regulation. No insurance legislation was passed and thus 
no insurance regulation existed until the 1870s when the Lloyd’s system of deposits was 
extended to the insurance market in general. It was only in 1986 at the earliest that it can be 
said that the UK for the first time introduced formal statutory regulatory system with the 
passing of the Financial Services Act (Vivian et al., 2016a). When insurance legislation 
began to be introduced, Lloyd’s however remained largely exempt from much of the 
legislation, since its self-regulatory system was in harmonisation with the legislation as will 
be discussed below (Hodgin, 1986). It was probably upon the Lloyd’s system of self-
regulation that the British market’s self-regulatory system evolved (Davison, 1987; 
MacGregor, 2015). 
In 1771, a formal committee, the Lloyd’s Committee (which continues to this day), with 
certain powers of management, was formed which thereafter, by virtue of a Trust Deed Act 
(1811), was authorised to i) manage the affairs of its subscribers; ii) bind them to their rules 
and regulations and iii) subsequently require the provision of guarantees and deposits as a 
condition of membership (Burling, 2011: 429). The Lloyd’s Act of 1871 established a 
committee of members, formally recognising the Lloyd’s Committee, ‘to have the 
management and superintendence of the affairs of the Society26 and to exercise all the powers 
of the Society’. Said Act of 1871 empowered the Committee to make byelaws for the 
purposes provided in the Act, for the better execution of the Act and for the furtherance of the 
objectives of the Society. Further powers were conferred to the Committee by virtue of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
often used by dishonourable traders and accordingly the term broker was associated with dishonesty and fraud 
(Raphael, 1995). 
26 The Lloyd’s market is frequently referred to as the Society. 
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Lloyd's Act 1911, the Lloyd's Act 1925 and the Lloyd's Act 1951. During this time, no 
comparative statutory oversight mechanism existed in the broader UK corporate market 
(Vivian, MacGregor & van Vuuren, 2016c). 
A series of Lloyd’s scandals in the 1970’s necessitated changes to the self-regulatory system 
to better regulate the market raising the spectrum of market conduct regulation and what is 
now known as corporate governance (Kelley, 1995). Following an inquiry, the subsequent 
Fisher Report (1980) precipitated the noteworthy 1982 Lloyd’s Act which introduced a 
number of changes (Fisher Bewsey, Waters & Ovey, 2003). The Fisher Report noted that 
although substantial changes were needed, the Lloyd’s market would be served best by 
“properly conducted self-regulation” and accordingly the 1982 Act endeavoured not only to 
maintain the system of self-regulation that traditionally governed Lloyd’s and the other 
financial institutions in the City, but also codified the practice of self-regulation (Kelley, 
1995; Lazarus, 2011:466).  
The 1982 Act, among other things, established a Council of Lloyd’s to define its functions 
(Kelley, 1925: 1935). Part of the problem was the conflict between insiders and external 
Names – the separation of ownership and control problem. The internal self-regulatory 
Lloyd’s model did not cater for this. A controlling body with independent members was 
required. Thus the controlling body, the Council, for the first time, included independent 
outsiders. The duly enacted new Lloyd’s Act 1982 largely institutionalised a number of the 
Fisher Report’s key recommendations relating to misconduct which aimed to monitor 
performance in the market and to avert a number of threats to society (Lazarus, 2011). In 
particular, the Report advocated performance management and focused on preventing market 
abuse (Lazarus, 2011). These measures proved inadequate and a further inquiry was instituted 
which was followed by the Neill Report in 1987. 
The self-regulatory system could not deal with the insider-outsider problem, which in any 
event is not an insurance problem. It is a problem common to stock exchanges which deal 
with insider trading. By the 1980s, much of the membership of Lloyd’s, the so-called Names, 
were scattered across the globe; they were largely outsiders. These outsiders had little 
knowledge of the workings of Lloyd’s with the self-regulatory structures being controlled by 
the insiders. Essentially, the outsiders were mere investors, providing capital to be used by 
the insiders; an investment problem. The market faced the investment problem, that which, as 
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will be seen below, was the cause of the South Sea Bubble problems. In the 1990’s, Lloyd’s 
faced a new crisis caused by long tail liability claims, liabilities which stretched over decades 
The institution of the individual Name, better suited to short-tail claims that are not exposed 
to insider trading, had outlived its usefulness and after the 1998-2001 crisis when corporate 
capital was introduced, its use declined. No doubt the individual Name may disappear in the 
future.  
In 1986, the British financial services sector moved away from a system of self-regulation 
towards a system of ‘statutory self-regulation’ by virtue of the 1986 Financial Services Act 
which established a number of regulatory agencies and which prescribed various rules and 
regulations (Bernard, 1987; Gower, 1988). Sir Peter Green, the Chairman of Lloyd’s at the 
time, argued through parliament that Lloyd’s should be exempt from the 1986 Act and should 
remain self-regulated through its own Lloyd’s Act (MacGregor, 2012). Green maintained that 
the Lloyd’s Act would allow the people who understood the Lloyd’s insurance business 
model to run the market as opposed to government officials who lacked such knowledge 
(MacGregor, 2012:81). Agreement existed on this point. As a result, Lloyd’s was exempt 
from the 1986 Act and continued to be regulated by the 1982 Lloyd’s Act but as before, in 
reality the difference was not that great. Thus, between the late 1980s and early 2000s “the 
Lloyd’s market had been regulated by Lloyd’s itself with only minimal external statutory 
oversight” (Burling, 2011: 429).   
The 1986 Act however did not last long. It was repealed and replaced by the single regulator 
model. Following the passing of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), the 
Lloyd's market was brought within the scope of the Financial Services Authority’s (FSA) 
regulatory authority, effective from the 1st of December 2001 (HM Revenue & Customs, n.d). 
Government was keen to bring the Lloyd’s market within the purview of the FSA since it had 
decided that all policyholders, whether transacting through the Lloyd’s market or the broader 
insurance market, should have the same protection under the same regulatory regime 
(Burling, 2011). As a result of this, the FSA would have broad powers over the Lloyd’s 
market and its various participants. Notwithstanding this, the FSA was aware that the Lloyd’s 
Council had a long history in terms of its regulating of the Lloyd’s market and therefore 
believed that the Lloyd’s Council was competent enough to perform a number of its 
regulatory duties on its behalf (HM Revenue & Customs, n.d; Financial Services Authority, 
n.d).  Accordingly, in order to avoid duplication, the FSA would supervise the market but 
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delegated much of its regulatory responsibility to the Council of Lloyd's (Financial Services 
Authority, n.d). This was done by virtue of “Supervision Arrangements for Underwriting 
Agents Enforcement Co-Operation Arrangements” to ensure consistent regulation. 
Originally, the FSMA 2000 established the functions of the FSA (although the FSA preceded 
the Act) and the memorandum of co-operation signified the means of co-operation between 
the FSA and Lloyd’s.  This co-operation arrangement was reinstated after the demise of the 
FSA and the formation of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), to be discussed in later 
sections, by virtue of the “FCA-Lloyd's Co-operation Arrangements”. In terms of the FCA- 
Lloyd's Co-operation Arrangements, both parties have agreed that they will: (a) seek to dispel 
any confusion or misunderstanding about their different roles; (b) seek to achieve a 
complementary and consistent approach, so far as that is consistent with their independent 
roles; (c) meet and communicate regularly at appropriate levels of seniority to discuss matters 
of mutual interest and; (d) aim to promote efficient and effective supervision and prevent 
unnecessary duplication. Furthermore, Lloyd’s is required to notify the regulator of “its 
intention to make any amendments which may alter the meaning or effect of any byelaw” 
(Burling, 2013: 67).  Although a memorandum of co-operation exists between Lloyd’s and 
the FCA, the Lloyd’s market is therefore still largely self-regulated by its internal byelaws 
which are very much in line with the regulatory requirements as stipulated by the FCA 
(Burling, 2011). A discussion of the various Lloyd’s byelaws is however beyond the scope of 
this research. 
5.1.1.2.1 Assessment of the regulatory position of Lloyd’s 
It is often noted in its long history that although various syndicates faced solvency issues in 
the early years, there is no record of any valid insurance claim not being paid by the Lloyd’s 
market (Raphael, 1995; Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995). These issues nonetheless would fall 
under the purview of prudential regulation, the first peak.  In addition to this, although at 
various times throughout its history, Lloyd’s faced “scandals”, the “victims” were generally 
the Names whom were the providers of capital or the “investors” in Lloyd’s (Raphael, 1995). 
These outsiders had little knowledge of the workings of Lloyd’s which were controlled by the 
insiders (Davison, 1987). Essentially the outsiders were mere investors, providing capital to 
be used by the insiders. Protection of the providers of capital is a capital market regulatory 
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issue and not an insurance issue and it is for this reason that this need not be considered in 
any greater detail in this study.   
As mentioned earlier, historically there has been no need for market conduct regulation since 
the law of contract regulated the relationship between the insurer and consumers. It was noted 
market conduct regulation can be destructive where it extends each parties’ obligations 
beyond what was agreed to in contract. The near collapse of the Lloyd’s market in the 1990s 
is illustrative of this point. 
Since the Lloyd’s market was at the time advised for legal purposes not to comment on their 
increasing losses, minimal literature exists on the various reasons for their near demise. In 
particular, Ian Hay Davison, as deputy Chairman and Chief Executive during this time 
commented in his affidavit to the High Court of Justice in 2005 that “we were told in 
Committee that it could not be discussed/minuted for fear of US attorneys' subpoenas to 
obtain the minutes for the complex litigation underway in the USA”.  As such, Vivian, 
Hutcheson, Mushai, MacGregor and Britten (2013) provide a unique explanation for the 
possible causes that almost brought the Lloyd’s market to its knees. 
Between the periods 1998 to 2001, Lloyd’s suffered an accumulated loss of approximately 
£20 billion (Vivian et al., 2013). It is generally understood that one of the main sources of 
Lloyds’ problems was the plethora of American asbestos liability claims (Vivian et al., 2013). 
Employees, alleging to have contracted an asbestos related disease, maintained that they had 
been exposed to asbestos in the workplace and accordingly sued employers, many of which 
were insured through the Lloyd’s market. As a result of this, hundreds of court cases arose. 
The legal basis upon which these claims were founded was the Law of Tort. Initially, the Law 
of Torts was “conceived to deal with damage to property caused by sudden and accidental 
events traceable to negligent acts of specific human beings” (Vivian et al., 2013: 3). 
Notwithstanding this, the courts began to recognise liability for gradually occurring events 
(asbestosis)27, something that was completely unknown at common law. As such, the early 
1990s witnessed the courts reinterpreting the Law of Tort and accordingly this saw the birth 
of the welfare state as courts began to impose liability for social reasons rather than legal 
                                                 
27 Asbestos related diseases can take between 20 to 30 years to manifest. That is, the side effects of asbestos 
exposure gradually show themselves over a number of years (See MacGregor, 2012). 
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reasons (Vivian et al., 2013). This concept in embedded in Lord Denning’s (1979:280) 
socialist interpretation in terms of which he states  
In most of the cases that come before the Courts today, the parties appear at 
first sight to be ordinary persons or industrial companies-or public authorities. 
But their true identity is obscured by masks. If you lift up the mask, you will 
usually find the legal aid funds or an insurance company or the taxpayer- all of 
whom are assumed to have limitless funds. In theory the Courts do not look 
behind the masks. But in practice they do... That is the reason the awards of 
damages have escalated so as to exceed anything that even the wealthiest 
individual could pay. The policy behind it all is that, when severe loss is 
suffered by any one singly, it should be borne not by him alone, but be spread 
throughout the community at large. 
Accordingly, courts were and may still be “increasingly seeing their role to remedy perceived 
social injustices; to be consumer champions” (Vivian, 2012:24). This idea is further 
reinforced as one judge pointed out that “public interest overrides contractual language” since 
companies and insurers were assumed to have deep pockets and could therefore afford to pay 
damages (Raphael, 1995: 198). 
This issue was further compounded by the fact that the courts began to reinterpret the 
contract, the very instrument that was intended to set the parameters of an insurers’ liability. 
The sanctity of the contract, an idea which supports the notion and operation of the doctrine 
of freedom of contract, was therefore negated. In terms of the traditional general liability 
policy wording, cover was provided for accidental losses arising from bodily injury or 
property damage. As stated above, such a cause of loss ought to be immediate and sudden in 
origin. Notwithstanding this, the courts reinterpreted contract wordings so as to allow these 
increasing liabilities to fall on insurers as a result of asbestos related claims; a loss which 
does not conform to the parameter set out above. In doing so, the courts extended coverage 
far beyond what was ever intended by the Lloyd’s market (Raphael, 1995). 
Furthermore, despite the fact that Lloyd’s policies were written on an occurrence basis, US 
Courts later reinterpreted this to mean that claims could be made at any time in the future for 
accidents or exposures that occurred in the past (Raphael, 1995: 144). As a result of this, 
liabilities were increasingly imposed on policies which had long since been thought to have 
expired as the courts stated that “all periods of insurance cover were liable, from inhalation of 
the first harmful asbestos fibre to outbreak of the disease, often thirty years later” (Raphael, 
1995: 146). 
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Since the courts interpreted insurance contracts to be strictly construed in favour of the 
injured in order to promote coverage, the Lloyd’s market experienced a multitude of claims 
for which it had never accounted (Raphael, 1995: 145). In 1991 Lloyd’s appointed the 
Rowland Task Force to look into the future of Lloyd’s and make recommendations for long 
term proposals for reform (Raphael, 1995). It was at this time that David Rowland, as 
chairman of the Task Force and who would later replace David Coleridge as chairman of 
Lloyd’s, commented that unless the contract is upheld, insurance becomes impossible. More 
specifically, it was noted that “if the courts continue to make judgements in favour of 
policyholders disregarding the policy wordings, then Lloyd’s only needed a fairly small share 
of the problem to suffer extraordinary and unaffordable losses” (Raphael, 1995: 206; 
MacGregor, 2012: 57). The social objectives of the courts (an idea which often underpins 
market conduct regulation objectives) and the complete obliteration of legal logic (as 
embedded in the Lockean framework) meant that the Lloyd’s market almost faced ruin. 
In terms of the economic nature of the regulation, as mentioned earlier, the conflict of interest 
between insiders and outsiders, a problem that Lloyd’s was ill-equipped to deal with, clearly 
touches on the issue of regulatory capture; the insiders benefitted from the system in place. 
The regulation of Lloyd’s was exclusively under the control of the insiders, giving virtually 
no protection to the outsiders. As indicated above, the resolution of this problem belongs to 
the capital market and is not an insurance regulation problem and thus this is not pursued in 
detail in this study.  
5.1.1.3 South Sea Bubble saga (1720) 
Over the years, historians have described the year 1720 as the “Bubble Year” where “fantasy, 
panic, folly, and grotesqueness” was the order of the day (Harris, 1994: 610). This incident is 
often referred to when demonstrating the need for government regulatory intervention 
although such regulation actually accelerated the inevitable collapse (Vivian, MacGregor & 
van Vuuren, 2015b). Recently, for example, Wallis, JA in Financial Services Board (FSB) v 
Dynamic Wealth and Others ZASCA 2011 193 noted that “ever since the bursting of the 
South Sea Bubble in 1720 governments have recognised the need, in the interests of the 
investing public, for regulation of the financial services industry”. 
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After having been established in 1711,28 the South Sea Company transformed itself from a 
trading company into a financial institution. The latter transpired after parliament had 
accepted the South Sea Company’s proposal to take over the British national debt in terms of 
which parliament would pay a 6% return on the advances made by the company (Walsh, 
2014: 3). From this point onward, the “investment frenzy” began and in turn, the value of the 
company’s stock increased by a whopping 300% just overnight (Watzlaff, 1971; Lynch, 
2001).  
The South Sea Company further lured investors who were captivated by the illusion of riches 
which the South Sea trade supposedly would generate (Wilson, 1995). Though the company’s 
profits were over time quite modest, investor interest was preserved with false claims of 
prosperity, fanciful tales and rumors of South Sea riches (Colombo, 2012). The South Sea 
stock prices continued to rise. The rising stock prices in turn, attracted all kinds of other joint-
stock companies to be launched hoping to emulate the success of the South Sea Company in 
attracting shareholder capital. These companies wanted to take advantage of the “booming 
investor demand for speculative investments” and accordingly, to cash in on the so called 
speculation mania (Colombo, 2012). Time soon revealed that a large majority of these 
companies were bogus schemes operating on a cunning modus operandi designed to take 
advantage of the credulity of investors (Cross & Prentice, 2007). Notwithstanding this, it was 
believed that the wave of new market entrants would compete with the South Sea Company 
(by diverting funds away from the South Sea Company) and accordingly, would endanger 
their own existence (Harris, 2000). By the 3rd of June 1720, the appreciation in the price of 
South Sea Company shares had started to decline and as a result, shareholders began to sell 
instead of buy (Vivian et al., 2015b). 
Since a number of influential politicians had invested huge amounts of money in the South 
Sea venture, the 1720 Act29 was passed by "a panic-stricken Parliament" who were concerned 
with alleviating the emergence of competition, hindering alternative investment opportunities 
                                                 
28 The South Sea Company was formed by an Act of Parliament in 1711 to trade as a monopoly since general 
legislation to form companies was only passed in 1844. The latter however was not beyond criticism since the 
Statute of Monopolies 1623 severely curtails the English royal privilege of granting monopolies. Moreover, 
monopoly traders required a special Act of Parliament (see Moir, 2013). 
29 Formally known as the Royal & London Assurance Act 1720. 
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and in doing so, diverting capital back into South Sea shares (Wilson, 1995; Banner, 1998; 
Cross & Prentice, 2007). Morgan and Thomas (1962:37) note that: 
No doubt there was genuine concern among some members of Parliament 
about the frauds that were obviously going on, but the timing and sponsorship 
of the Act leave little doubt that its main purpose was not to protect the public 
from fraud, but to protect the Company from competition in the new issue 
market. 
As a result of this, it is important to note that the 1720 Act was passed to “protect the South 
Sea’s rise, and not in consequence to its fall” (Wilson, 1995:44). In other words, the 1720 Act 
was not passed following the collapse of the South Sea; rather it caused the collapse. The 
language of the Act,30 which specifically exempts the South Sea Company from a number of 
its provisions, bears testament to this (Banner, 1998).   
The 1720 Act, popularly known as the ‘Bubble Act’ from the nineteenth century onwards, 
was said to be a “government-created entry barrier designed to put out of business (and 
hinder development of) all business associations which were competing with Parliament's 
chartering business" (Butler, 1986: 172; Harris, 2000). That is, all companies were required 
to have a royal charter in order to operate, which meant that the formation of a joint-stock 
company was made as difficult and expensive as possible (Morgan & Thomas, 1962; Wilson, 
1995). The passing of the 1720 Act meant that only two companies, the Royal Exchange 
Assurance and the London Assurance were permitted to carry out insurance business in 
England31 (Clarke, 2011). However, this provision did not apply to any individual who if 
they wished to enter into business could do so on their own (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995). 
That is, individual underwriters could continue at Lloyd’s and because of this, it follows that 
the Lloyd’s market was exempt from the 1720 Act. Following the passing of the 1720 Act, an 
order was also issued by the Lords Justices which dissolved the aforementioned ‘bubble 
companies’ who were allegedly competing for capital against the South Sea Company 
(Harris, 1994).  
                                                 
30 The full title of the so-called ‘Bubble Act’ is "An Act for better securing certain Powers and Privileges, 
intended to be granted by His Majesty by Two Charters, for Assurance of Ships and Merchandize at Sea, and for 
lending Money upon Bottomry; and for restraining several extravagant and unwarrantable Practices therein 
mentioned." 
31 During this time however, a number of companies petitioned to Parliament for incorporation. Parliament was 
however reluctant to grant corporate status unless it was clear that doing so would be desirable (Morgan and 
Thomas, 1962). 
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With investors’ naivety stretched to its limit and rumours of more and more people (including 
the directors themselves) selling off South Sea Company shares, few buyers could be found 
and investor confidence began to wane (Sornette, 2002). Soon thereafter, panic began to set 
in and share prices imploded - the metaphorical ‘bubble’ burst and the South Sea Company 
collapsed (Colombo, 2012). Public outrage prompted a number of investigations which 
revealed extensive fraud and accounting irregularities as well as corruption not only among 
company directors but also amongst politicians themselves and the highest level of 
government (Colombo, 2012). Because of this, consumer confidence in companies and their 
management was at its lowest and corporations were viewed as an instrument to defraud. 
Although the 1720 Act was a panic measure, it remained on the statute books for some 105 
years before it was repealed in 1825 (Wilson, 1995; Clarke, 2011). However, in terms of this 
repeal, incorporated companies could still not be established since no legislation existed 
which allowed for the formation and registration of any new companies32 (Vivian et al., 
2015c). As a result of this, for over a century there was very little need for extensive 
regulation of the financial services sector since very few business ventures were permitted to 
trade as the 1720 Act had long “arrested the development of the joint-stock company” 
(Freeman, Pearson & Taylor, 2013:640).  It therefore naturally followed that without 
companies there was no corporate insurance market to regulate. Accordingly, by the close of 
the 17th Century “the insurance trade as a whole in Britain was operating entirely without any 
direct government supervision” (Benfield, 2013:7). By the early 1800s however, there was a 
rise in unincorporated trading partnerships, operating on lines similar to Lloyd’s.  It was clear 
that legislation dealing with the corporate entity could not be delayed indefinitely. 
5.1.1.3.1 Comment on the regulatory position of the South Sea Bubble 
The South Sea Bubble saga was essentially fraud committed against investors. Investors were 
induced to purchase shares with little value. This is not an insurance problem. The South Sea 
Bubble saga and its regulatory endeavours can be categorised partly as prudential and partly 
as market conduct in nature. The collapse of the company reflects the prudential aspect. The 
company was a financial failure which could have been detected from its financial 
statements. It would have been clear that no revenue income was being generated. The shares 
                                                 
32 The legislation did not prohibit individuals from trading and for this reason Lloyd’s continued to trade since it 
comprised a syndicate of individuals. 
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were not sold on the basis of intrinsic value but rather on the basis of its future potential. On 
the other hand, the market conduct aspect of the South Sea Company is apparent since the 
scheme was specifically designed (or quickly degenerated into) a scheme to defraud 
investors. In the modern sense it can be argued that market conduct is involved if investment 
advisers were involved and recommended the purchase of shares because of commissions 
they expected to gain.  This aspect is not highlighted in accounts of the South Sea Bubble.  
Despite the fact that the South Sea saga does not appear to highlight any significant insurance 
market conduct issues, it is nonetheless an important development as it had an influence on 
the development of the Lloyd’s market. 
The legislative and regulatory steps were not taken in the public interest but were rather taken 
to protect the interests of those who were responsible for passing the legislation. Recall the 
large number of influential parliamentary members who stood to gain from the scheme. The 
legislation was being used for private purposes; it was passed largely to protect the interests 
of those who were responsible for passing the legislation itself. This is thus an early example 
of regulatory capture, in the broad sense. Over the years investment fraud has continued 
unabated. The South Sea saga therefore highlights the problem of regulatory capture and 
investment fraud which is not an insurance regulation matter. 
5.1.2 Rise of the insurance corporate market in the UK (1844-1870) 
The South Sea Bubble saga has a lasting impact for it was only in 1841, that a Select 
Committee, of the House of Commons, the Gladstone Committee, was established to 
investigate the state of the law insofar as it related to joint-stock companies (Morgan & 
Thomas, 1962). General legislation allowing the formation of new companies was thereafter 
passed in 1844 after which time the number of insurance companies proliferated (Wilson, 
1995). Despite this however, many of the UK’s most famous Victorian insurers were formed 
before 1844, that is, before it was legally possible to form companies.33 There were 
individual trading “companies” established in terms of a Deeds of Settlement (Gower, 1953). 
In particular, the Rock Life Assurance Company was established in 1806, the Crown Life 
was founded in 1825 and the Liverpool & London & Globe was formed in 1836 (Ogborn, 
1956; Thomas, 1973; Alborn, 2002). Accordingly, toward the end of the 19th century, there 
was a well-developed market of “companies” which was most likely modelled on the 
                                                 
33 These “companies” traded as unincorporated partnerships. 
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syndicate structure of Lloyd’s (MacGregor, 2015).  However, unlike Lloyd’s, there was no 
market regulator. It therefore follows that insofar as insurance regulation is concerned, 1844 
marks the start of modern insurance market regulation (Vivian et al., 2015c).  
The 1844 Act created the office of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and further 
provided that a company could become incorporated by a process of registration (Rix, 1945; 
Morgan & Thomas, 1962). Notwithstanding these provisions, from 1844 hereon until 1985, 
the general principles regarding the regulation of insurance companies was to leave 
companies virtually unfettered in the conduct of their business. 
After the passing of the 1844 legislation, the decade of the 1840s and 1850s witnessed a large 
number of insurers entering the market, however, very few survived for long (Daykin, 1992).  
In fact, Stephen Cave, as vice-president of the Board of Trade, pointed out that of the 285 
pure life insurance companies formed between 1843 and 1870, a mere 111 had survived by 
the latter date (Daykin, 1992; Ford, 2011: 253; Pearson, 2012). This was a matter of grave 
concern and accordingly the UK’s parliament appointed a Select Committee to investigate the 
subject and make recommendations. It was also at this time that the question arose whether or 
not there should be a single piece of legislation dealing with all companies, or whether there 
should be least two acts; one act for general companies and a separate act for insurers and in 
particular life assurance companies (Vivian, MacGregor & van Vuuren, 2015d). The Report 
from the Select Committee on Assurance Associations (1853) favoured a separate insurance 
Act and in doing so summarised its views for and against special life insurance regulation. In 
particular, the Select Committee (1853, article VIII) noted that 
On the one hand, even admitting the general wisdom of the principle of non-
interference on the part of the Government in matters of trade, it has been 
contended that the question of life insurance differs so materially, in its 
general character, from ordinary trading transactions, that it may fairly be 
considered as an exception to that rule. 
Another major concern of the Committee related to whether there should be regulation 
requiring shareholders to make payment to companies34 (Booth, 2007). At the time 
                                                 
34 After companies were legally able to form in 1844, there was still an aversion to handing over capital to 
companies since companies were viewed as a vehicle to defraud as a result of the South Sea saga. As such, 
shareholders did not pay over capital to the company and similarly companies were not required to make 
deposits. Shareholders merely subscribed to shares and would only pay over capital if called upon to do so. 
70 
 
shareholders could subscribe to shares which were allocated but not paid-up. If the company 
was in need of capital it could make a call on shareholders.  The Select Committee (1853) 
concluded that a compulsory amount of £10 000 of share capital ought to be paid-up. 
The 1853 Select Committee clearly expressed the reason for part of the share capital to be 
paid up. The Committee (1853) pointed out that the payment was an integral part of the 
process of establishing the bona fide intentions of a new company and such a deposit further 
provided security at the early stages of a company's existence. Some while later however, the 
Board of Trade Committee pointed out that the primary purpose of the deposit was not, in 
any sense, to protect policyholders but rather to prevent speculative ventures (Booth, 
2007:123). As such, it was assumed that the compulsory payment of this capital would reduce 
the number of short-lived start-up companies (Vivian et al., 2015d). Notwithstanding this, it 
does not appear as if too much attention was paid to the Select Committee’s 
recommendations.  
5.1.2.1 Tariff Offices 
In the early 1800s and in response to slow market growth particularly in the fire market, a 
number of insurance companies entered into various cooperation agreements (Pearson, 2002).  
This saw regular price setting meetings in terms of which premium rates (referred to as 
tariffs) were specified and policy wordings to be used were standardised (Westall, 1998). 
This culminated in the establishment of the fire insurance tariff and the insurance companies 
which cooperated with such were referred to as Tariff Offices (Fire Offices' Committee 
records, 2009). 
In 1868, a market organisation was established to foster co-operation and thereby administer 
the tariff system (Westall, 1998). It appears that a more formal market association was 
required to address the perceived issue that tariff rates were not being universally observed 
(Fire Offices' Committee records, 2009). Furthermore, there existed no statement of 
principles, rules or constitution on which the Tariff Offices were required to operate and 
accordingly, an association was required to provide clarity on this (Fire Offices' Committee 
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records, 2009).35 The organisation tasked with such became known as the Fire Offices 
Committee (FOC). 
The FOC continued to foster cooperation among Tariff Offices and in doing so, it set 
minimum premium rates (that were adequate to ensure market viability) and also developed 
model policy wordings (Pearson, 2012). This in turn, meant that product innovation, 
marketing and service provision became each insurer’s focal point since it was only on this 
basis that they could compete (Pearson, 2012). This also meant that barriers of entry were 
raised, particularly for foreign insurers which would then require a strong understanding of 
the UK insurance market consumer in order to be able to compete with local offices (Pearson, 
2002; Pearson, 2012). 
The FOC encouraged non-tariff insurance companies to join the tariff by restricting 
reinsurance, underwriting and tariff information to members only (Westall, 1998). Although, 
the FOC never fully gained complete market control, which in itself was a point of 
contention, it nevertheless was an important mechanism that maintained the self-regulatory 
approach that had long existed in the market and enhanced the stability of the fire insurance 
market (Westall, 1998; Pearson, 2012). More specifically, the tariff was successful in 
warding off a number of insurer insolvencies.  Between the 1960s and 1970s, a number of the 
UK insurer insolvencies occurred (Vivian et al., 2016c). These were largely (if not 
exclusively) drawn from the ranks of non-tariff companies. 
As the benefits of co-operation were realised, tariff committees were formed for different 
classes of insurance.  In particular, the Accident Offices Association (AOA) joined the FOC 
in 1906 (Westall, 1998). Furthermore, inter-firm cooperation and the tariff system spread 
beyond the bounds of the Empire. Specifically, there is no doubt that both Australia and 
South Africa followed the UK tariff system. The latter is discussed in succeeding sections. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Lloyd’s market underwent extensive 
expansion as it began to write non-marine classes of insurance, such as fire and accident 
insurance (Westall, 1998). Tariff Offices endeavoured to respond to increasing competition, 
however owing to the rigid nature of the tariff system, this proved difficult (Pearson, 2002). 
                                                 
35 Despite this need, the FOC never had a formal constitution and only formally adopted a statement setting out 
its aims and objectives in 1970.   
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Furthermore, tariff organisations had difficulty reforming the rating structure which had 
undergone few changes over the decades and accordingly the tariff system was being 
destabilised by increasing competition (Pearson, 2002). As a result of this, the AOA 
abandoned its own tariff system in 1968 (Westall, 1998). Despite the expanding Lloyd’s 
market and the rapidly increasing completion, the FOC however continued operating. 
In 1972, the UK Monopolies Commission undertook an investigation of the tariff system and 
thereafter submitted its report to Parliament (Carter & Doherty, 1974). The tariff system, as 
indicated above, was in any event in decline. In particular, the Commission’s mandate was to 
investigate whether a monopoly situation did in fact exist, and if so whether this was contrary 
to public interest in light of the perceived premium rate collusion (Carter & Doherty, 1974). 
The Commission (1972: par 395) concluded that “we see no alternative to [the] abolition of 
the system as a remedy” and accordingly the commission pointed out that the FOC and its 
tariff should be disbanded. Despite the Commission’s recommendations, the FOC remained 
in force until 1985, after which time it was eventually terminated (Carter & Falush, 2009). 
The end of the tariff system has been attributed to a number of other factors. Specifically, the 
long run volatility and inherent instability of maintaining monopolies and therefore, the tariff 
agreements, has been identified as one such factor (Vivian et al., 2016c). Collectively these 
factors and the recommendations of the Commission contributed to the demise of the tariff 
system.  
The demise of the tariff system therefore left a regulatory vacuum which was soon filled 
thereafter as will be discussed in later sections. 
5.1.2.1.1 Comment on market conduct issues of the tariff system. 
During this period, the market was self-regulated via tariff committees and it is fair to say 
that the tariff system governed what would be considered largely as market conduct issues. 
Collusion between insurers on a wide range of issues has been regarded as anti-competitive 
and was prohibited in the US in terms of anti-trust notions which culminated in the passing of 
the 1890 Sherman Act (Joskow, 1973; Wagner, 2000). Although tariff committees dealt with 
issues that can be classified as market conduct issues, the consumer was not the main focus of 
the tariff system. More specifically, albeit that colluding on prices is usually considered a 
73 
 
consumer issue, insurers have regarded this practice as a prudential matter to ensure that 
premiums are sufficiently high to reduce the risk of insolvency (Joskow, 1973).  
Generally the nature of the operation of the tariff system was within the Lockean contract and 
the rule of law framework since their recommendations were incorporated into contract 
terms. Despite the fact that the tariff system’s practices have rarely been regarded as market 
conduct issues by the industry, it was not unknown for tariff committees to issue guidelines 
on market conduct. For example, a guideline was issued which recommended that insurers 
should not exercise any subrogation rights against tenants if the tenant caused damage to the 
landlord’s property. Since there is no clear evidence of regulatory capture, the 
recommendations from tariff committees to ensure that the risk of insolvency was reduced, 
are arguably in line with public interest objectives.  
5.1.2.2 Life assurance market 
It was the demise of the Albert Life Assurance Company (which after careful consideration is 
clearly a prudential matter) in particular, which had “greatly affected public opinion in favour 
of some control of life assurance” (Raynes, 1948:354; Ferguson, 1976). By the end of 1865, 
Albert Life had absorbed a total of twenty- six life offices, after engaging in an aggressive 
programme of costly mergers and acquisitions and by 1869, the stability of the company was 
under pressure (Walford, 1887; Raynes, 1948; Daykin, 1992). A month after an application 
was made for the winding up of Albert Life, a similar application was made for that of the 
European Assurance Society and accordingly, these two failures exposed the weaknesses of 
the UK’s legislative structure (Daykin, 1992: 321). The opinion has been expressed that the 
Albert Life failed because of the large number of acquisitions and not because of its 
insurance business, an important factor since insurance regulation would not resolve the 
Albert Life issue. 
A number of authors suggest that the regulation of insurance business essentially only began 
in earnest following the passing of the Life Assurance Act of 1870 (Daykin, 1992; Daykin & 
Cresswell, 2001; Ford, 2011:251). As such, given the social and commercial importance of 
insurance and its long history, it is notable that regulation of the industry is a relatively recent 
phenomenon (Noussia, 2011:34). Said legislation was largely enacted in response to life 
assurance firm collapses and scandals and as such governmental intervention was merely 
reactive, although such regulatory interference remained at a minimum (Ford, 2011:251). In 
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fact, the 1870 Act can be described as the mere regulation by law since the Act contains no 
supervisory provisions. 
Legislation setting out the basic framework for life insurance regulation, was introduced to 
the House in 1870 by the Board of Trade and was known as the Life Assurance Companies 
Act of 1870 (Booth, 2007). It is important to highlight that it was the aforementioned 
governmental department that became the regulator of insurance firms (other than friendly 
societies or Lloyd’s members), to the extent it can be called regulation, however the notion of 
“freedom with publicity” prevailed since, as mentioned above, no supervisory provisions 
were included in the Act (Ford, 2011). No regulator was appointed as currently understood. 
A number of authors argue that the provisions of the Act can be divided into four principle 
heads, each of which is discussed briefly below.36 
The Life Assurance Act of 1870 required companies to do the following: 
i) Deposits: The Act required that all newly established life offices deposit a sum of 
£20,000 with the Accountant General of the Court of Chancery. A number of 
reasons were set forth as to why such a deposit would be desirable. The 1853 
Select Committee, as mentioned earlier, emphasised that making shares partly 
paid-up would provide security during the early stages of the new life office. 
Making shares partly paid up could have the same outcome as the deposit which 
was paid over to a third party. The deposit could be called upon to ensure that 
obligations under the contracts of assurance could be fulfilled. However as noted 
above, the Board of Trade Committee highlighted that the requirement of making 
shares paid-up was rather an effort to deter any speculative ventures which were 
generally short lived and largely fraudulent. The deposit would reduce the large 
number of short-timed companies. It was speculation which had caused the South 
Sea Bubble. 
It is believed that the recommendation for a deposit system mirrored the 
longstanding Lloyd’s practice (Gibb, 1957). In particular, Gibb (1957:129) noted 
                                                 
36 See King (1892); Raynes (1948); Ferguson, 1976; Daykin (1992); Daykin & Cresswell (2001); Booth (2007); 
Ford (2011). 
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that “in this matter of deposits Lloyd’s was acting as a pioneer and setting an 
example that the British Government followed consistently when it became 
concerned to prevent loss by the failures of insurance companies’ holds true”. 
The deposit system introduced in the 1870 Act was copied from the Lloyd’s 
practice. The Lloyd’s system for solvency capital developed in the late 19th 
century. By the late1850s, it was commonplace to ask underwriting merchants or 
‘Names’ to provide security or guarantees for possible liabilities in case the 
syndicate faced claims requiring a call against Names (Raynes, 1948). The deposit 
system was therefore a type of policyholder protection tool. The deposit system 
replaced the original ‘surety system’ after Mr Sharp, the wealthy relative of a 
young man who wanted to be a Name, insisted on the payment of a cash deposit 
of £5 000 as opposed to the accepted method of standing surety (Gibb, 1957; 
MacGregor, 2015). The Lloyd’s Committee reluctantly accepted the deposit in 
lieu of the surety and over time this system slowly became the norm (Gibb, 1957). 
After 1857, it became common practice for Names to lodge a deposit of £5 000 
with the Committee at Lloyd’s (Raynes, 1948). The deposit was not for solvency 
purposes per se but rather a method of obtaining assurance that the Name had 
some wealth to settle his liabilities (Davison, 1987).  
The Lloyd’s system for solvency capital therefore precipitated the 1870 deposit 
requirements. This practice was thereafter merely institutionalised for the British 
life assurance market in terms of the 1870 Life Assurance Company Act although 
the reason for doing so was very different to that of Lloyd’s. 
ii) Separation of the life fund: All newly established life offices, transacting in other 
lines of insurance, were required to keep a separate account for life and annuity 
business. This was referred to as the principle of separation of assets in terms of 
which the life fund could not be used for purposes other than for meeting life 
assurance liabilities. This requirement further prevented any contamination of the 
life fund as a result of financial pressures on the other general classes of insurance 
business.  
iii) Accounts, returns and other information for members: The ‘life assurance fund’ 
was subject to actuarial evaluation and reporting in addition to a number of other 
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controls. Amongst other things, this included regular investigations into the 
financial condition of the firm (to be quinquennial for companies established after 
the 1870 Act, but only decennial for existing companies); the publication of 
annual accounts of the company, and the distribution of an abstract of the actuarial 
valuation. In addition to this, the 1870 Act required the furnishing of all such 
information of this nature to the public (and more importantly, policyholders and 
shareholders) which would be sufficient to facilitate an assessment of the financial 
position of the company. The latter gave rise to the idea of ‘freedom with 
publicity’. That is, insurance firms maintained a good deal of business freedom 
provided that their affairs and financial positions were made public in such a way 
that it could be verified by independent actuaries and all other interested parties.  
This phenomenon remained a fundamental principle in the UK’s insurance 
regulatory system until responsibility for the regulation of insurance was assumed 
by the FSA. The latter is discussed in section 5.2.1.2. In addition to making such 
information available in the public domain, insurance firms were required to 
furnish a copy of such documentation to the Board of Trade. However, because of 
industry resistance to the Board’s monitoring of annual accounts, the Board 
eventually conceded that its role should be less active. 
iv) Amalgamation and Winding up: As a result of the experience of insurance 
insolvencies arising from imprudent amalgamations, the 1870 Act also contained 
provisions relating to amalgamations and insolvency. That is, amalgamations 
could only take place following approval from the Court of Chancery. The due 
process to be observed in arriving at such a sanction was set out in Section 14 of 
the 1870 Act. Similarly, the Courts were also to be involved in the winding up of 
insurance companies. 
Pearson (2012: 81) points out that the 1870 Act “scarcely challenged the dominant laissez-
faire principles of the British state, as it merely required the annual balance sheets of [a life 
office] to be audited and published and a deposit of £20,000 to be left with the Court of 
Chancery. The policing of companies was left to their shareholders and the insured”. 
However, in general, there was very little dissatisfaction with the 1870 Act, although a few 
practical amendments were proposed (Booth, 2007).  Those amendments were incorporated 
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in 1871 and 1872 respectively and the latest amended and consolidated Act was known as 
`The Life Assurance Companies Act, 1872' (Booth, 2007). This legislation however remained 
applicable to the life assurance industry only and accordingly, the Act did not cover general 
classes of insurance business (Daykin & Cresswell, 2001; Ford, 2011).  
5.1.2.2.1 Analysis of the 1870 legislative changes 
The 1870 Life Assurance Act was passed in response to the collapse of the Albert Life. The 
Act required insurance companies to deposit an amount of £20,000 with the government and 
to publish audited annual financial statements which were also deposited with the 
government (Daykin, 1992). All of these requirements concern prudential regulation. There is 
no indication that the legislation overtly had any market conduct objectives. There is neither a 
clear indication nor strong evidence of any regulatory capture. The legislation therefore 
appears to have been in the public interest.  
5.1.3 Regulation of the insurance market (early 1900s onwards) 
5.1.3.1 British Assurance Act 
As mentioned above and as indicated by its name, the 1870 Life Assurance Act dealt with life 
assurance only, although other forms of insurance existed.  In the early years of the 20th 
century, it was clear that other classes of insurance business, not transacting in conjunction 
with life assurance, should be subject to some similar form of regulation to strengthen the 
security of policyholders (Raynes, 1948; Carter & Falush, 2009). Supervision was extended 
to general insurance business following the passing of the 1907 Employer’s Liability 
Insurance Companies Act (Daykin, 1992). Two years thereafter, Mr Churchill, then president 
of the Board of Trade issued a Bill in 1909 that sought to bring general insurance companies 
within the regulatory framework created by the Life Assurance Act (1870-1872) (Raynes, 
1948; Daykin, 1992; Ford, 2011). In other words, the British Assurance Act of 1909 was 
indicative of the UK’s decision to regulate the insurance market as a whole with a single 
piece of legislation. The Lloyd’s market had already adopted such an holistic system prior to 
this and as such, the Bill was government’s endeavour to follow suit. In fact, the Lloyd’s 
experience of having two regulatory systems had revealed that this was not the correct route 
to go.   
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More specifically, by the late 19th century, the Lloyd’s market was transacting in both marine 
and non-marine business (Dickson, 1960). However, the 1871 Lloyd’s Act dealt only with 
marine insurance and accordingly non-marine insurance was outside the purview of the Act. 
For example, members of marine syndicates had to lodge a deposit of £5 000 while non-
marine syndicates were not required to do so (Gibb, 1957; Vivian, MacGregor & van Vuuren, 
2016a).  This was particularly problematic and was brought to the forefront following the 
Burnard scandal in 1902. It was at that time that Cuthbert Health, “the father of modern 
Lloyd’s” asserted that there should not be two separate regulatory systems within Lloyd’s for 
the two distinct classes of business but rather a single system for the entire Lloyd’s market 
(Gibb, 1957). The Lloyd’s society was thus forced to re-evaluate their self-regulatory system 
and thereafter implemented an integrated and holistic system for the market as a whole (Gibb, 
1957). The Lloyd’s market would therefore be holistically managed and accordingly, a 
simple regulatory philosophy emerged; one market, one regulatory system. Legal Opinion 
was obtained which took the view that the Lloyd’s Act would need to be changed to permit 
an holistic system and the Lloyd’s Act of 1911, as mentioned above, removed the marine 
restriction which had existed in the 1871 Act.  
One may argue that much of the regulatory steps adopted by Churchill were largely 
influenced by the Lloyd’s model since Churchill’s father-in-law was Colonel Sir Henry 
Hozier, who was the secretary of Lloyd’s from 1874 to 1906 (Wrigley, 2002; MacGregor, 
2012). Accordingly, there can be little doubt that Churchill was extensively briefed by his 
father-in-law about the troubles at Lloyd’s and the steps taken to deal with those problems 
(Vivian et al., 2016a). The Lloyd’s experience therefore illustrated the value in an integrated 
regulatory system. 
The 1909 Act, which replaced the Life Assurance Act (1870-1872), extended the regulatory 
regime to include, by way of Section I, life assurance business, fire insurance business, 
accident insurance business, employers’ liability insurance business and bond investment 
business37 (Raynes, 1948; Daykin, 1992; Ford, 2011). The 1909 Act (which not only repealed 
the 1870 Act but also replaced the 1907 Employer’s Liability Insurance Companies Act) 
essentially mirrored a number of the provisions contained in the Life Assurance Acts of 
                                                 
37 The fundamental principle that one market be regulated by one system was therefore adopted.  This would 
become Churchill’s legacy and gift to society. 
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1870-1872 (Ferguson, 1976). That is, deposit requirements to the Paymaster-General, 
separation of funds, detailed revenue accounts and due process for amalgamations and 
winding-up of insurance companies were all addressed in the 1909 Act. As before, the new 
Act had very limited supervisory provisions (Ford, 2011).  
5.1.3.1.1 Analysis of the 1909 changes 
The 1909 changes were merely bringing the life and general markets into harmony. The 
Lloyd’s experience of an holistic system had revealed that this was the correct route to go. 
This would become Churchill’s gift to society, an ideal that appears to be forgotten in light of 
recent regulatory changes. The changes were arguably in the public interest since no evidence 
of regulatory capture is suggested. 
5.1.3.2 Continued improvements 
Immediately after World War II, the government endeavoured to strengthen and “plug some 
of the gaps” in the 1909 Act (Daykin, 1992: 331). The latter was realised through the passing 
of the Assurance Companies Act 1946 which continued the holistic approach to regulation 
and extended the 1909 Act to marine, aviation and transit insurance business (Ford, 2011: 
256). Thereafter, the Insurance Companies Act of 1958, largely a consolidation of the Acts 
passed between 1909 and 1946, was enacted. Nevertheless, it was obvious that greater 
regulatory oversight would be needed in the future. It was the failure of a few high profile 
non-tariff insurers in the 1960s that warranted government intervention and the development 
of a reformed regulatory regime for the insurance market.  
5.1.3.3 Impact of the failures of a number of insurers in the 1960s 
More specifically, the collapse of the Fire, Auto and Marine Insurance Company (FAM) in 
1966 signalled the beginning of more rigorous government control (Hodgin, 1986). In July 
1966, FAM was put into liquidation as a result of plummeting underwriting returns and the 
systematic defrauding of over 400,000 policyholders (Massey, Hart, Widdows, Law, 
Bhattacharya, Hawes & Shaw, n.d). Rapid expansion, fraud, reckless management, greed, 
under-pricing (by virtue of premium undercutting), gross incompetence, high broker 
commissions and false reporting were all attributed to its demise and served to weaken public 
confidence in insurance companies (Day, 2000; Daykin & Cresswell, 2001; Ford, 2011; 
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Massey et al., n.d.). Although the regulator had had doubts as to the longevity of the 
company, it did not act (Massey et al., n.d). Yet again, the Board of Trade was criticised for 
its failure to intervene timeously and for their very circumscribed powers (Daykin, 1992).  
Against this backdrop, Part II of the Companies Act of 1967 gave the Board additional 
powers of supervision and intervention and the Insurance Companies (Accounts and Forms) 
Regulations 1968 was evidence of government’s more engaged approach (Ford, 2011: 257). 
Despite this, the lack of supervisory intervention and controls was further put to the test 
following the collapse of Vehicle & General (V&G) in 1971. This spurred the Insurance 
Companies Act of 1973 (an amended and consolidated version of its 1958 and 1967 
predecessors) in terms of which additional supervisory powers were granted to the Secretary 
for the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)38 (Ford, 2011). 
In response to public outrage following the collapse of FAM and V&G and particularly 
Nation Life (in 1974) the Policyholders Protection Act 1975 was passed39 (Hodgin, 1986; 
Lee, 2001). In the insurance arena, the 1975 Act has been described as a mechanism to ensure 
that policyholders are financially protected and compensated, where legislation to ensure the 
solvency of an insurance company has failed (Birds, 2010; Merkin & Hjalmarsson, 2013). 
The 1975 Act has been described as playing a “suitably efficient role” in protecting 
policyholders (Hodgin, 1986: 51). Notwithstanding these developments, the regulatory 
regime remained largely reactive guided by the endemic laissez-faire sovereignty. In fact, 
Ford (2011:262) notes that “in the UK everything was permitted unless it was expressly 
prohibited”. These measures were largely prudential in nature.   
5.1.3.3.1 Analysis of the changes 
The collapse of a number of insurers throughout the 1960s and 1970s and the legislation 
which followed clearly points to the growing appetite for prudential regulation during this 
time. On the other hand, the issue of fraud, premium undercutting, high broker commissions 
and the legislative responses are clearly market conduct in nature. As mentioned above, 
legislation that is designed to respond to various corporate failures and/or market failures 
                                                 
38 In 1970 the Board of Trade merged into the new DTI. 
39 This Act was subsequently amended in 1997 and replaced with the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(FSMA) 2000 which provided a general compensation scheme for compensating consumers of failed financial 
services who are unable to pay their debts (Fisher, Bewsey, Waters & Ovey, 2003; Birds, 2010). 
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may be in the public interest. In light of the absence of evidence to suggest otherwise, the 
legislation and regulations promulgated during this time were most probably in the public 
interest. 
5.1.3.4 Insurance Companies Act of 1982 
Following the implementation of the 1973 EU Non-Life Directive (to be discussed in section 
6.2) which endeavoured to create a common solvency regime, the Insurance Companies Act 
of 1982 (which consolidated the earlier 1974 Insurance Companies Act) was subsequently 
passed.40 In particular, the prudential regulation and authorisation of insurance companies 
was provided for under the 1982 Act (Ferran, 2003). The 1982 Insurance Companies Act 
made provisions for minimum solvency margins and defined the conditions necessary in 
order for an insurer to be authorised to transact insurance business within the UK (Hardwick 
& Guirguis, 2007: 207). A discussion of said prudential requirements is beyond the scope of 
this study, however, in short, the object of the legislation was to: i) ensure that insurance 
companies maintained prescribed levels of assets over liabilities (based on a common EU 
definition of “margin of solvency”); ii) maintain detailed financial information which was to 
be made available to both the public and the Treasury and; iii) ensure that only fit and proper 
persons transact in insurance business (OECD, 2002: 278; Hardwick & Guirguis, 2007). Of 
more significance to this paper, is Section III of the 1982 Act which makes provision for the 
“conduct of insurance business”. 
According to Section 73 of the Insurance Companies Act of 1982: 
Any person who, by any statement, promise or forecast which he knows to be 
misleading, false or deceptive, or by any dishonest concealment of material 
facts, or by the reckless making (dishonestly or otherwise) of any statement; 
promise or forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive, induces or 
attempts to induce another person to enter into or offer to enter into any 
contract of insurance with an insurance company shall be guilty of an offence. 
The 1982 Act also makes provision for the regulation of insurance intermediaries. In terms of 
Section 74, intermediaries in any insurance transaction (who are connected to a particular 
                                                 
40 At this time, banks were regulated by the Bank of England (by virtue of the Banking Act 1987) while 
insurance companies were subject to solvency regulation under the Insurance Companies Act of 1982 (Taylor, 
2009). The Lloyd's insurance market had a special status under the Insurance Companies Act 198272 and an 
exemption under the Financial Services Act 1986 (Ferran, 2003: 269). 
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insurance company) are required to give the prospective client prescribed information with 
respect to his connection to that company. This might have been done to allow the buyer to 
assess the product and incentives of an advisor and thereby make an informed investment 
decision. The latter is market conduct in nature. 
Despite Section III, prudential regulation (and accordingly the financial viability of an 
insurance firm) was largely the focus of the 1982 Act (Lowry & Rawlings, 2004). In fact, 
Ford (2011: 267) points out that “while the conduct of long-term insurance business was 
increasingly regulated under the 1986 [Financial Services] Act, prudential regulation 
continued to be governed by other legislation, in particular the Insurance Companies Act [of] 
1982”. Until this point, self-regulation was an important source of insurance practice and was 
until recently, the only recognised system in the UK (Birds, 2010). Notwithstanding this, the 
practice of self-regulation has declined over time for a number of reasons, as described 
below. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence that suggests otherwise, it appears that this 
legislation was designed to be in the public interest. 
5.1.4 More recent regulatory developments 
Schaefer (1990) and Ford (2011) identify three fundamental developments in the recent 
regulatory reform that have greatly changed the shape of financial services regulation in the 
UK. These fundamental developments include: i) the formation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC)41  in 1957, ii) the passing of the Financial Services Act of 1986 and iii) by 
virtue of the passing of the Financial Services Market Act of 2000, the development of a far 
more sophisticated regulatory approach by both government and regulators. For continuity 
purposes, the narrative moves away from the chronological storytelling and continue to 
discuss the history of insurance legislation and regulation in the UK. In doing so and in order 
to fully explore these regulatory developments, a brief outline of preceding legislation is also 
discussed in order to provide a comprehensive historical overview. Thereafter, the account 
continues with a discussion of the EEC, its directives and the impact of said directives on the 
UK financial market. 
                                                 
41 Now the European Union (EU). 
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5.2 Transition to regulatory bureaucratic centralism: the rise of market conduct in 
terms of the Financial Services Act of 1986 
The 1986 Act can be best described as a “game changer”. Although the changes to follow 
were not as a result of an identified insurance problem (but rather an investment issue, as will 
be explained), these changes had a direct bearing on the development of insurance regulation 
and thus a discussion of the 1986 Act is an important element in the narrative. 
Up until 1985, the only known system in the UK was the system of self-regulation governed 
by the rule of law. However, following the liberalisation of the market as a result of EEC 
directives, the government of the day endeavoured to create a more effective regulatory 
system for the financial services industry. In particular, it was investment business and not 
insurance business that was in need of reform. Moran (1986:187) emphasised that: 
The fierceness of competition and the pace of innovation (in part around the 
circumvention of old established regulations) associated with this process 
(regulatory change) has imperilled the stability of financial systems and forced 
the elaboration of new rules governing prudence and honesty in the conduct of 
(investment) business. 
As a result of this, the government enlisted the help of a leading academic lawyer and advisor 
to the DTI, Professor L.C.B. Gower in 1981 as part of a one man committee, to undertake a 
review of investor protection in the UK, particularly in the securities market (Pimlott, 1985). 
Professor Gower was therefore tasked with reviewing the existing regulatory structures and 
with making proposals for reform (Robson et al., 1994).  In fact, the aim of review “was to 
consider whether the existing system of disclosure [and] regulation provides adequate 
protection in an efficient and economical way and, if it does not, what should be done about 
it" (Gower, 1984 as cited in Pimlott, 1985: 147). 
Although, Gower was tasked with assessing the regulatory structures to evaluate the degree 
of investor protection, the commission was initially and centrally concerned with the question 
of “de-regulation”.  The idea of “de-regulation” is a strange one indeed since until 1986 the 
hallmark of the UK financial markets was self-regulation. That is¸ the market up to 1986 had 
never been regulated and accordingly, the idea of deregulation seems trite. In the centuries of 
its history, the UK financial market had never been regulated, and accordingly, the question 
arose as to what part of “de-regulation” he was concerned with. The focal point of his 
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attention nonetheless was the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In particular, stock brokers and 
investment intermediaries were his main concern.  
Through their control of the exchange, both stock brokers and intermediaries imposed 
restrictive practices in terms of who could become a stock broker and what rate of 
commission could be charged.  These restrictive practices were drawn up and imposed by the 
LSE itself on its members for the benefit of existing members, in terms of its 500 page rule 
book. The LSE had created an exclusive club which was difficult for outsiders to enter.  Over 
time, there was a growing realisation that the voluntary rules of the LSE were restrictive, 
protecting largely the interests of the members of the exchange, as noted above.  
According, the Office of Fair Trading referred the Stock Exchange rule book and certain 
other practices to the Restrictive Trade Practices Court, alleging that these practices were 
anti-competitive and therefore violated the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1984 (Johnson, 
1992). As a result of this, the LSE decided to amend its rules lifting the restrictions. Lifting 
these would result in banks and other institutions acquiring ownership of brokerages ending 
the era of the individual stockbroker. As a result of lifting these restrictions, securities trading 
practices thereafter underwent considerable changes. The latter is referred to as the London 
Stock Exchange's “Big Bang” which was implemented on the 27th of October 1986. These 
changes were not owing to the passing of the 1986 Financial Services Act. This marked the 
arrival deregulation which was not deregulation of statutory regulation  (Clemons & Weber, 
1990).  
It was also during this time, throughout the 1980s, that the stock price manipulation in the 
case of the Guinness Distillers take-over took place. This resulted in a number of criminal 
convictions. This problem was detected by the USA’s Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) which caused UK politicians to eye the SEC type of regulatory system with envy 
(Gower, 1988). Additional claims of fraud included the Johnson Matthey case (which led to 
the government suing a leading firm of accountants), a number of perceived scandals in the 
Lloyd’s market and more significantly the collapse a prominent investment firm, Norton 
Warburg, in 1981 (Radcliffe, Cooper & Robson, 1994). The series of scandals highlighted the 
misalignment between the operations of the financial markets and the government’s “political 
commitments” and accordingly, attracted considerable publicity (Radcliffe et al., 1994). As a 
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result of this, the international competitive position of London was under scrutiny owing to 
these perceived regulatory failures (Robson, Willmott, Cooper & Puxty, 1994).  
The increasing concern with “crooks, rogues and incompetents in relation to investor 
protection” attributed to government’s desire to ensure that foreign investors would be 
comfortable interacting with the London market, particularly in the light of more rigorous 
regulatory systems in the United States (Robson et al., 1994: 542).  This also meant that the 
pervasive concept of self-regulation came under fire and the “inherent conflicts” and 
“operational inadequacies” of self-regulation were recognised (Ford, 2011: 265). In response 
to this, the government embarked on a journey to address these weaknesses and accordingly 
this period marked the beginning of a shift to an enhanced regulatory framework (Ford, 2011: 
265). This would be done with the help of Professor Gower, who was perceived to be an 
authority on company law. 
After publishing a Discussion Document in 1982, Professor Gower stated that the review of 
investor protection was being undertaken in conjunction with an analysis of the degree of 
protection enjoyed by persons engaged in investments other than securities (Pimlott, 1985). 
Thus, the review included an assessment of consumer protection measures and regulations in 
the insurance market, amongst others, although, as mentioned above, the thrust for the new 
regulatory regime had its roots in investment failures and not insurance failures.  The 
insurance market being historically and fundamentally self-regulated was, so to speak, sucked 
into the new system and was neither the source nor the impetus for such reform.  
Accordingly, the 1986 Financial Services Act, which followed Gower’s report and 
recommendations, was therefore not directed at a specifically identified insurance problem 
and for the first time in British history, a centralised bureaucratic regulatory system was born. 
It was as a result of the 1986 legislative changes that market conduct arose in its modern 
form.  
The 1986 Financial Services Act emerged, receiving Royal Assent on November 7, 1986 
following a number of recommendations by Professor Gower (Barnard, 1987). The mammoth 
289 page Act has often been described as an enabling Act “[in] response to pressure to 
improve the adequacy of regulation and the inability of the financial markets to provide an 
impression of honesty through unsupervised self-regulation” (Robson et al., 1994: 541). 
Being an enabling Act, the detail would be contained in regulations to be published.  The UK 
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had moved from away from self-regulation to hundreds of pages of regulations, which over 
the next few years would grow to more than 10 000 pages of regulations and guidelines. 
 The lengthy Act is entitled: 
An Act to regulate the carrying on of investment business, to make related 
provisions with regard to insurance business and business carried by friendly 
societies…to make provisions as to the disclosure of information obtained 
under enactments relating to fair trading, banking and insurance…42 
Furthermore, in the Conservative Party election manifesto of 1987, it was declared that: 
The Financial Services Act of 1986 … contains stringent new powers to 
investigate insider dealing which was first made a criminal offence by the 
Conservative Government in 1980. The Conservative Party is the party of law 
and order. That applies just as much to City fraud as to street crime. 
The provisions of the 1986 Act insofar as they relate to the insurance market are discussed 
below.  
5.2.1.1.1 Securities and Investment Board and Self-Regulatory Organisations  
In arriving at his recommendations, Gower pointed out that the existing Prevention of Fraud 
(Investments) Act of 1958 was no longer adequate and therefore should be replaced by more 
comprehensive legislation43 (Cartwright, 1999). Gower emphasised his preference for the 
establishment of a number of bodies that would regulate their members, subject to 
government supervision (and certain conditions and carefully defined limits) and therefore 
the idea of self-regulation prevailed to a certain extent44 (Peeters, 1988: 395; Radcliffe et al., 
1994). In particular, Gower (1988:8) asserted: 
What I believed was needed was something similar to the system adopted in 
the United States some 50 years earlier and later copied, with modifications, 
by many Commonwealth and foreign countries. I wanted statutory control of 
investment business, widely defined, under which all those conducting that 
                                                 
42 Lloyd’s of London and the Banking industry are exempt from the provisions of the Act.  
43 The narrow scope of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958 meant that a number of industries 
were exempt from its application.  
44 Gower recommended a self-regulatory system through the operation of SRO’s. However, Gower was unaware 
of the fact that a similar system, in terms of tariff committees, had once proven to be unsuccessful and was later 
disbanded in the late 1970s since it was found to be unlawful.  
87 
 
business would be authorised by, and regulated through, membership of a few 
self-regulatory organisations recognised by, and under the surveillance of, a 
governmental or quasi-governmental body which, ideally should be a self-
standing Commission. 
Professor Gower was committed to the fact that there was a need for a redistribution of 
responsibilities between governmental regulators and self-regulatory bodies and accordingly 
between statutory and non-statutory regulation (Peeters, 1988: 383). Gower (as cited in 
Pimlott, 1985:149) pointed out that"[i]t should be the role of government to decide major 
questions involving public policy but discretionary day to day regulation is better handled by 
self-regulatory agencies". Gower pointed out that self-regulation could be enforced more 
effectively since its success depends on such non-legal sanctions such as adverse publicity, 
suspension of listing, and expulsion from the "club" (Pimlott, 1985:148). On the contrary, the 
existing statutory regulation depended on criminal proceedings which required a high degree 
of proof and thus had a low rate of success (Pimlott, 1985:148). The idea of self-regulation 
was further supported by the Council for the Securities Industry who argued that government 
regulation inevitably results in over-detailed regulation and a rigid interpretation of rules 
(Black & Nobles, 1998a: 935). This was further reiterated by a number of other claims that 
stated that the government should avoid direct involvement in the regulation of financial 
services (Robson et al., 1994).  
Following the passing of the 1986 Act, it has been cited that government had introduced a 
new system of “self-regulation within a statutory framework” (Bernard, 1987: 344). 
However, Gower (1988: 11) who was clearly an admirer of the American SEC, but who had 
accepted that the UK market would not at that stage accept the SEC model, points out that a 
more accurate description of what transpired is “statutory regulation monitored by self-
regulatory organisations recognised by, and under the surveillance of, a self-standing 
Commission”. That is, since he realised that the UK financial market would not accept the 
US SEC system, he recommended a system which could be morphed into a US SEC type of 
system.    As mentioned above, this meant that the idea of self-regulation would remain but it 
would be subject to the surveillance and oversight of the state, in the form of the DTI and, 
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more directly, the newly created Securities and Investment Board (SIB)45 (Robson et al., 
1994: 541).  
In line with Gower’s recommendations, the SIB was established as the ‘designated agency’, a 
non-statutory, private limited company, the board of which was to be appointed by the 
Secretary of State and the Governor of the Bank of England (Bernard, 1987; Hablutzel, 
1992). However, the ultimate authority vested with the Secretary of State who could at any 
time resume regulatory responsibility from the SIB if it ceased to conform to the 
requirements set out in the legislation (Peeters, 1988).  That is, although almost all the powers 
of regulation were vested with the DTI, powers could be delegated to the SIB to “oversee and 
authorise more specialist, sector-based, self-regulatory organisations (Radcliffe et al., 
1994:613). Accordingly, in addition to issuing rules on the standards of conduct, financial 
supervision and protection of client money, the granting of authorisation and the monitoring 
of the conduct of authorised persons would be carried out by a network of self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs)46 approved by the SIB (Hatchwell & Fiducia, 2009; Taylor, 2009). The 
SIB was therefore poised to become the centralised regulator (Vivian, MacGregor & van 
Vuuren, 2016b). 
According to Chapter III, Section 8(1) of the Act, an SRO is a body (whether a body 
corporate or an unincorporated association) which regulates the carrying on of investment 
business of any kind by enforcing rules which are binding on persons carrying on business of 
that kind either because they are members of that body or because they are otherwise subject 
to its control. A number of criteria ought to have been satisfied before a regulatory agency 
was recognised. For example, a number of entrance conditions had to be satisfied to ensure 
that members of the regulatory agency were "fit and proper" persons (Robson et al., 1994).  
In order to receive authorisation to carry out investment and insurance business, a firm had to 
be a member of an SRO or had to be regulated directly by the SIB (Black & Nobles, 1998a). 
                                                 
45 In addition to the establishment of SROs, Recognized Professional Bodies (RPB) were also developed. This 
would regulate a number of professional bodies (i.e. accountants). A further discussion of RPB’s is beyond the 
scope of this study (see Robson et al., 1994 for further detail). 
46 SROs are often referred to as second-tier regulatory bodies. 
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Within an insurance context, the most important recognised SRO’S for the control of retail 
financial services were47:  
• The Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association 
(FIMBRA): for the regulation of independent financial intermediaries/advisors, 
including life assurance intermediaries 
• The Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO): for the 
regulation of insurance companies and specifically life offices. 
5.2.1.1.2 Conduct of investment and insurance business 
Since the regulations which investment business will have to observe include those 
prescribed by the 1986 Act itself and by the secondary legislation to be promulgated by the 
SIB, it is therefore necessary to examine both the rules and regulations as per to the 1986 Act 
and in accordance with the SIB48 (Gower, 1988: 13). It is imperative to make note of the 
terminology that is used in the 1986 Act. That is, the 1986 Act uses the expression 
“regulations” in relation to the secondary legislation made either by the Secretary of State or 
by the SIB (by virtue of delegation), however it is “rules” that would be made by the SRO’s 
(as well as the SIB in addition to their “regulations”) (Gower, 1988: 16). Chapter V and VI of 
the 1986 Act provide the framework for the regulation of financial services. As Gower (1988: 
16) puts it, the 1986 Act provides the skeleton (of regulation), while the DTI, the SIB and the 
SROs are engaged in clothing the skeleton with flesh and muscle. More specifically, Part I, 
Chapter V and Part II, Section 133 of the Act, provide a framework for the regulation of the 
conduct of investment and insurance business respectively. In was in terms of this approach 
that the UK financial services sector moved from a system of regulation by law to a system of 
regulation by bureaucracy. 
                                                 
47 The Securities Association (TSA), The Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers (AFBD) and the 
Investment Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO) constitute the remaining approved SROs. LAUTRO 
and FIMBRA were subsequently de-authorised in 1997. 
48 The main rules and regulations which the Secretary of State may make and which the SIB has had to make 
are: notification regulations, conduct of business rules, financial resources rules, cancellation rules, 
compensation fund rules, clients’ money regulations , and unsolicited calls regulations (See Gower, 1988). 
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According to Section 40 (Part I, Chapter V) of the 1986 Act: 
(1) Any person who- 
(a) makes a statement, promise or forecast which he knows to be misleading, false 
or deceptive or dishonestly conceals any material facts ; or 
(b) recklessly makes (dishonestly or otherwise) a statement, promise or forecast 
which is misleading, false or deceptive, is guilty of an offence if he makes the 
statement, promise or forecast or conceals the facts for the purpose of 
inducing, or is reckless as to whether it may induce, another person…to enter 
or offer to enter into, or to refrain from entering or offering to enter into, an 
investment agreement or to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights 
conferred by an investment. 
(2) Any person who does any act or engages in any course of conduct which 
creates a false or misleading impression as to the market in or the price or 
value of any investments is guilty of an offence if he does so for the purpose 
of creating that impression and of thereby inducing another person to acquire, 
dispose of, subscribe for or underwrite those investments or to refrain from 
doing so or to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by 
those investments. 
Part II, Section 133 of the Act makes specific provision for the conduct of insurance business 
and reads: 
(1) Any person who- 
(a) makes a statement, promise or forecast which he known to be misleading, 
false or deceptive or dishonestly conceals any material facts ; or  
(b) recklessly makes (dishonestly or otherwise) a statement, promise or forecast is 
guilty of an offence if he makes the statement, promise or forecast or conceals 
the facts for the purpose of inducing, or is reckless as to whether it may 
induce, another person (whether or not the person to whom the statement, 
promise or forecast is made or from whom the facts are concealed) to enter 
into or offer to enter  into, or to refrain from entering or offering to enter into, 
a contract of insurance with an insurance company (not being an investment 
agreement) or to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by 
such a contract. 
Gower (1988: 17) sums up that the rules and regulations prescribed under the 1986 Act can 
be divided into 5 main aims. These include:  
i) To ensure that those persons undertaking investment business are “fit and proper” 
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ii) To ensure that authorised firms are subject to rules and regulations to safeguard 
client protection 
iii) To provide clients with adequate channels of complaint 
iv) To provide clients with the “ultimate safety net” of a compensation fund should 
the firm become insolvent 
v) To ensure that firms are put out of business as rapidly as possible if they 
transgress and, if their offence is sufficiently grave, that they are prosecuted 
According to Chapter V, Section 48(1) of the 1986 Act, the Secretary of State may make 
rules regulating the conduct of investment business by authorised persons but those rules 
shall not apply to members of a recognised self-regulating organisation in respect of 
investment business in which case they are subject to the rules of the organisation. The notion 
that the Secretary of State is the ‘delegated authority’, to which a number of functions are 
conferred, is emphasised throughout the 1986 Act and is further reinforced by virtue of 
Chapter VI of the 1986 Act. This however creates confusion as the reader may assume that 
the “top body” of this new regulatory structure would continue to be the DTI (Gower, 1988: 
11). However section 114 subsection (1) provides that, if it appears to the Secretary of State 
that “a body corporate has been established which is able and willing to discharge all or any 
of the functions designated to which this section applies” and that certain specified 
requirements are satisfied, he may make an order transferring all or any of those functions to 
that body-which the Act describes not as a Commission, but as a “designated agency” 
(Gower, 1988:11).  
In February 1987, the SIB officially requested that the Secretary of State acknowledge the 
Board as the first ‘designated agency” under the Act and further to make its rulebook public 
(Peeters, 1988: 392). Said recognition was conferred on May 18, 1987 by virtue of Section 
114(2) which states that should the aforementioned conditions be fulfilled “the body to which 
functions are transferred…shall be the body known as The Securities and Investments Board 
Limited49 if it appears to the Secretary of State that it is able and willing to discharge them”. 
Thereafter, the Secretary of State also delegated most, but not all, of their functions to the 
SIB (Gower, 1988). This included a number of “draconian powers”, some of which included 
                                                 
49 As permitted by paragraph 2 of Schedule 9, the SIB subsequently dropped the word “Limited” from its name. 
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the power to remove or suspend a firm’s authorisation, the power to call for information from 
any authorised person, the power to investigate an authorised business as well as prosecution 
powers (Gower, 1988). 
In addition to complying with the “statements of principle” as provided in the 1986 Act, 
authorised persons ought not to violate the specific ‘conduct of business rules’ of the SIB or 
of any SRO to which they are a member (Thieffry & Brooks, 1999). Accordingly, any 
authorised firm that is a member of a recognised SRO is not subject directly to the rules of 
the SIB but rather to those rules of the respective recognised (approved) SRO by virtue of 
their membership contract (Gower, 1988). In order to obtain approval, a SRO’s rules must 
afford adequate consumer protection at least equivalent to those of the SIB (Bernard, 1987). 
In other words, the supervision of market conduct activities is entrusted with the SRO 
provided that they produce rule books which are at least as effective to the rule book of the 
SIB (Buckle & Thompson, 1998).  
It was envisaged that SRO’s would be subject to a three-tier rulebook structure as created by 
the SIB and as modelled on the provisions of the 1986 Act (Brazier, 1996). The “first-tier” 
contained ‘40 Core Conduct of Business Rules’ which are detailed market conduct provisions 
that govern various inter-relationships (Fishman, 1991). These rules were concerned with 
market conduct since SROs could not set capital adequacy standards50 (Peeters, 1988). It is 
the former that is of particular interest in this paper and of significance in the pursuit of 
tracing market conduct regulation.  
It is important to note however, that under the 1986 Act, the SIB's ‘Conduct of Business 
Rules’ applied to insurance companies and friendly societies only to the extent of the 
marketing of policies and the management and marketing of pension funds (Peeters, 1988). In 
order to avoid a lengthy discussion of each SRO’s specific rules, a summary of the most 
relevant rules to the insurance industry, as per the SIB’s rulebook, are listed below. Recall, 
that in order to receive approval, each SRO’s rules had to be of the same standard as those 
provided by the SIB. One could then argue that each SRO’s rules would be of similar 
                                                 
50 While the conduct of investment long-term insurance business was regulated under the 1986 Act, prudential 
regulation was largely governed by earlier legislation (including the Insurance Companies Act 1982). A number 
of subsequent reforms regarding prudential regulation were made. For a more comprehensive analysis of this 
see Ford (2011:267). 
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substance and accordingly any discrepancies in rulebooks would be a mere difference in 
semantics. That is, they will differ in form only (Gower, 1988).  
The SIB’s rules aimed to ensure that authorised persons and firms adhered to a high standard 
of integrity and fair dealing, acted with due skill, care and diligence and complied with best 
market practice (Barnard, 1987: 350). Following a review of Barnard (1987), Black and 
Nobles (1998a), Black and Nobles (1998b) and Rees and Kessner (1999), a summary of the 
most relevant rules to the insurance industry are listed below51: 
• The “know your customer” rule: any person tasked with advising on or recommending a 
specific investment product is required to obtain sufficient and adequate information 
from the client concerning their personal and financial situation (as may be relevant) 
and investment objectives. It was however only in 1992 that guidance was given as to 
what the “know your customer” duties actually entailed with regards to pension 
business. 
• The “best advice” or “best execution” rule: any person tasked with advising on or 
recommending a specific investment product is required to advise and recommend on 
those products which are most suitable for the customer and best satisfy their needs. In 
particular, the SIB has pointed out that the investment product recommended “must not 
be one which on any reasonable view the customer would be better off without” but 
rather that which “would plainly be more appropriate”. 
• Adequate record keeping: although the maintaining of adequate records was a 
requirement, regulators failed to convey what was meant by this and what constituted 
adequate record keeping. In fact, the SIB failed to prescribe any minimum length of the 
record keeping document and did not express the types of information that each firm 
was to record.52 
• Disclosure requirements: Independent Financial Advisors (IFA) were required to 
disclose both their status as well as the fact that they received a commission. In other 
                                                 
51 Said rules have often been described as “general rather than specific” and accordingly what they required in 
practice was often left to the discretion of the firms themselves (Black & Nobles, 1998b: 936). 
52 The most common method of record keeping was known as the “fact find”. This was simply a popular method 
to “know your customer” and a mechanism to comply with the record keeping requirement. 
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words, sellers of insurance were required to inform prospective clients whether they 
were acting as an independent broker or exclusively selling the product of one company 
only. In addition to this, financial advisors were required to disclose any other material 
information and to supply “sufficient information” (rates and returns and other charges 
and expenses). This requirement appears to have been a reiteration of Section 74 of the 
Insurance Companies Act of 1982. 
• Complaint requirements: firms are required to ensure that each claim was investigated 
and dealt with by the relevant person with appropriate experience and competence. 
• Compliance procedures: each firm ought to have established compliance procedures in 
addition to compiling a compliance manual. 
It is important to note at this point, that the Secretary of State could amend the rules of the 
SIB (and obviously those of an SRO) if they were contrary to any provision of the 1986 Act. 
In fact, Chapter III, Section 13 asserts: 
If at any time it appears to the Secretary of State that the rules of a recognised 
organisation do not satisfy the requirements…. [of] this Act he may, instead of 
revoking the recognition…direct the organisation to alter, or himself alter, its 
rules in such manner as he considers necessary for securing that the rules 
satisfy those requirements. 
The aforementioned rules were not however without criticism. Regulators were often charged 
with failing to give adequate guidance as to what constituted “adequate record keeping” or 
what were the explicit duties of “know your customer” (Black & Nobles, 1998a). Pimlott 
(1985:149) notes that the idea of self-regulation carries with it the risks of imprecise and 
vague rules. The latter appears to have been the case. Notwithstanding this, the 
abovementioned scandals and an increasing level of international cooperation through the 
newly established European Community resulted in an “increased acceptance of the role of 
government in developing enhanced regulation and actively supervising compliance by 
insurers” (Daykin, 2001:2). The life of the 1986 Act and its complex structures however 
proved to be short lived and were replaced when the FSA was established.53  
                                                 
53 The FSA officially opened its doors on 1 June 1998 and assumed responsibility for insurance regulation in 
1999. 
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5.2.1.1.3 Analysis of 1986 changes  
The regulatory approach ushered in by the 1986 Act marks a complete break with the past. 
Firstly, and as was pointed out, the changes had nothing to do with the insurance market. 
What was now being regulated was the ‘financial market’ as a whole. Thus the inexplicably 
restrictive practices of the London Stock Exchange and stock manipulation (a repeat of the 
1720 South Sea Bubble) resulted in a generalised statutory management system being 
introduced which irrationally encompassed the insurance industry and other markets. The 
main thrust of the 1986 Act was the creation of bureaucratic institutions which developed 
various requirements which were clearly market conduct in nature.  The age of market 
conduct was thus born. It should be clear that the enormous array of new obligations which 
were imposed on financial institutions did not arise from contract. The market conduct 
system therefore abandoned the Lockean system.  
As indicated, the 1986 changes for the first time abandoned the UK’s self-regulatory system 
by introducing a bureaucratic supervisory system - the centralised managerial system. The 
system lasted less than a decade and the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995 demonstrated its 
ineffectiveness. This system was thereafter replaced with an even more managerially intense 
system, which too was abandoned after the 2008 events. It has often been argued that 
legislation that is promulgated is done so in the public interest. Yet, these centralised 
managerial systems have clearly failed and have been enormously expensive. There is no 
evidence that the public had, in fact, benefitted. 
5.2.1.2 Financial Services Authority and Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
It did not take long to abandon Gower’s scheme as introduced by the 1986 Act. In addition to 
the pension mis-selling scandal (to be discussed in section 5.5.3) being one of the prominent 
issues that eventually “drove the overhaul of the system”, the closure of the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI) and the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995 had too 
beckoned greater regulatory oversight (Ferran, 2012; Arnott, 2009).  The collapse made it 
clear that the complex system created by the 1986 Act was a failure and accordingly was also 
the catalyst for the establishment of the FSA, to be discussed below.54 Such “corporate 
                                                 
54 The SIB was renamed the FSA and thus, technically speaking, no new regulatory body was formed. This is 
contrary to the belief that the FSMA 2000 created the FSA in the early 2000s. Although the FSMA 2000 spelled 
out the functions of and gave full effect to the FSA, the Authority had existed since 1998 prior to the passing of 
the Act.  
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collapses and malpractices within the sector suggest[ed] that, despite UK financial markets 
being well-developed and relatively sophisticated, there [had] been sufficient system 
weaknesses to enable episodes of financial company malfeasance” (Handley-Schachler, 
Juleff & Paton, 2007: 628).  
Heffernan (2005:231) points out that both the closure of BCCI and the collapse of Barings 
Bank “raised questions about the supervisory abilities of the Bank of England”.  The Bank of 
England’s responsibility and capabilities for regulating the banking industry thus came under 
fire since it appeared that Barings had enjoyed a relatively light touch regulatory regime 
(Taylor, 2009:70). More specifically, the Bank of England was heavily criticised for not 
intervening sooner to prevent the numerous BCCI fraudulent operations (Ferran, 2003: 261). 
The Labour Government asserted that the then 300 year old Bank of England was incapable 
of regulating the prudential affairs of banks and accordingly, the government of the day 
sought to establish a single regulator for the entire financial market (Heffernan, 2005; Taylor, 
2009; Ferran, 2003). 
The rationale to create a single financial regulator was based on the so-called “blurring the 
boundaries” argument (Taylor, 2009:73). In his statement to the House of Commons on the 
20th of May 1997, Gordon Brown argued that: 
At the same time, it is clear that the distinctions between different types of 
financial institution-banks, securities firms and insurance companies-are 
becoming increasingly blurred. Many of today's financial institutions are 
regulated by a plethora of different supervisors. This increases the cost and 
reduces the effectiveness of the supervision.  
There is therefore a strong case in principle for bringing the regulation of 
banking, securities and insurance together under one roof. Firms now organise 
and manage their businesses on a group-wide basis. Regulators need to look at 
them in a consistent way. That would bring the regulatory structure closer into 
line with today's increasingly integrated financial markets. It would deliver 
more effective and efficient supervision, giving both firms and customers 
better value for money, and would improve the competitiveness of the sector 
and create a regulatory regime to genuinely meet the challenges of the 21st 
century.  
Furthermore, a single regulator, it was argued, was in line with best international practice. 
After all, Norway introduced the ‘single regulator’ in 1986, Denmark in 1998, Sweden in 
1991, Japan in 1998, Korea in 1998 and Iceland in 1999 (Briault, 2000; Davies & Green, 
2008).  As a result of this, some two years after the failure of Barings Bank in 1995, the 
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responsibility for all aspects of financial regulation was transferred to the FSA55 (Heffernan, 
2005). The FSA became the ‘one-stop-shop financial regulator’ so to speak (Vivian, 2015a). 
The supervisory and related powers were transferred from the Bank of England to the FSA in 
June 1998 in terms of the Banking Act 1998 (Ferran, 2003). The latter violated Churchill’s 
legacy which, as mentioned earlier, endeavoured to create one holistic regulator for a single 
market (each with their own characteristics) and not for the financial market in its entirety. 
The Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 (fully in effect from 1 December 
2001) further completed this process of integration and signaled a shift away from self-
regulation toward statutory regulation (Davies, 2001; Daykin & Cresswell, 2001). As such, 
the FSA was to operate under the terms of this statute as the single statutory regulator of 
financial services in the UK. A more comprehensive and assertive approach to regulation 
emerged following the passing of FSMA 2000 (Ford, 2011). The FSMA 2000, which 
repealed both the 1986 Act and Insurance Companies Act 1982, spelt out the both the 
functions and the responsibilities of the FSA. That is, the FSA’s regulatory powers were 
derived from the FSMA 2000 although the FSA had existed prior to this time. According to 
Part I, Section 2(2) of the Act 2000, the regulatory objectives of the FSA are: 
• Market confidence: Maintaining confidence in the financial system; 
• Public awareness: Promoting public awareness of the financial system56; 
• The protection of consumers: Securing the appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers; 
• The reduction of financial crime: Reducing the extent to which it is possible for a 
business carried on by a regulated person to be used for a purpose connected with 
financial crime. 
                                                 
55 Although the Bank of England was no longer the formal prudential regulator, it continued to share the 
responsibility for ensuring the financial stability of the market with both the FSA and the HM Treasury in terms 
of a Memorandum of Understanding (see Heffernan, 2005). 
56 This objective was later replaced with a new objective of “contributing to the protection and enhancement of 
the UK’s financial system as per the Financial Services Act 2010.  
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Furthermore, yet not explicitly stated in the Act 2000, the FSA was engaged in a “massive 
exercise to implement MiFID” into the national legislative framework (Moloney, 2014: 149). 
The latter is discussed in section 6.2.7.   
In managing its affairs, the Authority ought to have had regard to generally accepted 
principles of good corporate governance. In addition to this, the FSMA 2000 provided a set 
of principles of good regulation that must have been adhered to by the FSA when discharging 
its duties. In other words, the four aforementioned objectives were “conditioned by a set of 
principles of good regulation” (Davies, 2001:280). Accordingly, the FSA ought to have had 
regard to: 
• The need to use its resources in the most efficient and economic[al] way; 
• The responsibilities of those who manage the affairs of authorised persons; 
• The principle that a burden or restriction which is imposed on a person, or on the 
carrying on of an activity, should be proportionate to the benefits, considered in 
general terms, which are expected to result from the imposition of that burden or 
restriction; 
• The desirability of facilitating innovation in connection with regulated activities; 
• The international character of financial services and markets and the desirability of 
maintaining the competitive position of the UK; 
• The need to minimise the adverse effects on competition that may arise from anything 
done in the discharge of those functions; 
• The desirability of facilitating competition between those who are subject to any form 
of regulation by the Authority; and 
• The establishment of a consumer financial education body to facilitate consumer 
education in the section (this was implemented only in April 2010). 
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The FSA’s regulatory regime was anchored on a set of principles of good practice. Under the 
2000 Act, firms carrying on regulated activities are to be regulated by the FSA and are 
required to: 
• Conduct its business with integrity 
• Conduct its business with due care, skill and diligence 
• Take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively 
(with adequate risk management systems) 
• Maintain adequate financial resources 
• Observe proper standards of market conduct 
• Pay due regard to the interests of its customers and communicate information to them 
which is clear, fair and not misleading 
• Manage conflicts of interest fairly 
• Take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions 
for any customer entitled to rely upon its judgment 
• Arrange adequate protection for customer’s assets 
• Deal with regulators in an open and cooperative way 
• Disclose promptly any information relating to the firm of which the FSA would 
reasonably expect prompt notice. 
From this it can be seen that the regulatory activities of the FSA encompassed two main 
areas, namely prudential regulation and market conduct regulation or regulation of conduct of 
business. It is the latter that is of relevance to this report. In particular, Principle 3 (‘Market 
Practice’) requires that a firm observe high standards of market conduct. It should also, to the 
extent endorsed for the purpose of this principle, comply with any code or standard in force 
from time to time and as it applies to the firm. In the end, the FSA’s regulatory guidelines 
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amounted to a mammoth 10 500 pages - a completely unworkable and complex set of rules 
(Vivian, 2015c). 
It was also around this time in July 2000, that the General Insurance Standards Council 
(GISC) was established to regulate the sales, advisory and service standards of its members 
(Hodgin, 2002). This voluntary regulatory body for brokers aimed to ensure that insurance 
customers were treated fairly by establishing a set of minimum standards of good practice 
(Hodgin, 2002). As mentioned earlier, prior to May 2001 when the GISC replaced the 
Insurance Brokers Registration Council (IBRC), brokers were to be registered under the 1977 
Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act and furthermore were subject to the codes of practice 
and conduct as administered by the IBRC (Summer, 2013). Thereafter, the GISC, like its 
predecessor, established standards of conduct for brokers (modelled on the ABI codes) and 
further laid down a number of sanctions (Summer, 2013). According to the Code, members 
were required to: 
• Act fairly and reasonably in their dealings with customers 
• Ensure that information given to customers is clear, fair and not misleading 
• Avoid conflicts of interest 
• Provide sufficient information and assistance to ensure that consumers make an 
informed decision 
• Handle claims fairly and promptly 
• Ensure that all advertising and promotional material is clear, fair and not misleading 
• Explain the services offered including whether or not the service is given 
independently 
• Ensure that, as far as possible, that the products and services offered match the 
customers’ requirements 
• Explain all the main features of the products and services that offered 
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• Provide the customer with full details of the costs of the insurance including policy 
premiums, fees and charges other than the insurance premium, and the purpose of 
each fee or charge, and commission payments or any other amounts received for 
arranging the insurance  
• Provide appropriate and knowledgeable advice or recommendations that are aimed at 
meeting the customer’s interests  
• Ensure that misleading claims are not made on any product or service offered or make 
any unfair criticisms about products and services that are offered by a competitor  
Under the GISC Rules (Rule F42), insurance companies that were members thereto could not 
accept business from non-GISC member brokers (Burling, 2013). However, following the 
enactment of the 1988 Competition Act, the rule was deemed anti-competitive and 
accordingly, the GISC was unable to actively enforce its standards (Merkin & Steele, 2013).   
On 12 December 2001, Government announced the extension of FSMA 2000 to include 
brokers and thereby announced that the FSA would be responsible for the regulation of 
insurance intermediaries (Burling, 2013). The order came into force on 31 October 2004 and 
from 14 January 2005, virtually all insurance activities were governed by statutory regulation 
(Ford, 2011:273). Accordingly, GISC codes of practice were eventually replaced by the 
Insurance Conduct of Business’ Rules (ICOB) (Summer, 2013).  
5.2.1.3 Equitable Life 
As mentioned above, in addition to performing ‘conduct of business’ supervision, the FSA 
was also responsible for micro-prudential supervision of banks, building societies, investment 
firms, insurance companies and brokers, credit unions and friendly societies (House of Lords 
Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 2009). As such, the responsibility for the supervision 
of financial stability was shared by HM Treasury57, the Bank of England and the FSA, in 
what was known as the “tripartite authorities” (Hall, 2009b).  
The problems of Equitable Life, which came to a head in 2000, exposed various gaps in the 
regulatory structure and thereafter provided considerable impetus for reform (Wheatley, 
2013). More specifically, the near collapse of Equitable Life has been described as “the 
                                                 
57 Formally known as Her Majesty’s Treasury. 
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biggest crisis in the modern history of British insurance and pensions” and accordingly, has 
resulted in numerous reports and inquiries as to who may be to blame (Roberts, 2012:1). The 
crisis revealed itself in July 2000 when Equitable Life’s assets were insufficient to meet 
liabilities and as such, it announced its closure to new business on 8 December 2000. 
(Jørgensen, 2004; HM Treasury, 2009). The continuation of Equitable Life was safeguarded 
by adjustments to its balance sheet, the sale of realisable parts of the business and the 
negotiation of a “compromise settlement” between itself and various policyholders in order to 
stabilise its business (Roberts, 2012: 7). However, by October 2008, in the wake of the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers and the financial crisis, potential purchasers who were 
interested in acquiring Equitable’s remaining 500 000 policyholders were no longer able to 
do so (Roberts, 2012). It was the latter that ultimately resulted in the Equitable’s demise and 
which put the proverbial “nail in the coffin”. 
By this time, a significant number of reports, including the Ombudsman’s report, had been 
published in terms of which the role of the financial regulator was interrogated. The near 
collapse was not caused by traditional insurance products but rather (and once again) by a 
pension product.  At a time when interest rates were high, the Equitable sold guaranteed 
pensions which became unsustainable as interest rates dropped.  The guarantees could only 
be funded over the short run from profits that were generated by other businesses.  As it 
became more and more clear that the low interest rates would prevail for a long time, these 
guarantees would become unsustainable and would cause the Equitable Life to go insolvent. 
Accordingly, over time, it became increasingly clear that the Equitable would not be able to 
honour its obligations.   
The only practical solution was for the Equitable Life to reduce the guarantees it had 
contractually agreed.  Most would regard this to be a market conduct matter since the insurer 
had mis-sold a product.  Nevertheless, in order to achieve this, the Equitable approached the 
courts which initially agreed to this. However, this was eventually overturned by the UK 
Supreme Court. More specifically, disgruntled policyholders sued the Equitable and of course 
won their case in the UK Supreme Court. The problem was that the insurer would never be in 
a position to make good on its promises and once the court made its ruling, the insurer was 
obviously insolvent. Insolvency is a prudential matter and thus the market conduct matter 
became a prudential matter. The Equitable Life soon closed its doors to new business.  
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Effectively it placed itself into a run off.  One again, investment products had caused the 
problems. 
The Penrose Report of the Equitable Life Inquiry (2004) stated that the near collapse of 
Equitable Life could be attributed not only to deficient non-executives, autocratic managers 
and an inadequate corporate governance structure, but also to the weak regulatory system 
(Roberts, 2012). In fact, Lord Penrose remarked that “it be appropriate to comment that the 
practices of the Society’s management could not have been sustained over a material part of 
the 1990s had there been in place an appropriate regulatory structure”. More specifically, the 
Prenrose report (2004) criticised the FSA for neglecting the numerous problems that the 
Equitable Life was facing. Similarly, the Baird Report (2001) pointed out a number of 
inadequacies in the FSA’s approach to the scandal and as such, noted that prudential 
supervision had failed to restrain the hazardous conduct of the firm (Ryder, Griffiths & 
Singh, 2012). Arnott (2009), the former head of Consumer Education for the FSA, noted that 
“it [the FSA] was immersed in the task of ensuring that the three million people who had 
been mis-sold personal pensions received the compensation that was their due”. As such, the 
FSA had failed to recognise a number of early warning signs and as a result “the scandals 
kept coming” (Arnott, 2009).  
However, the Baird Report (2001) acknowledged that the Equitable Life was already headed 
towards failure by the time the FSA had assumed responsibility. In fact, the report (2001: 
187) states:  
Applying hindsight, it is fair to say that, by 1 January 1999 [when the FSA 
took over], the ‘die was cast’ and we have seen nothing which the FSA could 
have done thereafter which would have mitigated, in any material way, the 
impact… as far as existing policyholders were concerned, or made any 
material beneficial difference to the financial outcome as far as Equitable Life 
was concerned. 
Said claims were further supported by Ann Abraham, as the Parliamentary Ombudsman at 
the time, who noted in her report, Equitable Life: a decade of regulatory failure (2008), that 
the FSA was clear of any wrongdoing and that regulatory maladministration and a “serial 
regulatory failure” was to blame. This appears to be the case since the collapse of Equitable 
Life coincided with the formation of the then newly established FSA and as such, many of 
the problems associated with the Equitable transpired under the watch of the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) and HM Treasury (Thoyts, 2010).  
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Following the announcement of Equitable’s near failure, the FSA commissioned John Tiner 
(as the FSA’s managing director for consumer, investment and insurance issues) “to lead a 
‘complete overhaul’ of insurance regulation” (Roberts, 2012:10). This became known as the 
‘Tiner Project’ which in time, adjudged the insurance regulatory system and concluded that 
the system as a whole was “somewhat antiquated”58 (Roberts, 2012:10). All of the 
abovementioned complex changes were unable to prevent the financial failures.  As a result 
of this, the demise of the Equitable Life gave considerable impetus for reform.59 
5.2.1.4 Birth of Twin Peaks: the birth of the market conduct regulator 
The Equitable Life’s problems dated back several decades although its consequence only 
became clearer after the Penrose report in 2004.  The problems in the financial markets 
became more acute with the Global Banking Crisis of 2008.  The UK’s manifestation of this 
was the collapse of Northern Rock, yet another banking crisis (as a result of the interbank 
loaning situation).  These developments once again resulted in further regulatory changes 
since the Select Committee on Treasury (2008: para 9) declared that: 
The FSA did not supervise Northern Rock properly. It did not allocate 
sufficient resources or time to monitoring a bank whose business model was 
so clearly an outlier; its procedures were inadequate to supervise a bank whose 
business grew so rapidly. 
The Tripartite authorities were thus also heavily criticised for their involvement or lack 
thereof in the Northern Rock experience. In fact, the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee concluded that “for a run on a bank to have occurred in the United Kingdom is 
unacceptable, and represents a significant failure of the Tripartite system”. This failure can be 
attributed to the lack of emergency liquidity assistance, which traditionally would have been 
provided by the Bank of England (Domanski & Sushko, 2014). Since, the Bank of England 
had been completely divorced from the regulation of the banking industry since the early 
2000s, it was therefore no longer the lender of last resort. Neither the FSA nor the Bank of 
England could therefore restore the financial stability of the Northern Rock. 
                                                 
58 The Tiner Project coincided with the EU’s Solvency II project (see Eling, Schmeiser & Schmit, 2007). 
59 This was coupled with a number of troubled financial institutions including the collapse of Independent 
Insurance and the failure of the Enron employee pension scheme.  
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In addition to this, what is clear is that the FSA established a strong consumer protection 
regulator at the expense of financial stability (Taylor, 2009). Arnott (2009) reiterated this 
point:  
[it was] clear that the FSA became the victim of regulatory capture. From the 
start, market confidence was the overriding objective and consumer protection 
was not given sufficient weight. "Light touch regulation" was the watchword, 
with the threat from the industry that otherwise London would lose its 
predominance in world financial markets. So, despite the continuing scandals, 
the lessons were [not] learned by the regulator, or by government, and when 
the FSA set up a system for regulating mortgages in 2004, yet again it was too 
light touch to be effective 
The FSA had therefore developed a life of its own; it had morphed into a market conduct 
regulator. It has been suggested that the FSA’s focus on market conduct was a rational 
response to several scandals and an ever increasing number of consumer complaints (House 
of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 2009). Furthermore, one can argue that 
since the FSA did not know how to regulate banks, in an attempt to maintain its existence, it 
created the market conduct regulation ‘creature’. Notwithstanding this, the Northern Rock 
episode provided the impetus to restore some balance to the post-1997 arrangement (Taylor, 
2009).  
The latter was further compounded by the global financial crisis in 2008, after which time the 
UK’s regulatory system was once again forced to reflect on itself amid numerous criticisms 
and controversies.60 It was this crisis which demonstrated that the FSA was an abject failure 
which was woefully unprepared and incapable of managing the prudential risks of banks 
(Vivian, 2015c). Accordingly, the fallout from the global financial crisis achieved two 
regulatory outcomes, including: i) a greater scrutiny of whether firms have sufficient capital 
                                                 
60 Not only did the global financial crisis result in regulatory reform in the UK but it also highlighted several 
weaknesses in the EU’s financial regulatory architecture. In 2009, the “Larosière Report” was published which 
highlighted that financial supervision in Europe was “uneven and uncoordinated”. Furthermore, the Report 
emphasised that “Remuneration and incentive schemes within financial institutions contributed to excessive 
risk-taking”. This eventually resulted in the establishment of the European system of financial supervisors 
(ESFS), consisting of three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA). In addition to this, the EU sought to tackle the conflicts of interest posed by 
certain incentives schemes and thereby acknowledged the need for enhanced market conduct regulation (See, 
Financial Services Commission, 2014). 
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and; ii) a shift towards focusing on how transactions are undertaken and their impact on 
customers and wider financial markets (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2014:2). The latter indicates 
the UK’s growing appetite for both prudential and market conduct regulation. 
Since the FSA had all but ignored prudential regulation (by developing itself into a market 
conduct regulator), it became clear that a prudential regulator was necessary and that 
prudential matters should be returned to the Bank of England.  On 26 July 2010, the HM 
Treasury published its proposal for a dual-track regulatory system61 (Ford, 2011). According 
to Taylor (2009:78), the Twin Peaks proposal argued that  
The institutional structure of regulation should in future comprise two 
regulatory agencies, a Financial Stability Commission and a Consumer 
Protection Commission. The first would be responsible for ensuring the 
stability of the financial system as a whole, mainly through the application of 
prudential regulations. The second would be in charge with ensuring that firms 
deal with their (retail) customers in a fair and transparent manner.  
As such, the FSA would be split into the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), a subsidiary 
of the Bank of England, and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)62 (Stowell, 2012). As 
such, the FSA would cease to exist and prudential regulation would once again fall under the 
purview of the Bank of England. This proposal for reform was further supported by 
Government, who alleged that no one central authority existed for the supervision of the 
financial system as a whole (Ford, 2011). On the other hand, however, the FSA initially 
contested the proposal claiming that prudential and market conduct regulation generally dealt 
with similar issues and accordingly, there would be a significant and inefficient overlap 
between the two separate agencies (Taylor, 2009). That is, “there seemed little point in 
having two regulators reaching essentially duplicate judgments of broadly similar matters” 
(Taylor, 2009: 80). Accordingly, the FSA argued that since regulation would focus on similar 
fundamental issues, said issues would be best regulated by a single regulatory authority 
(Taylor, 2009). One cannot help but think that this is a suitable example of regulatory 
                                                 
61 The Twin Peaks regulatory structure had previously been actively debated in the UK prior to the 1997 reform. 
The decision to create a single financial regulator was however taken in favour of the twin peak model (see 
Taylor, 2009). 
62 A number of name changes have been made prior to what is now known as the Financial Conduct authority. 
To begin with, the Consumer Protection Agency (CPA) was proposed as the regulator of market conduct issues. 
The CPA then became the Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA), which following the Treasury 
Select Committee recommendation, was eventually changed to the Financial Conduct Authority. 
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capture, something that the FSA had already been accused of not long before (Arnott, 2009; 
Taylor, 2009). 
As alluded to above, the FSA was criticised for its focus on market conduct supervision at the 
expense of prudential regulation (House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 
2009). Lord Turner conceded that: 
Broadly speaking, [it is] true to say that in retrospect we [the FSA] focused too 
much on the conduct of business and not enough on prudential... the Treasury 
Select Committee of the House of Commons... were primarily quizzing the 
FSA on... Equitable Life... mis-selling of endowments, mis-selling of 
mortgages... so it would not be surprising if the tendency of the focus of the 
organisation was to thinking the external world is really worried as to whether 
they have a grip on conduct of business so that is what they do (Q 518).  
The numerous crises discredited the FSA’s claim that there were natural synergies between 
prudential and market conduct regulation (Taylor, 2009). In fact, the FSA may simply have 
been tasked with too many functions (including those of a prudential and consumer 
protection nature) to perform them all adequately (Taylor, 2009). 
Moreover, the main argument underpinning the Twin Peaks proposal was that banking 
supervision should remain within the central bank as the Bank of England was lender of last 
resort and accordingly “the information acquired in the capacity of the bank supervisor was 
essential to the central bank performing the lender of last resort function” (Taylor, 2009: 84). 
For that reason, the best arrangement was for the lender of last resort and the banking 
supervisor to be located in the same institution (Taylor, 2009). Proponents of the dual track 
system recognised this argument, particularly after the collapse of the Northern Rock. More 
specifically, Professor Willem Buiter as expert witness to the House of Commons Treasury 
Select Committee, argued that 
The notion that the institution that has the knowledge of the individual banks 
that may or may not be in trouble would be a different institution from the one 
that has the money, the resources, to act upon the observation that a particular 
bank needs lender of last resort support is risky. 
On 1 April 2013, the proposal for reform was realised and the UK’s regulatory system 
adopted the “twin-peaks” regulation model, in terms of which the “one size fits all” approach 
of the FSA was abandoned in favour of two more specialised bodies or ‘centres of expertise’ 
(Hodgson & Baker, 2011). The latter was achieved following the passing of the Financial 
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Services Act 2012 in terms of which both the PRA and the FCA came into existence. In terms 
of this arrangement, the PRA is responsible for the micro-prudential regulation of banks, 
insurance companies and investment firms (the Bank of England is responsible for macro-
prudential regulation)63 while the FCA is responsible for the conduct of business and market 
functions of all financial institutions (Stowell, 2012). In addition to market conduct functions, 
the FCA is also responsible for the prudential regulation of around 24 500 firms that are not 
regulated by the PRA, one of which includes insurance intermediaries (Hodgson & Baker, 
2011). The Financial Services Bill, which received Royal Assent in December 2012, 
specified the FCA’s statutory objectives and its statutory principles of good regulation 
(McMeel, 2013:606). 
According to its mandate, the FCA has a number of operational objectives in terms of which 
it should: 
• Secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers (the consumer protection 
objective);  
• Promote effective competition in the interests of consumers in financial markets (the 
competition objective); and 
• Protect and enhance the integrity of the UK’s financial system (the integrity 
objective).  
The details of the regime are contained in secondary legislation and rules (Ferran, 2003:276). 
The latter is discussed in the section below. 
5.2.1.4.1 Core conduct of business rules 
Market conduct or conduct of business rules, refer to the rules that govern how various 
aspects of a business or firm should be conducted (Smethurst et al., 2011). Since the UK 
refers to said rules with the use of the ‘conduct of business’ title, this section does the same 
although the terminology ‘market conduct’ has been referred to in earlier sections. Conduct 
of business rules are generally designed for the benefit of the retail consumer and accordingly 
                                                 
63 The Bank of England was given formal statutory responsibility for financial stability under the Banking Act of 
2009 (see Taylor, 2009). 
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may restrict the operation of some rules (derived from insurance contract law) which are 
often described as favouring the insurers and not policyholders (Smethurst et al., 2011: 358).    
Over the years, market conduct rules in the UK have been amended and as such, a number of 
earlier sourcebooks have been revoked. Most recently, the UK’s Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook of 2001 (COB) was replaced with the New Conduct of Business Sourcebook 
(COBS) which took effect on 1 November 2007 and is still applied today.  Although COBS 
covers “broadly the same material” as the old COB sourcebook, it implements a number of 
provisions, principles and rules as set out in EU MiFID64 (Financial Conduct Authority, 
2014a). In other words, MiFID provisions have been enshrined in the UK’s conduct of 
business rules and regulations. Because of this, there is considerable overlap between MiFID 
provisions and existing ‘Conduct of Business’ and ‘Insurance Conduct of Business’ Rules 
(ICOB) (Field Fisher Waterhouse, 2007). For that reason, and in order to avoid lengthy 
repetition, a brief overview of a collection of conduct of business rules, applicable to the 
insurance industry and as imposed by the current FCA, are discussed below: 
i) Act honestly, fairly and professionally: A firm must act honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interests of its client (“The client's best 
interests rule”). 
ii) Act with integrity, skill, care and diligence: A firm is required to act with 
integrity, skill, care and diligence (“The customers' interests rule”). 
iii) Material Interest: Where a firm has a material interest in a transaction to be 
entered into with or for a customer, the firm must take reasonable steps to ensure 
fair treatment for that customer and as such, manage any such conflicts of interest 
in a fair manner. 
iv) Disclose information before providing services: A firm must provide appropriate 
information in a comprehensible form to a client about the firm and its services, 
its investment strategies, including appropriate guidance on and warnings of the 
risks associated with such investments, the complexity of its products, as well as 
the costs and other associated charges. In doing so, this should allow a client to be 
able to reasonably understand the nature and risks of the service and of the 
                                                 
64 In addition to this, current conduct standards incorporate a number of other rules which have been inherited 
from a various codes of conduct of the ABI and former SRO’s (see Norton Rose Fulbright, 2014). 
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specific type of investment/product that is being offered and, consequently, to 
make (investment) decisions on an informed basis. 
v) Inducements: A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that neither it nor any of 
its agents offer, give, nor solicit, any inducement which is likely to significantly 
conflict with any duties owed to its customers. 
vi) Fair and Clear Communication: A firm may make a communication with another 
person which is designed to promote its services only if it can show that it 
believes on reasonable grounds that the communication is fair and not misleading. 
Furthermore, a firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that any agreement, 
written communication, notification or information which it gives or sends to a 
customer to whom it provides investment services, is presented fairly and clearly. 
vii) Advertising and Marketing: Where a firm issues or approves an investment 
advertisement, it must apply appropriate expertise and be able to show that it 
believes on reasonable grounds that the advertisement is fair and not misleading. 
Furthermore, a firm must refrain from “cold calling”. 
viii) Information about the firm: A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that a 
customer to whom it provides its services is given adequate information about its 
identity and business address, the identity and status of other relevant agents with 
whom the customer has contact, the identity of the firm's regulator and the 
compensation scheme in which the firm is a member. 
ix) Insurance Intermediary: A firm which acts as an independent intermediary must 
act independently and exclusively for one insurer whenever it advises customers 
on product packages. Furthermore, if an insurance intermediary informs 
a customer that it gives advice on the basis of a fair analysis, it must give that 
advice on the basis of an analysis of a sufficiently large number of contracts of 
insurance available in the market to enable it to make a recommendation regarding 
which contract of insurance would be adequate to meet the customer's needs. 
x) Commission Payments and Fee Disclosures: A firm may only deal through a 
broker pursuant to a soft commission agreement provided that the broker has 
agreed to provide best execution to the customer and adequate prior disclosure is 
made. That is, a firm must provide its customer with details of the amount of 
any fees other than premium monies for an insurance mediation activity. The 
details must be given before the customer incurs liability to pay the fee, or before 
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conclusion of the contract, whichever is earlier. This is often referred to as the 
‘disclosure regime’.  
xi) Appointed representatives: A firm must satisfy itself on reasonable grounds and 
on a continuing basis that any appointed representative is fit and proper to act for 
it in that capacity. 
xii) Suitability of Advice: A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of 
its advice for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment. In doing so, 
a firm must: (1)  establish the customer's demands and needs by using information 
readily available to the firm and by obtaining further relevant information from 
the customer, including details of existing insurance cover; (2)  take reasonable 
steps to establish whether a policy  is suitable for the customer's demands and 
needs, taking into account its level of cover and cost, and relevant exclusions, 
excesses, limitations, and conditions; (3)  inform the customer of any demands 
and needs that are not met; and (4)  explain to the customer its recommendation 
and the reasons for the recommendation. 
xiii) Assessing Appropriateness: Similar to the ‘suitability of advice’ requirement 
discussed above, a firm is obligated to ask the client to provide information 
regarding his knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the 
specific type of product or service offered or demanded so as to enable the firm to 
assess whether the service or product envisaged is appropriate for the client. 
Moreover, when assessing appropriateness, a firm must determine whether the 
client has the necessary experience and knowledge in order to understand the risks 
involved in relation to the product or service offered or demanded. Thereafter, 
a firm should take reasonable steps to ensure that a customer only buys a policy 
under which he is eligible to claim benefits. If, at any time while arranging 
a policy, a firm finds that parts of the cover apply, but others do not, it should 
inform the customer so he can take an informed decision on whether to buy 
the policy. Furthermore, a firm must make a record of the eligibility assessment 
and, if the customer proceeds with the arrangements proposed, retain it for a 
minimum period of three years from the date on which the assessment was 
undertaken. 
xiv) Best Execution:  Firms must take all reasonable steps to obtain, when executing 
orders, the best possible result for its clients, taking into account the execution 
factors, including price, speed and any other direct or indirect costs. Furthermore, 
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when a firm is authorised to execute orders on behalf of clients it must do so in a 
prompt, fair and expeditious manner. 
xv) Claims Handling: Firms are required to handle claims fairly and promptly and in 
accordance with the FSA’s Dispute Resolution: Complaints (DISP) sourcebook. 
Where firms have failed to do so, customers may refer their claims to the 
Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) which was established in 2000 to provide a 
cost effective and informal mechanism for dispute resolution. 
In summary, and according to Smethurst et al. (2011: 357), conduct of business rules are 
generally restricted to pre-contractual matters, and cover the following matters: 
• The marketing and advertising of insurance products 
• The provision of information by a firm to a prospective insured during the sales 
process  
• The suitability of advice 
• The potential conflicts of interest that may arise 
• The record keeping requirements  
• The claims and complaint handling process 
Conduct of business rules are legally binding on those firms authorised by the FCA to carry 
out their business (Smethurst et al., 2011).  Breaches of these rules may attract penalties (both 
financial and public censure) for undesirable practices and those persons who suffer loss as a 
result of the contravention, may sue for damages under section 150 of FSMA 2000 
(Smethurst et al., 2011: 386).  
It was also at this time that the IAIS published the “Insurance Core Principles, Standards, 
Guidance and Assessment Methodology” (as amended in 2013). According to ICP19 
(“Conduct of Business”) insurers and intermediaries are required to: 
• Act with due skill, care and diligence when dealing with customers; 
• Establish and implement policies and procedures on the fair treatment of customers; 
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• Take into account the interests of different types of customers when developing and 
marketing insurance products;  
• Promote products and services in a manner that is clear, fair and not misleading; 
• Satisfy various timing, delivery, and content of information requirements; 
• Provide appropriate advice, taking into account the customer’s disclosed 
circumstances;  
• Ensure that any potential conflicts of interest are properly managed;  
• Handle claims in a timely and fair manner;  
• Handle complaints in a timely and fair manner; and  
• Protect private information on customers.  
Although greater regulation has resulted in an increase in the cost of compliance to the 
industry, a number of firms have welcomed the regulation where it has reassured customers 
and in doing so, has encouraged further investment activity (Lowry & Rawlings, 2004). In 
other words, Ford (2011:265) argues that although insurers had previously seen regulation as 
a barrier to entry, the industry has begun to press for better regulation as this could enhance 
their reputations and put them at the centre of the global financial market. The new financial 
regulatory regime coincided with other initiatives affecting the insurance industry, one of 
which included preparations for the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) (Hodgson & Baker, 
2011). In fact, the FCA was required to “build on the progress recently made by the FSA 
towards a more interventionist and pre-emptive approach to retail conduct regulation. As a 
starting point… it will continue with initiatives such as the Retail Distribution Review” (HM 
Treasury, 2010: 34). 
5.2.1.5 Retail Distribution Review (RDR) 
Since the mid-1980’s, the UK has addressed mis-selling and improper advice with a number 
of different approaches. These included various “best interest” requirements and disclosure 
regimes, as discussed above (Niemeyer & Thorun, 2012). However, said requirements failed 
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to prevent other major mis-selling scandals, including the endowment (mortgage) mis-selling 
scandal and payment protection insurance (“PPI”) mis-selling scandal in the early 21st 
century (McMeel, 2013). As a result of this, financial regulators recognised the dangers of 
commission payments (Niemeyer & Thorun, 2012). More specifically, in 2002, the FSA 
expressed its concerns over incentive payments and remuneration structures and as such, 
proposed several improvements (Niemeyer & Thorun, 2012). Similarly, the Treasury Select 
Committee (2004) asserted that the long-term savings industry was “wedded to an 
inappropriate sales and commission led business model which [was] damaging the reputation 
of the industry and undermining consumer confidence in long-term saving”. Furthermore the 
Committee (2004) emphasised that:  
Action is needed to better align consumer and product provider interests in the 
area of financial services. The current commission structure within the 
industry rewards potentially inappropriate and short-term sales practices. 
Sometimes this is at the expense of the saver's long term interests. It is 
unacceptable that the industry's current commission structures rewards the 
industry irrespective of the investment performance of the products it sells. 
Results from an enquiry into the adopted ‘disclosure regime’ found that there had been “little 
evidence that the [disclosure regime had] had a significant effect on the market” (CRA 
International, 2007: 4). Furthermore, it was found that “investors find it difficult to decode 
labels and [did] not equate commission payments, even with specific disclosure, with 
potential prejudice to the independence of advice” (Moloney, 2010: 268). As such, the system 
was criticised for not only rewarding quantity of business over quality of business, but also 
for creating product bias, unsuitable sales and unncessary commissions and fees (Niemeyer & 
Thorun, 2012). 
In response to the aformentioned criticisms, the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) was rolled 
out, effective from 31 Decmber 2012 (Galbiati & Soramäki, 2014).  The RDR provisions 
intend to improved the quality and suitability of advice given by prohibiting product-provider 
commission payments and further seeks to address conflicts of interest and perverse 
incentives65 (Andenas & H-Y Chiu, 2014). According to Brown and Rice (2012: 579) and 
                                                 
65 In addition to improving the transparency of charges and services offered and removing commission 
payments to advisers, the RDR rules have further raised the minimum level of adviser qualifications (Financial 
Conduct Authority, 2014b). 
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Niemeyer and Thorun (2012:54), in terms of the RDR rules, firms that offer financial advice 
to retail clients will have to: 
• Design and create their own charging structures and communicate them with their 
clients before providing any advice. This should be done using a price list of tariffs 
and agreement should be reached between themselves and their prospective client. 
Furthermore, financial advisors will no longer be unable to receive commission 
payments from product providers. The latter aims to prevent advisors from being 
biased by the amount of commission payments and in doing so, endeavours to prevent 
advisors from promoting one product over another to the detriment of the consumer. 
• Describe their services as either “independent” or “restricted”. 
• Meet high standards of professionalism and expertise through recognised 
qualifications and codes of ethics. 
Following the implementation of the RDR, a number of significant new rules are found in 
COBS 6.1A in terms of which a firm that makes a personal recommendation to a retail client 
in relation to an investment product ought to comply. In particular, COBS 6.1A.4R provides 
that a firm must: 
1. only be remunerated for the personal recommendation (and any other related services 
provided by the firm) by adviser charges; and 
2. not solicit or accept (and ensure that none of its associates solicits or accepts) any 
other commissions, remuneration or benefit of any kind in relation to the personal 
recommendation or any other related service, regardless of whether it intends to 
refund the payments or pass the benefits on to the retail client; and 
3. not solicit or accept (and ensure that none of its associates solicits or accepts) adviser 
charges in relation to the retail client's retail investment product which are paid out or 
advanced by another party over a materially different time period, or on a materially 
different basis, from that in or on which the adviser charges are recovered from the 
retail client. 
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As mentioned above, RDR rules and provisions have attempted to enhance the quality and 
suitability of advice by imposing a ban on product-provider commission payments. As such, 
COBS 6.1B. 5R asserts that a firm must not offer or pay (and must ensure that none of its 
associates offers or pays) any commissions, remuneration or benefit of any kind to another 
firm, or to any other third party for the benefit of that firm, in relation to a personal 
recommendation (or any related services), except those that facilitate the payment of adviser 
charges from a retail client's investments in accordance with this section. 
The FCA has acknowledged that RDR rules are likely to be compatible with the impending 
EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II, to be discussed below (Rice, 2012). 
However, whereas RDR rules prohibit all commission payments made to advisers by anyone 
other than their clients, the final MiFID II proposals will most likely only create an improved 
‘disclosure regime’ and are likely to impose a ban on third party payments to "independent" 
advisers only (Brown & Rice, 2012: 579).  
The impact of MiFID II on the UK’s RDR rules and provisions will presumably only reveal 
itself when the new Directive is transposed into the UK’s legislative framework. However, 
the impact of the MiFID II on RDR rules may become obsolete as the Financial Advice 
Market Review (FAMR) is considering radical reforms to regulation which may roll back key 
aspects of the current RDR in order to boost access to advice (Selby & Sands, 2016: para 1). 
In particular, in August 2015 the Government appointed a panel of experts (jointly led by the 
Treasury and the FCA) to assess the current regulatory and legal frameworks governing the 
provision of financial advice and to develop reform proposals66 (Financial Conduct 
Authority, 2015). The review is said to tackle the advice gap that is arguably more prevalent 
amongst the lower end of the market (HM Treasury, 2015). This may suggest that 
policymakers are eager to pursue changes which could potentially undermine RDR rules and 
regulations and this in itself may suggest the Governments’ uncertainty regarding its 
experimentation with RDR (Selby & Sands, 2016). This in itself may indicate that RDR is 
not in the public interest. Notwithstanding this, however, at present RDR rules and provisions 
continue to regulate the market. 
                                                 
66 Some potential  proposals may include i) reducing the qualification requirement for advisers selling basic 
products, ii) developing a new charging structure similar to the former  commission system and iii) banning 
regulated advisers from selling unregulated products (See Selby & Sands, 2016). 
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5.3 British Intermediaries Market 
5.3.1 Regulation of insurance intermediaries 
Up to this point, government intervention was concerned mostly with the financial stability of 
a firm and the various reactive mechanisms for insurance firm failures. However, control and 
supervision of intermediaries eventually came within the purview of government and 
accordingly formed part of the overall policyholder protection package (Hodgin, 1986). In 
1977, the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 was passed. This was not surprising 
since commission hungry agents who, in many cases, lacked the ability to market products 
effectively and efficiently, were said to have contributed to many of the failures discussed 
above (Lowry & Rawlings, 2004). Although government had recognised the need for 
increased supervision in this regard, the regime remained largely self-regulated (Hodgin, 
1986). The British Insurance Council (a collection of various broker’s organisations) and the 
Insurance Brokers Registration Council (IBRC)67 (a non-statutory and independent 
organisation) collectively promulgated a series of codes of practice and enforced regulation 
amongst the fraternity (Jess, 2011).  
Registered brokers were required to comply with a code of conduct, maintain professional 
indemnity insurance, establish a complaints procedure and compensate affected policyholders 
as a result of a broker’s negligent action (Ford, 2011: 261). Wang (2003: 91) points out that 
the conduct of such an intermediary was subject to the principles of the Code of Conduct. As 
such, this indicates the existence of a legislated form of conduct regulation, although it was 
enforced by non-statutory, independent organisations on a self-regulatory basis. 
The code of conduct contained a number of guidelines, some of which read as follows: 
Insurance brokers shall at all times conduct their business with utmost good 
faith and integrity… they shall do everything possible to satisfy the insurance 
requirements of their clients and shall place the interests of those clients before 
all other considerations. Subject to those requirements and interests, insurance 
brokers shall have proper regard for others… statements made by or on behalf 
of insurance brokers when advertising shall not be extravagant or misleading. 
The 1977 Act, which was subsequently repealed by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(FSMA) 2000, was followed by the 1982 Insurance Companies Act (restricted to general 
                                                 
67 This was subsequently replaced by the General Insurance Standards Council under FSMA 2000 (see below). 
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insurance business) and the Financial Services Act of 1986 (applicable to long term insurance 
contracts) (Lowry & Rawlings, 2004). According to Lindell (1998 as cited in Beveridge, 
2001:11), the 1977 Act was repealed after consultations with Government led to the 
conclusion that the  
case for continuing statutory regulation of insurance brokers has not been 
made ... it no longer fully meets the needs of today's market… to maintain and 
improve professional standards in the transaction of non-life insurance 
business (such as car and house insurance) by brokers and other 
intermediaries, the Treasury will look to voluntary self-discipline rather than 
statute. 
Accordingly, it was decided that statutory regulation was unnecessary and a better system 
would be one of self-regulation by a body that was independent of insurers and intermediaries 
and who would take into account the interests of industry players and their customers 
(Beveridge, 2001). The latter may indicate the applicability of the public interest theory as an 
explanation for such regulation. 
5.4 British Friendly Societies 
5.4.1 Regulation of friendly societies 
Just after the Life Assurance Act was passed, the UK parliament turned its attention to 
Friendly Societies.  It is appropriate to deal with this aspect as an interlude. Friendly societies 
were subject to minimal regulation under the 1793 Friendly Societies Act (the Rose Act ‘for 
the Encouragement and Relief of Friendly Societies’) since Government interference in an 
open market was unheard of and not thought of (Macnicol, 1998; Ford, 2011). In fact, Daykin 
(1992: 316) asserts that although “members of Parliament were concerned about the 
possibilities for abuse and saw the need for some protection for policyholders, the 
government of the day did not want to restrain free trade”. However, legislation passed since 
1793 contained gradual increases in regulatory control and requirements68 (Gilchrist & 
Moore, 2007:176). This appears to have been in response to “the wholesale error, deception, 
                                                 
68 A total of 19 Acts regulating friendly societies were passed between 1793 and 1875. Between 1793 and 1830, 
legislation was passed for the sole purpose of encouraging the development of friendly societies in order to 
relieve some of the “public burthens” on the state in terms of poor relief. Thereafter, concern over the financial 
stability and management of friendly societies became the prerogative of parliamentary committees. The 
Friendly Societies Act 1992 was subsequently repealed (See Gosden, 1961: 173-174). 
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fraud and swindling, which [were] perpetrated upon the most helpless portion of the 
community, who [found] themselves without defence” (Dennett, 1998: 59). 
Members of Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone’s administration (1868-1874) had long 
been concerned with the mismanagement of friendly societies and reflected on those 
‘nefarious’ societies who recruited highly paid agents to go door to door to recruit, and often 
harass, members who could ill-afford such premiums (Gilchrist & Moore, 2007:173). The 
latter eventually led to the formation of the Industrial Life Offices Association69  the 
forerunner of the LOAA, after co-operative action was taken (Gilchrist & Moore, 2007:173). 
However, the Association only came into being formally in 1901, and as such, it would be 
erroneous to discuss this point any further.  
Of utmost importance was the passing of the 1875 Friendly Societies Act following the 
recommendations of a Royal Commission as a result of ongoing concerns regarding 
inadequate premiums and mismanagement of friendly societies, amongst other things (Ford, 
2011: 253). The 1875 Act not only consolidated earlier legislation regarding friendly 
societies, but also sought to alter the previously existing law in numerous important 
particulars (Holdsworth, 1875:7). The following extract appears in Holdsworth’s (1875) 
‘Friendly Societies Act, 1875 with Explanatory Introduction and Notes’: 
While it [the 1875 Friendly Societies Act] affords additional facilities for the 
formation of these societies and the conduct of their business, it is also 
intended to furnish securities against improvident management; and to prevent 
the wasteful dissipation of funds, the arrangement of contributions on a basis 
inadequate to the realisation of the benefits promised, or the pursuit of unfair 
and unjust conduct on the part of the managers of a society towards any of its 
members. 
The political action enunciated above was driven by the general dissatisfaction with the way 
in which friendly societies were operating (Gilchrist & Moore, 2007). The Act of 1875 not 
only introduced specific audit, solvency, management and financial reporting requirements70, 
                                                 
69 The Industrial Life Offices Association was founded in 1901 amid concerns that agents were ‘poaching’ 
clients from one company to another for commission purposes. In 1940, the Association underwent a name 
change and was thereafter referred to as the Industrial Life Offices Association. The association ceased to exist 
in 1985 when its functions were delegated to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) (See London 
Metropolitan Archives, 2011). 
70 In 1867, the Registrar of Friendly Societies estimated that since 1793, 36 per cent of societies formed had 
subsequently collapsed. This was said to have been the result of recurring financial difficulties, competition 
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likened to modern prudential regulation principles, but also by way of Section 30 of the Act, 
developed a number of provisions that governed the interrelationship between members and 
societies (Campbell, 1911; Gilchrist & Moore, 2007:180). That is, the 1875 Act not only 
imposed a number of requirements that set out to govern the formation and operation of 
friendly societies but also, and more notably, addressed issues of mismanagement of funds 
and the unfair treatment of policyholders (Ford, 2011:253). It is the latter that is of particular 
significance in the quest to track the evolution of market conduct regulation.  
In particular, policy lapses, forfeiture, and the winding up and merging of societies were all 
of special importance. In fact, Gladstone had commented that a policyholder had no control 
over his policy when it passed from hand to hand in the case of a merger (Dennett, 1998). In 
order to remedy the aforementioned problems, Section 30 of the 1875 Act required the 
delivery of proper notice before forfeiture and further limited the freedom of the offices to 
transfer policyholders from one insurer to another without proper consultation (Morrah, 
1955:58).  
Section 30(2) and (3) read as follows: 
No forfeiture is incurred by any member or person insured by reason of any 
default in paying any contribution, until after a written or printed notice has 
been delivered or sent by post prepaid to him, or left at his last known place of 
abode, by or on behalf of the society, stating the amount due by him, and 
apprizing him that in case of default of payment by him within a reasonable 
time, not being less than fourteen days, and at a place, to be specified in such 
notice, his interest or benefit will be forfeited, and after default has been made 
by him in paying his contribution in accordance with such notice.  
No transfers without written consent. No member of or person insured with 
any society can unless in the case of an amalgamation, transfer of 
engagements, or conversion into a company under section twenty-four of this 
Act, or as respects an industrial assurance company of an amalgamation or 
transfer of business under the Life Assurance Companies Act, 1870, become 
or be made a member of or be insured with any other society without his 
written consent, or, in the case of an infant, without that of his father or other 
guardian; and the society to which such member or person is sought to be 
transferred shall within seven days from his application for admission to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
between societies and subsequent dangerous price undercutting, incompetence, instability and fraud, amongst 
other things. This in turn warranted the need for major new intervention (See Macnicol, 1998:114; Broten, 
2010). 
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same give notice thereof in writing to the society from which he is sought to 
be transferred.  
5.4.1.1 Analysis of the regulatory changes 
Although Section 30 of the 1875 Act suggests some form of market conduct regulation, the 
latter idea was not consciously the priority of parliamentary committees. In fact, the primary 
objective of the 1875 Act (and the amending Acts that would follow) was to ensure the 
solvency of friendly societies in the public interest. As such, market conduct regulation was 
not a principal consideration nor a pressing necessity since the fraternal ethos of societies and 
the competition for new members meant that societies were “seen to be generous in 
interpreting the terms of their insurance contracts with members… and their constitutions 
would not permit them to go against the wishes of their members” (Macnicol, 1998: 118). By 
defining the process to be followed by Friendly Societies in dealing with the proceeds of 
policies, the legislation was defining the law required for Locke’s rule of law. 
5.5 British Pensions Market 
One of the main issues which brought market conduct to the fore is the so-called pensions 
mis-selling episode and attention is now turned to this matter. At this point it must be recalled 
that from a regulatory perspective, the focus had shifted from specific problems to regulation 
of financial markets. The pension fund market is simply a part of the broader financial 
market. 
In order to comprehend the events which led to the pension mis-selling scandal and more 
specifically the rise of the regulation of market conduct, it is necessary to begin with an 
understanding of the UK’s pension system. The following sections describe the pension 
system in the UK between the periods of 1601 to 2002 although the UK has since seen a 
number of subsequent pension reforms over the years (Attanasio & Rohwedder, 2003). 
Contemporary reforms are however beyond the scope of this study as they have no bearing 
on the pension mis-selling scandal. However, although the mis-selling scandal occurred in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, it is necessary to track the evolution of earlier old age provision 
in order to provide a complete and coherent account of these developments. The following 
section maps the history of welfare provision starting with the seventeenth century with the 
passing of the poor relief at the end of Queen Elizabeth's reign in 1601.  
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5.5.1 Evolution of provision for the destitute, including the aged 
Economic historians argue that society has evolved through four stages or states of nature.  
These are: the Hunter-Gatherer society, the Pastoral society, the Agrarian or Agricultural 
society and the Industrial society (North 1981; North 1990; Lenski, Nolan & Lenski, 1995; 
Vivian & Mushai, 2012). The evolution of societies influenced the provision for the aged, 
particularly with the fruition of modernity. The transition from the agricultural to the 
industrial age is of particular significance since hunter-gatherers and the pastoral society had 
a very short life expectancy and the weak, infirmed and aged were “simply left to die” and 
accordingly no specific provision was made for the aged (Vivian & Mushai, 2012). Short life 
expectancy continued in the agricultural age but the aged continued to live on the land they 
had tilled. Urbanisation, and with it the urban poor problem, was prompted by the transition 
from the agricultural age to the modern industrial age (Evans, 2013). Said transition ushered 
in higher economic growth but brought with it the wage economy, unemployment and the 
industrialised society which prompted the call for a more formal system of old age provision 
(Vivian & Mushai, 2012). In particular, as the rural poor migrated to industrial sites in search 
of work, urban poverty escalated (Ishay, 2008).  
Historically, three systems for old age provision have emerged. These are: i) the Elizabethan 
Poor Laws system, ii) the Bismarckian State Pension and iii) Occupational Pensions or 
Personal Pension Schemes (Vivian & Mushai, 2012). These are now discussed. 
5.5.1.1 Elizabethan Poor Laws System (EPL) 
The earliest attempts to provide for the poor (including the aged) were the Poor Laws of 1597 
and 1601 under the reign of Queen Elizabeth I following a series of bad harvests that resulted 
in widespread deprivation and unrest (Blake, 1995; Slack, 1995). Although the origins of 
parochial poor relief extend as far back as the fifteenth century, the 1601 Poor Laws are in 
many respects a consolidation and reiteration of earlier legislation (Higginbotham, 2011). 
Furthermore, the 1601 Act has come to be regarded as a milestone in British social legislation 
and accordingly this is the most suitable point of departure (Quigley, 1996; Higginbotham, 
2011).  
During the sixteenth century, Parliament passed a number of laws that set out to define the 
“dependent poor” and outlined the processes for providing for the destitute since poverty and 
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old age had become critical social problems (Lees, 1998:22). These laws were codified in 
1601 and the famous yet problematic Poor Laws are often cited as marking the foundation of 
state welfare provision (Higginbotham, 2011). These laws however, have not been without 
criticism and a mere glance at the works of many leading economists including Smith (1776) 
and Mill (1848) bear testament to this. The institutionalisation of state provision in 1601 
nominated the parish as the administrative unit responsible for poor relief, with 
churchwardens or parish overseers collecting poor-rates in order to finance and allocate relief 
(Glicken, 2011). That is, poor rates were levied on land occupiers and home owners and as 
such, the Elizabethan Poor Laws was and still is a non-contributory71 state welfare system 
that has since been adopted by number of countries (Higginbotham, 2011; Vivian & Mushai, 
2012).  
The Poor Laws were problematic from inception in 1601 with the problems escalating until 
the reforms of 1834. During the interim, the Poor Relief Act of 1662 (‘The Settlement Act’), 
the Poor Relief Act of 1722 and the Poor Relief Act of 1795 attempted to address some of the 
problems. However, calls for reform remained as the taxes to fund poor relief increased 
dramatically and the perceived deterioration in the quality of labour prevailed (Quigley, 
1996: 117). The need for reform was eventually heeded in August 1834 when the “reform of 
the Poor Laws, 4 & 5 William 4, Chapter 76” was enacted. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 
1834, often referred to as the New Poor Laws, is said to be the “single most important piece 
of legislation ever enacted” (Englander, 1998: 1). Rising costs of poor relief, rural 
incendiarism and industrial unrest resulted in the establishment of the Royal Commission 
whose primary purpose was to investigate the workings of the Poor Law and make 
recommendations for its improvement (Englander, 1998). By virtue of the 1834 Act, outdoor 
relief was abolished and an increasingly more “deterrent” poor law system was established in 
terms of which workhouses were deliberately maintained in unpleasant conditions (Besley, 
Coate & Guinnane, 2004). In particular, indoor poor relief (provided in Workhouses) would 
become as unfavourable as possible thereby encouraging the ‘poor’ to leave the workhouse in 
search of whatever employment was attainable in the open market (Englander, 1998). 
The Poor Laws remained in operation until the National Assistance Act came into force in 
1948 (Blake, 1995) as a consequence of the Beveridge Report. That is, the 1948 Act formally 
                                                 
71 In terms of a non-contributory system, benefits are paid out of current contributions without the need for a 
contribution record (Barr, 2012). 
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repealed the Poor Law system and “extended and consolidated the means-tested safety net” to 
make further provision for the welfare of the disabled, sick, aged and other persons (Office 
for National Statistics, 2011; The National Archives, n.d; Department for Work & Pensions, 
n.d.). The essential characteristic of the Elizabethan Poor Laws system is that it is paid out of 
current taxes.  As such, it is unfunded. 
5.5.1.2 Bismarckian State Pension 
Prior to the Old Age Pensions Act (1908), developments had taken place in Germany which 
subsequently influenced pension developments in the UK.  These are now discussed.  Otto 
von Bismarck introduced a number of social welfare systems in the 1880s in order to gain the 
support of the working class and to weaken the popular support for the socialist parties 
(Leichter, 1979). Said system is a state managed old age contributory pension scheme that is 
generally funded through “social security payroll tax (or payroll deductions) on a pay-as-you-
go basis” (Vivian & Mushai, 2012:7). This is referred to as the Bismarckian state pension 
system. Contributions received, are used immediately to fund current payments to pensioners 
and entitlement to a pension payment is conditional upon the contribution record of those 
employees who had contributed to the scheme during their working lives (Natali & Rhodes, 
2004). In other words, a Bismarckian scheme undertakes to provide a pension to previously 
employed persons who contributed to the scheme during their working lives and in this 
regard, the EPL and the Bismarckian systems differ (Vivian, 2010). The characteristic of this 
system is thus: beneficiaries make contributions via a social security payroll tax to the state 
administered scheme from which they draw benefits upon retirement.   
In recent times, the economic sustainability of the Bismarckian pension system has come 
under scrutiny owing to increased longevity which has necessitated a number of reforms 
(Barr, 2006). The Bismarckian pension model is based on the primary goal of income 
maintenance (or consumption smoothing) and, since its introduction by Bismarck in 
Germany, it has become a common form of state provision among developed countries, 
including the UK (Natali & Rhodes, 2004).  The UK’s scheme was thus based on the German 
model. In fact, the UK took its first legislative steps to introduce a Bismarckian-type pension 
system in 1908 following the enactment of the Old Age Pensions Act which is said to be the 
modern foundation of social welfare in Britain (Thane, 2008). A number of authors argue that 
it was not until the passing of the Old Age Pensions Act in 1908 that any “systematic, 
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centrally organised provision for the elderly” existed (Dilnot, Disney, Johnson & 
Whitehouse, 1994: 10).  
 Arza and Johnson (2006: 56) suggest that: 
The United Kingdom’s 1908 scheme… emerged from a lengthy debate in 
which social commentators, labour representatives, employers, and politicians 
sought to find a better and more systematic way of delivering assistance to 
genuinely needy older people [other] than by means of a stigmatising Poor 
Law. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in the nineteenth 
century may have been the catalyst for welfare measures of this nature (Arza & Johnson, 
2006). That is, although Ashton (1964) pinpoints the start of the English Industrial 
Revolution to 1760, it was only in the nineteenth century that the industrial revolution was 
bearing fruits which manifested in an increased GDP per capital which enabled social 
problems (increased unemployment, rural-urban migration and the call for state old age 
provision, as mentioned earlier) to be addressed. Accordingly, this may have necessitated the 
need for the national pension scheme in 1908. 
The 1908 scheme was a flat-rate, means-tested, subsistence level pension that was accessible 
only to the ‘respectable’72 poor over the age of 70 (Gilbert, 1970; Dilnot et al., 1994). In 
1925, the Widow’s, Orphans’ and Old Age Pensions Act, a contributory pension scheme 
which was intended to provide only a basic pension for manual and other low-wage workers, 
was passed (Ogus & Wikeley, 1995 as cited in Williamson, 2002; Blake, 1995; Bozio, 
Crawford & Tetlow, 2010). Closely aligned to the aforementioned legislation, was the 
passing of the 1911 National Insurance Act following the 1909 Budget speech -‘the People’s 
Budget’ (Gilbert, 1976). In 1911, the then Prime Minister, David Lloyd George introduced a 
compulsory health insurance scheme similar to that which was introduced in Germany in 
1883 (Merrills & Fisher, 2013). Although the 1911 Act did not explicitly relate to pension 
provision, it did provide sickness and unemployment benefits as financed by a social security 
payroll tax (Blake, 1995).  
                                                 
72 Benefits were available for the elderly of a ‘good moral character’ (Department for Work & Pensions, n.d.). 
Williamson and Pampel (1993) point out that the 1908 scheme maintained the Poor Law standpoint of the 
‘deserving poor’ versus the ‘undeserving or able-bodied poor’ who were in fact deserving of punishment. 
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Following the Beveridge Report73 of 1942, the National Insurance Act of 1946 was enacted 
which introduced a universal, contributory state pension from July 1948 to men of 65 years 
and older and to woman of 60 years and over (Department for Work & Pensions, n.d; 
Emmerson & Johnson, 2001). The Beveridge Report was tabled in the middle of World War 
II and was seen as “the dawning of a new age to replace the pre-war horrors of mass 
unemployment, inability to afford health care, and poverty in sickness, widowhood and old 
age” (Abel-Smith, 1992:5). The Beveridge Report thus signalled a change in the UK’s social 
order and signified transformation away from the old aristocratic age. It has been argued that 
the 1946 Act “incorporated the old-age pensions into the National Insurance system, 
[thereby] unifying the social insurance program” (Arza & Johnson, 2006:66). The National 
Insurance Act of 1946 introduced the Basic State Pension (BSP), with effect from 1948 
(Arthur, 2008). The latter will be discussed in section 5.5.2.1. 
5.5.1.3 Occupational pension schemes 
Occupational pension schemes are pensions schemes organised or sponsored by employers in 
terms of which, the company or organisation undertakes to provide retired employees with a 
pension (Blake, 1995; Vivian & Mushai, 2012). In the UK, since a Basic State Pension exists, 
occupational schemes are, in nature, top up schemes as discussed below.   A large portion of 
employees are covered under self-administered schemes, however owing to the complexity of 
pension schemes for employers, a number of occupational pension schemes operate with the 
help of professional fund managers, pension administrators and consultants (Association of 
British Insurers, 2000).  Blake (2003) asserts that most occupational pension schemes in the 
UK have been set up, in principle, as pension trust funds.74  
Occupational pension schemes have long been a technique to encourage long-term tenure and 
reduce employee turnover (Budd & Campbell, 1998; Emmerson & Johnson, 2001). 
Historically, occupational pension schemes operated on a defined benefit basis (final salary 
scheme) which are funded via payroll deductions and are generally supplemented by 
employer contributions (Hall, 2009a). Occupational pension schemes operated on a ‘defined 
                                                 
73 The Social Insurance and Allied Services report. 
74 Blake (2003: 9) explains that a trust is a legal relationship between individuals and assets, by which assets 
provided by one individual (the settlor) are held by another group of individuals (trustees) for the benefit of a 
third group of individuals (the beneficiaries). 
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benefit basis’ which exposed employers to considerable long term liabilities. To dispense 
with this risk, since the 1960s there has been a tendency in the private sector to move toward 
defined contribution occupational pension schemes.  
5.5.1.3.1 Defined benefit 
In terms of a defined benefit (DB) scheme, it is the pension benefit that is defined in advance 
conditional on the individual’s years of service and some measure of earnings (Disney, 1995; 
Blake, 2002). That is, the employer promises to pay the assured a lifelong defined monthly 
pension payment upon retirement (Vivian & Mushai, 2012). DB schemes are considered 
favourable only to those individuals who prefer long-term employment with the same 
organisation since DB schemes appear to reward long-term tenure and tend to penalise 
mobile labourers (Broadbent, Palumbo & Woodman, 2006; Munnell, 2006). In particular, 
Broadbent et al. (2006 as cited in Josiah, Gough & Shah, 2014: 20) point out:  
A typical UK worker who changed jobs at the average level of 6 times during 
their working career would suffer a loss of 25-30 per cent of the full service 
benefit they would have received had they remained with the same employer 
throughout their career. 
5.5.1.3.2 Defined contribution 
Monies payable under a defined contribution (DC) scheme at the end of a period depend on 
the total contributions and investment earnings accumulated in an individual’s account and 
accordingly, a DC scheme can be likened to a modern savings account (Bodie, Marcus & 
Merton, 1988). As a savings account, the defined contribution is not a pension scheme, since 
it does not provide a pension. Instead the accumulated savings from this individual reserve 
can be used to buy an annuity from an insurance company (Disney, Emmerson & Smith, 
2003). In contrast to the DB scheme, it is the contribution rate that is defined in a DC plan, 
and the potential retirement income from a DC scheme is far more uncertain or unpredictable 
than the retirement income payable under a DB scheme (Blake, 2002).  
5.5.1.3.3 Decline of DB schemes in the private sector 
Active membership in DB pension schemes in the private sector has declined since the late 
1960s whilst in contrast, DC pension plans have experienced rapid growth (Carrera, Curry & 
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Cleal, 2012). Aaronson and Coronado (2005) have argued that the increased cost of DB 
schemes was the impetus for the migration from DB to DC schemes in the UK. A number of 
authors indicate that the increased cost of DB plans and the difficulty in running these 
schemes has been influenced by a number of risk factors which ultimately affected the 
funding position of the scheme (as determined by the ratio of assets held in the scheme to the 
liabilities owed to pensioners) (Blake, 2002; Carrera et al., 2012; Josiah et al., 2014).  
Carrera et al. (2012:23) provides an in-depth discussion of these risks and other broader 
social factors, as synthesised below: 
i) Longevity risk: An increase in life expectancy owing to medical advancements and 
improved lifestyles has resulted in people living longer and accordingly, this has led 
to an increased post-retirement period. As a result of this, many insurance companies 
and employers have experienced actuarial deficits caused by an increase in their 
liabilities since a number of pensioners appear to have been living far beyond their 
pension age and not conforming to predicted mortality rates. In a DC scheme, said 
longevity risk is borne by the individual since it is his level of contribution (and 
investment returns) which ultimately affect the size of the pension pot available for 
future retirement income. Historically, this has been the case in the UK. As society 
changed, people began to live longer, families decreased in size and the proportion of 
old individuals to young individuals increased.   It became clear that the DB schemes 
were building up massive deficits.   This was referred to as the Pensions Black Hole. 
ii) Investment risk: Investment performance is critical for sponsors of DB plans since 
they may be required to make a deficiency payment if the funding position of the 
scheme is insufficient to meet future pension promises. Equity returns appear to have 
been volatile over the years and as such, sponsors of DB schemes have faced great 
uncertainty associated with future investment returns. The migration from DB to DC 
schemes has meant that investment risks are now borne by the individual/employee 
since it is once again the combination of contributions made and investment returns 
that underpin the quantity of accumulated savings available for future pension 
provision. 
iii) Regulatory and Legislative Changes: Tighter regulations regarding DB schemes and 
the introduction of new accounting rules meant that the attractiveness and 
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affordability of providing DB pension plans has declined. In fact, Vivian and Mushai 
(2012: 8) acknowledge that modern accounting rules require that if a deficit exists in 
the pension fund, said liability should appear on the firm’s balance sheet. Following 
this, it became clear that a number of firms faced serious unfunded liabilities and 
firms worried that deficits disclosed would, in turn, reflect financial weakness (Josiah 
et al., 2014). As such, many companies felt it would be best for their long term 
sustainability to discontinue the DB pension scheme in favour of a DC scheme since 
the investment risk would fall on the assured (The Occupational Pensioner’s Alliance, 
n.d.). In addition to this, the 1986 legislation allowed firms and workers to contract 
out of employer-sponsored DB schemes into individual personal pensions offered by 
insurance companies or self-administered employer schemes on a DC basis. A 
number of employees did so since the accrual losses associated with DB plans could 
be mitigated by way of a DC pension plan (Broadbent et al., 2006). 
iv) Labour market mobility: The UK has witnessed significant labour market changes 
resulting in increased labour market mobility. Since DC schemes have the advantage 
of portability, the latter has dominated the private sector since the post-war period. 
Furthermore, DB schemes were thus becoming increasingly unsustainable in the private 
sector. Changing the benefit structure in pension provision was therefore the private sector’s 
response to the increasing costs of pension provision on a DB basis. Furthermore, Broadbent 
et al. (2006) emphasises that the shift from DB to DC schemes reflects the regulatory and 
accounting reform which has made the financial risks associated with DB plans more 
transparent. “Since DC contributions can be fixed as a predictable share of payroll, migrating 
to a DC plan offers employers a means of reducing balance sheet and earnings volatility, at 
least over the long term” (Broadbent et al., 2006: 2). 
5.5.1.4 Personal pension provision 
In a personal pension scheme, an individual accumulates his or her pension contributions in a 
fund (via monthly contributions), the proceeds of which are then used to provide a pension 
upon retirement either through endowment or an annuity (Disney & Whitehouse, 2005). In 
contrast to an occupational pension scheme, an employer is not required to contribute to a 
personal pension, and usually does not do so (Black & Nobles, 1998b). Personal pensions 
play a significant role in providing a retirement income for the self-employed or for those 
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employees who do not have access to an occupational pension scheme (Association of British 
Insurers, 2000). According to Black and Nobles (1998b:795), the amount paid upon 
retirement is dependent on a number of factors including: i) the contributions paid by an 
individual (to ensure an adequate pension), ii) the investment performance and/or return of 
the fund into which the contributions have been paid, and iii) the fund manager's charges.  
5.5.2 Conservative Government 
Since its inception in 1948, there had been discontent with the state scheme, especially the 
flat rate benefit.  This resulted in a number of attempts to improve the system.  The 
Conservative government’s pension reforms culminated in 1986 and resulted in a four-tier 
pension system characterised by a mixture of unfunded state provision and funded private 
provision (Schulz, 2000; Blake, 2003). The four major retirement income vehicles, at the 
time, included the Basic State Pension (BSP), the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS), the employer sponsored occupational scheme and individual Personal Pensions 
(Blake, 2000). The history of each pension system is discussed below.  
5.5.2.1 Basic State Pension 
The National Insurance Act of 1946 introduced the BSP which formally came into effect in 
1948 (Bozio et al., 2010).  Although the Beveridge Report had envisaged a fully funded 
universal scheme, the government opted rather for a “pay-as-you go” system financed by flat-
rate contributions on employees whose earnings fell above the lower earnings limit threshold 
(Disney & Whitehouse, 1993; Whitehouse, 1998; Attanasio & Rohwedder, 2003). The 
problem was that the pension would become payable to the then current retiring workers who 
had not contributed to the scheme because it had not yet come into existence.  Parliament 
would not agree to any contribution from general taxes.  The scheme had to be funded out of 
social security payroll contributions. Individuals paid National Insurance (NI) contributions 
based on overall budgetary needs and the “distributional objectives” of the government 
(Bozio et al., 2010: 8). The latter meant that the flat-rate contributions required to finance 
current pension funding was particularly onerous on low-paid workers. Clearly these workers 
paid a greater percentage of their income in comparison to high income earners.  The flat rate 
contribution system had to be abandoned in favour of a form of earnings-related contribution 
payments (Whitehouse, 1998).  
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The full BSP was payable on a weekly basis to individuals who were above the State Pension 
Age (SPA)75 and who had made a sufficient number of contributions over their working life 
(Blundell, Meghir & Smith, 2002). An individual who had contributed at least nine-tenths 
(90%) of his or her working life was entitled to a full benefit pension (Attanasio & 
Rohwedder, 2003). In other words, if an individual was credited with the “requisite number 
of qualifying years out of their working life, they [would] receive a BSP at the full rate. If 
they [had] fewer qualifying years than this, a pension [would be] payable at a pro-rata rate” 
(Bozio et al., 2010:12). As such, the BSP was not quite universal, as the contribution 
requirements mentioned above ought to have been satisfied in order for an individual to be 
able to have claimed a full pension (Dilnot et al., 1994; Johnson & Stears, 1996).  
Furthermore, additional means-tested welfare benefits were available for those deemed to 
have inadequate benefits- often referred to as “the most needy” (Budd & Campbell, 1998). In 
other words, low income earners who qualified for additional welfare benefits, were entitled 
to added social security payment subsidies on top of the BSP (Blundell, Fry & Walker, 1988). 
During the mid-1900s, roughly 15% of pensioners were dependent on the minimum means-
tested benefit income support on top of the state pension (Blundell & Johnson, 1999).  
By the late 1950s, about two-thirds of employees were dependent on the state pension (Bozio 
et al., 2010). However, since the BSP provided the bare minimum in pension provision and 
left many workers on or below subsistence-level income, there was increased pressure to 
introduce an earnings-related top-up to the BSP for those employees who did not have access 
to an occupational pension (Whitehouse, 1998; Taylor-Gooby, 2005). In addition to this, 
Abel-Smith and Townsend (1965) argue that the penalties incurred by early leavers in 
occupational pension schemes and the unwillingness of government to make occupational 
pension schemes mandatory for all employees, may have further exacerbated the need for a 
state second-tier pension.  
                                                 
75 Between 1948 and April 2010 the official SPA was 65 for men and 60 for woman. However, between April 
2010 and March 2020 the SPA will increase by one month every month until the SPA for woman equates to that 
of men (65 years). This will ensure financial sustainability of the scheme on the basis of increased life 
expectancy (see Bozio et al., 2010).  
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5.5.2.2 State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) 
The National Insurance Act of 1959 introduced the Graduated Retirement Benefit (GRB) 
which offered a modest state earnings related pension (Dilnot et al., 1994). The scheme was 
relatively short-lived as benefits payable were too meagre and as such, the graduated pension 
was superseded by SERPS in 1978 (Blundell & Johnson, 1999). As a result of this, the Social 
Security Act of 1975 introduced SERPS to supplement the “minimal and inadequate” BSP 
and as such, SERPS formed the second tier in state pension provision (Whitehouse, 1998; 
Budd & Campbell, 1998; Schulz, 2000:94).  
SERPS aimed to pay 25 per cent of average individual earnings in the best 20 years’ 
earnings76 and were payable together with the BSP (Whitehouse, 1998: Attanasio & 
Rohwedder, 2003). In order to avoid industry opposition, the government designed the 
contracting out scheme to ensure that the private sector (and particularly employer-provided 
pension funds) would not be suppressed by the introduction of SERPS and accordingly, that 
good opportunities for the private sector would remain (Whitehouse, 1998; Attanasio & 
Rohwedder, 2003; Taylor-Gooby, 2005). As a result of this, employees who belonged to an 
occupational pension scheme could opt out of SERPS (and pay a reduced NI contribution 
rate) as long as the occupational pension scheme guaranteed at least the same pension benefit 
as that of SERPS- ‘a guaranteed minimum pension’ (GMP)77 (Blundell et al., 2002). Such 
schemes were known as contracted-out salary-related (COSR) schemes (Bozio et al., 2010). 
Employers usually made membership of their occupational scheme a condition of 
employment and accordingly, pension arrangements at the time were characterised by very 
little freedom of choice (Sullivan, 2004). 
5.5.2.3 Occupational pension schemes 
Although occupational schemes had long existed before the Second World War, they became 
particularly widespread in the tight labour market post war (Bozio et al., 2010). In the 1960s, 
occupational pension schemes were largely the domains of “full time, unionized, male 
workers” in large companies and in the public sector (Emmerson & Johnson, 2001: 24). In 
                                                 
76 Subsequent reductions in the generosity of SERPS meant that it was worth only 20% of average lifetime 
earnings to anyone retiring after 2000 (Blundell et al., 2002). 
77 This requirement was subsequently abolished and occupational schemes merely had to demonstrate that they 
satisfied the reference scheme test (see Blake, 2003). 
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addition to this, employers could provide private pensions to attract key workers (without 
being forced to include lower income earners) and as such, employer based occupational 
pension schemes were particularly dominant amongst high income white-collar workers 
(Emmerson & Johnson, 2001; Sullivan, 2004; Munnell, 2006).  
Up until the 1986 legislation, approved occupational schemes had to be of the defined benefit 
form (salary-related pension schemes) (Budd & Campbell, 1998:112). In fact, Disney 
(1995:21) points out that since only DB plans could attract approved status under the original 
provisions of the contracting-out legislation, it is not surprising that DB provision was the 
dominant form of occupational pension plan provision in Britain. In spite of this, there has 
been a growing trend for employers to close the existing DB schemes to employees and opt 
rather for a DC scheme in order to have greater certainty with regard to costs78 (Association 
of British Insurers, 2000: 16).  As mentioned above, this was owing to the massive deficits 
that DB schemes were building up which was referred to as the pension Black Hole. 
Notwithstanding the legislative changes in 1988, which prevented employers from making 
membership to their scheme a condition of employment, occupational pension schemes 
appear to have remained relatively widespread (Emmerson & Johnson, 2001). 
5.5.2.4 Personal pensions 
The defining feature of Thatcher’s Conservative Government (1979-1990) was its attempts to 
control public spending through privatisation (Hills, 1998). The government was keen to 
reduce their liabilities in terms of SERPS.  These measures included making systematic 
“cuts” in state pension provision and transferring the burden of pension provision to the 
private sector through a number of tax incentives and deregulation of the private sector 
(Blake, 2003). This is consistent with Thatcher’s ideal to “roll back the state” and restrict 
public spending (Taylor-Gooby, 2005). In fact, “Britain is the only G-7 nation that has made 
the transition from a largely public PAYG earnings related scheme to a partially privatized 
alternative with funded individual accounts” (Williamson, 2002: 416). The rational for said 
reforms was the so-called population aging which was said to have resulted in an unfavorable 
and unsustainable cost of future pension provision (Taylor-Gooby, 2005).  
                                                 
78 About 15% of employees are now thought to be covered by DC schemes (Association of British Insurers, 
2000). 
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With the pervasive ideology of privatisation and a further re-examination of public spending, 
the 1986 Social Security Act consisted of a number of measures to encourage individuals to 
leave SERPS (Whitehouse, 1998; Rees & Kessner, 1999; Blake, 2003). It was at this time 
that government was concerned with the projected cost of SERPS once the “baby boom” 
generation began to retire and accordingly, sought to further reduce public expenditure 
(Hemming & Kay, 1982; Department of Health and Social Security, 1984 as cited in Disney, 
Emmerson & Smith, 2003). In particular, it was expected that dependency ratios (the ratio of 
retired individuals or households to those of a working age) would escalate in the future 
(Banks & Emmerson, 2000: 4).  
In 1988, the Conservative government gave tax and “national insurance concessions” with 
the desire to encourage individuals to opt for portable personal pensions as opposed to state 
provision under SERPS or occupational pension provision (Hills, 1998). Government thus 
designed and promoted a new pension dispensation – the age of the personal pension scheme 
was born. An employee could choose to opt out of SERPS even if the employer did not offer 
an occupational pension scheme provided that the employee joined a so-called "Approved 
Personal Pension" or a contracted out money-purchase (COMP) scheme. (Attanasio & 
Rohwedder, 2003: 1503; Bozio et al., 2010).  This was done not only to further reduce public 
spending but also to give employees a greater freedom of choice since employees themselves 
could decide whether to contribute to SERPS, their employers’ pension schemes or a personal 
pension scheme (Sullivan, 2004).  
The Conservative government endeavoured to ensure that personal pensions would succeed 
by reducing the generosity of public pension benefits, introducing rebates, tax relief, and 
incentive bonuses and embarking on an aggressive advertising campaign that set out to 
convert employees to the new personal pension option (Schulz, 2000: 95: Banks & 
Emmerson, 2000). The important point to realise is whatever scheme replaced SERPS would 
have to be, right from its inception, far inferior to these existing schemes.  The pensioners 
would, by design, be worse off. However, this is not what government marketing had 
projected. Government advertising unreservedly celebrated the new personal pension plan 
era.    
Following the 1988 pension reform, around 6 million people (more than one-quarter of all 
employees) had taken out a personal pension by the mid-1990s (Blundell et al., 2002). This 
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was not only owing to major financial incentives, but also the lure of the stock market boom 
and supposed stock market gains which meant that individuals saw private pension saving as 
the better alternative to state run schemes (Vincent, 2003). This was despite the capital 
market uncertainty and high transaction costs of private pension provision (Whitehouse, 
1998). It later transpired that a number of individuals who had taken out personal pension 
plans did so to their detriment resulting in the pension mis-selling scandal (Rees & Kessner, 
1999).  
5.5.3 Pension mis-selling scandal 
As mentioned earlier, a potential source of market conduct regulation are events such as the 
pensions mis-selling scandal, which is now considered.  
Following the 1988 legislation, government and insurance companies embarked on a 
vigorous campaign to promote their “personal pension” products since individuals were able 
to opt out of both SERPS and/or their occupational pensions into an approved personal 
pension scheme (Bennett & Gabriel, 2001). Personal pensions were available from a number 
of providers including insurance companies, building societies, unit trusts, banks and other 
financial organisations (Budd & Campbell, 1998; Black & Nobles, 1998b; Association of 
British Insurers, 2000). The vast array of pension providers resulted in a highly competitive 
private pension market and many authors argue that this may have contributed to the mis-
selling of personal pensions in the 1980s (Soin & Huber, 2013).  
Government ministers and politicians also openly endorsed the personal pension system and 
as many as 550 000 personal pensions were sold during the next four months (Aldridge, 
1997; Bennett & Gabriel, 2001). There are no records to suggest that when the proposal was 
made to transfer out of occupational schemes to the personal pension plans that anyone 
(including an actuary, regulator, politician, insurance company, pension fund administrator or 
the financial press) warned that new scheme would be to the disadvantage of existing 
members opting to transfer. Nonetheless, it later transpired that a number of individuals 
purchased personal pensions to their detriment resulting in the so-called pension mis-selling 
scandal (Rees & Kessner, 1999).  Schulz (2000: 93) points out: 
… the political rhetoric at the time sounded good: bigger pension benefits, 
lower government pension costs, greater individual control, investment 
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flexibility and [the] use of supposedly more “efficient” private companies. But 
the reality has turned out to be much less than was promised. 
It is important to emphasise however, that at no time was it a condition of the personal 
pension scheme that the returns had to be equal or superior to the existing state defined 
benefit schemes.   This was never built into the scheme.  The private financial market was not 
required to guarantee equal performance.  The private financial sector could create, operate 
and manage the new private pensions but they could not make them more beneficial than the 
defined benefit scheme.  The private financial market never said it could. In fact, the new 
system, as mentioned above, would naturally be inferior. This was inevitable but instead of 
the government pointing out this inevitability, the private financial market became the ‘fall 
guy’. The private sector was accused of mis-selling the private pension plans.  
It has been cited that the “scandal” revealed itself in 1992 following a report by the Pension 
Law Review Committee and a review of SRO members’ pension sale files by the SIB (Black 
& Nobles, 1998a; Bennett & Gabriel, 2001). It was found that a mere nine per cent of 
insurance firms displayed adequate record keeping and compliance with the “know your 
customer” and “best advice” rules. This prompted further investigation. 
Since the typical retiree lacks both the expertise and the technical knowledge to deal with 
complex pension issues, the industry itself is often called upon to provide the necessary 
advice (Ring, 2005). The mis-selling scandal was the adverse product of such since most 
individuals were “ripe for the picking - looking for quick and easy answers and finding it 
difficult to easily evaluate, in an informed way, the advice they receive[d]” (Schulz, 2001: 
98). Black and Nobles (1998a: 793) assert that ‘mis-selling’ could refer to any one range of 
situations, namely: i) the use of deliberate strategies to sell products to individuals which 
were known to be unsuitable; ii) the use of aggressive and often unethical sales strategies; iii) 
the failure to give suitable advice when it is needed and; iv) the ignorant and incompetent 
selling of inappropriate products.  
There are four main examples or scenarios where the so-called ‘pension mis-selling’ occurred 
(Whitehouse, 1998:24). Each of these instances is discussed below: 
i) Certain elderly individuals who were persuaded to ‘contract out’ of SERPS in 
favour of a personal pension scheme, fell victim to the mis-selling scandal since 
SERPS offered a better pension alternative to the vigorously marketed personal 
137 
 
pension. Early contributions made merely covered the high transaction costs 
incurred and the short time frame in which returns may have been realised meant 
that contributions would have insufficient time to generate an adequate fund 
(Taylor-Gooby, 1999). The latter is depicted in Figure 1 below (as described in 
Whitehouse, 1998:15).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii) Individuals who fell below the lower earnings threshold, and particularly woman, were 
said to have been mis-sold personal pensions. This was owing to the fact that DC personal 
pension schemes depend on the quantum of contributions made. Since the contributions paid 
were often inadequate to bear the high transaction costs, accumulated benefits were 
insufficient at retirement (Whitehouse, 1998; Ward, 2000).  
iii) A number of individuals, who were persuaded to transfer their pension out of an 
occupational plan into a personal pension scheme, were also casualties of the mis-selling 
scandal. The latter appears to have been the most significant case of pension mis-selling and 
accordingly, has attracted wide review. 
Until 1988, membership to an employer’s pension scheme could be a condition of 
employment and accordingly, by this time, a number of individuals working for a larger 
employer were likely to have accrued workplace pension benefits (Pensions Management 
Figure 1: Marginal Increment to Personal Pensions and SERPS at various ages 
(prior to 1993) 
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Institute, 2013: 1). The ‘hard selling’ of providers who focused on the national rebate 
incentive and down played the transactions costs associated with personal pension schemes, 
saw millions of individual move from good quality occupational schemes to the inferior 
alternative (Disney & Whitehouse, 1992; Pensions Management Institute, 2013:1). Mis-
selling was said to have occurred since a number of individuals were left substantially worse 
off thereafter.  
The latter may be attributed to a number of factors. To begin with, individuals were worse off 
after transferring their assets to an approved personal pension scheme, since an employer was 
no longer obligated to contribute to the private pension plan (Black & Nobles, 1998b). That 
is, employers would usually make contributions to an occupational pension plan (worth 70 
per cent of the pension on average) but would rarely make such a contribution to a personal 
pension scheme (Blake, 2002). As such, the lack of employer contributions meant that there 
was little chance that a personal pension would yield a better investment than its occupational 
pension counterpart. To emphasise this point, Blake (2002:334) reports that a miner who 
transferred to a personal pension scheme in 1989 and who retired in 1994 at age 60 would 
receive a lump sum of £2576 and a monthly pension of £734. On the contrary, had he 
remained in his occupational pension scheme, that same miner would be entitled to a lump 
sum of £5125 and a monthly pension of £1791.  
In addition to this, scheme members were further disadvantaged because 25 per cent of the 
transfer value was taken in commission and other administration costs (Blake, 2002). In 
summary, the UK’s Office of Fair Trading (1997: 8 as cited in Barr & Diamond, 2008) 
pointed out that: 
Many personal pensions are… simply poor value. Their benefits are consumed 
in the high levels of expenses needed to support the marketing effort and 
active management of the funds. In comparison with most occupational 
schemes, the level of employers’ contributions may be inadequate or non-
existent.  
Moreover, occupational pension schemes generally offer “death in service benefits” (a form 
of life assurance risk benefits) 79, “ill health benefits” (a form of disability insurance) and 
                                                 
79 The provision of risk benefits by a pension fund is common practice but has complications.  The pension fund 
is not a registered licenced insurer and thus legally the risk benefits should be provided by an insurer.  This then 
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other benefits to spouses and dependants (Black & Nobles, 1998a: 940). On the contrary, 
personal pensions would typically only offer these benefits as optional extras. Accordingly, 
scheme members who opted to join personal pension schemes not only sacrificed their 
employer’s contributions but also forfeited these aforementioned benefits.  
v) Lastly, individuals who were persuaded not to join an employer sponsored pension scheme 
in favour of a personal pension scheme are included in the estimate of those affected by the 
scandal. The reasons for this are similar to those listed above in point iii. 
Once again, it is important to remember that the pensions Black Hole meant that the state 
system had to change and in terms of the new system pensioners naturally would be much 
worse off.  This would be the outcome with whatever new system replaced the old system 
despite claims of ‘hard-selling’ and the various regulatory weaknesses, discussed below.  
There was nothing wrong with the replacement schemes but in reality, said schemes could 
not produce the same outcomes which had become unsustainable.     
5.5.3.1 Regulatory failures 
Upon examination by the accountancy firm, KPMG, a random sample of 735 transfers from 
occupational pension schemes between 1991 and 1993, revealed that over 90 per cent of 
these cases exhibited some mis-selling (Sullivan, 2004:93). This appears to be so since 
“virtually every case examined” exhibited unsatisfactory regulatory compliance, 
inappropriate advice and inadequate and incomplete case files (Schulz, 2000). Regulators 
relied on these factors in order to shift the burden for compensation onto the unsuspecting 
financial market.  
As a result of these factors, the focus of attention at this time was directed toward what had 
been done by both firms and regulators to prevent the mis-selling of personal pensions (Black 
& Nobles, 1998a). The answer to this question represented a large scale failure by the 
regulatory system (Minns, 2001). Government had found regulating the private sector 
difficult since it was the very sector that it sought to promote (Taylor- Gooby, 2005). As 
such, the private pensions market remained within a weak regulatory regime (Taylor-Gooby, 
2005). Furthermore, the SRO system was “thoroughly discredited in the eyes of opposition 
                                                                                                                                                        
raises the question as to the role of the pension fund.  Is it an agent of the insured or is the insured the fund 
which is insuring itself against the risk?  These questions are usually neither asked nor answered. 
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lawmakers” (Taylor, 2009:67). This was compounded by the Robert Maxwell scandal 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2005). 80 Accordingly, the apparent failure of the SRO structure was the 
catalyst for further regulatory reform and could possibly be attributed to the i) complicated 
relationship between SROs and the statutory regulatory, ii) the inability of self-regulation to 
raise the standards in the market as a whole and iii) the failure to deal with a problem where 
there was a need for the entire industry to change (Davies, 2001:281). 
Moreover, and as mentioned above, Black and Nobles (1998a) note that following the mis-
selling scandal and upon investigation, a number of firms admitted non-compliance. That is, 
“there had been a widespread breach of the “best advice” and “know your customer” rules 
which represented a major regulatory failure by both regulators and firms” (Black & Nobles, 
1998a: 941). According to a Parliamentary Committee Report in 1998 (as cited in Minns, 
2001) “the Treasury said that the Regulatory system failed to prevent, or deal more swiftly, 
with mis-selling because firms simply did not abide by the regulatory rules”. Furthermore, 
following a review of Black and Nobles (1998a) and Black and Nobles (1998b), a number of 
other factors can be attributed to the so-called regulatory failures that resulted in the mis-
selling scandal. These factors are listed below: 
• Inadequate Management Supervision: On the backdrop of increased competition 
within the UK’s insurance market, insurance firms sought to expand their direct sales 
forces to ensure that as many brokers as possible would sell the company’s products. 
This was done to the detriment of both the management supervision and training of 
such financial advisors. In fact, advisors were frequently recruited without sufficient 
checks since insurance firms were looking for people “capable of producing a 
reasonable level of business, and quality came second”. In addition to this, SRO’s had 
a difficult time ensuring compliance since they had no direct contractual relationship 
with an appointed representative (AR) and therefore were unable to act directly 
against them. Coupled with the fact that insurance firms often lacked an 
                                                 
80 The SROs were heavily criticised for failing to protect the interests of consumers in a number of high-profile 
financial scandals including the Maxwell affair. By 1991, over £440 million from pension funds had been 
fraudulently misappropriated by Robert Maxwell to buttress a number of business failures. Said scandal is often 
referred to as the Mirror Group Pension scandal. See Stiles & Taylor (1993); Spalek (1999) and Ferran (2003) 
for further discussions. 
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understanding and awareness of what was involved in the management of a sales 
force, the casualty in this instance was inadequate supervision and control of AR’s. 
• Inadequate training of salesmen: The low levels of training and competence of 
salesmen further exacerbated the regulatory failures of insurance firms. In 1988, 
LAUTRO published a number of rules, one of which required that a company appoint 
representatives who had the “requisite aptitude and competence”. However, it was 
later revealed that a mere thirteen days of training was all that was necessary before 
an agent could meet with a client. During the period of 1989-1991, 54 percent of new 
sales recruits left the market. Owing to the high level of turnovers, training was costly 
for firms whom ultimately resorted to ignoring the abovementioned requirements. The 
lack of training regarding occupational schemes further compounded the mis-selling 
scandal. In fact, Lord Hoffmann in General Insurance Holdings v Lloyd’s Bank 
Group Insurance Co. Ltd UKHL 2003 48  asserted that “the underlying reasons for 
mis-selling [was] partly the method by which salesman were paid but largely the 
inadequacy of the training and monitoring of their performance provided by the 
companies employing them”. Since salesmen had neither the understanding nor the 
knowledge of the nature of occupational pension schemes, or their benefit structures, 
they were unable to make the necessary detailed comparisons and therefore did not 
always provide “best advice”. In fact, in February 1992, LAUTRO issued its 
fourteenth bulletin and commented that: 
Company representatives too often fail to make a sufficiently detailed, 
realistic or objective analysis of the relative merits of transferring 
their prospective investors to a personal pension or leaving them in 
their occupational scheme. Sometimes it is because the 
representatives have not been trained regarding how and why they 
should undertake such an analysis. Sometimes they have been 
adequately trained but nonetheless choose to ignore the requirement.  
As such, and as mentioned above, a number of ineligible individuals were ‘mis-sold’ 
pensions.  
• Commission structures: The low levels of training and competence was further 
reinforced by the fact that advisors had no incentive to partake in training since their 
remuneration structure was sales driven on a commission only basis. That is, “time 
spent in training was time not spent selling, and no sales meant no income”. As a 
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result of the pressures to receive an income, advisors often negated the exhortations 
for ‘quality business’ and thereby paid little attention to sales ethics and the “niceties 
of know your customer”. Compliance with these rules would often result in no sale. 
Furthermore, commission structures meant that salespersons had every incentive to 
downplay the disadvantages or problems with the product and in doing so failed to 
safeguard the best interests of their client. Although persistency rates and 
“commission claw back arrangements” were ways of incentivising the sale of quality 
business, the combination of “claw backs(s), volume-related performance indicators 
and commission-only remuneration” resulted in commission hungry advisors. 
• Ineffective Compliance Officers: During the reign of the FSA regulatory system, 
firms were required to ensure their own compliance by employing an assigned 
compliance officer. This new role brought with it a number of uncertainties since 
compliance officers were entering into unchartered territory in terms of which there 
was no benchmark as to how to operate. As a result of this, compliance systems 
appear to have been inadequate, unsatisfactory, disorganised and severely under-
resourced. Furthermore, periodic monitoring appears to have been weak and serious 
compliance shortcomings necessitating further remedial action were evident.  
• Novelty of the regulatory system: Regulators had little experience as to what 
standards should be imposed and lacked a detailed understanding of the necessary 
regulatory framework. Furthermore, regulatory officials often lacked the necessary 
‘industry background’ and accordingly, lacked specific product knowledge. As a 
result of this, the initial ‘advisory visits’ were more of a way to educate themselves 
about the industry than it was to introduce the industry to regulation. 
Over time, it became clear that regulators had not pre-empted the scandal since they were 
“simply not looking” (Black & Nobles, 1998b). That is, sales techniques, marketing 
procedures, and compliance with “suitability of cover” and “best advice” were simply not the 
priority of regulators.  However, it can be argued that the source of the pensioners’ loss was 
not bad advice or the various other regulatory failures that are often cited; it was the move to 
a deliberately designed inferior system as a result of necessity in order to reduce and 
ultimately get rid of the pension Black Hole.   
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These regulatory failures, inter alia, nonetheless signalled the need for far greater regulatory 
oversight. In fact, the pension mis-selling scandal has been cited as one of the principal 
reasons for regulatory reform undertaken by the Labour Government since consumer 
protection measures in legislation were deemed to be inadequate81 (McMeel, 2013: 598). This 
culminated in the i) establishment of an independent new body known as the Occupational 
Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA), ii) the formation of a new body, the FSA (as 
discussed above) and iii) the passing of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 
which repealed the 1986 Act (discussed earlier) (Lowry & Rawlings, 2004; Barr & Diamond, 
2008). It was during this time that the Labour Government recognised and decided there were 
too many regulators, and therefore announced that the eight existing financial services 
regulators would be merged into a single authority, under the control of the old 
SIB82 (thereafter renamed the Financial Services Authority in 1997)83 (Ford, 2011: 268).  
The FSA officially opened its doors on 1 June 1998 and assumed responsibility for insurance 
regulation in 1999. It was also at this time that the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) was established to which UK insurance supervisors soon became 
members84 (Ford, 2011).  
5.5.3.1.1 Assessment of the nature of the regulatory changes 
It can be accepted that mis-selling falls squarely within the purview of market conduct and 
hence the pensions mis-selling played a significant role in the rise of the second peak- the 
market conduct peak. The current regulators’ obsession with advice, intermediaries, the RDR 
and the like can be traced back largely to this saga.  
The pension mis-selling saga is complex.   From the 1960s onwards it was becoming clear, 
for the reasons set out above, that defined benefit schemes were likely to run into a loss in the 
                                                 
81 In fact, as early as 1995, the Labour Party (then in opposition to the Conservative party) clearly expressed that 
it would “remove the last remnants of self-regulation and the "unnecessary" distinction between the SIB and the 
SROs” if it were to come into power (Ferran, 2003). 
82 The failure of the SRO’s was to be expected, within the insurance context. As mentioned before, the system 
was a failure from the day it was put into practice. The tariff committees, which possessed a number of similar 
characteristics to Gower’s system, had been closed down shortly before the SRO self-regulatory system 
following the report of the Monopolies Commission.  It is odd to see one government institution shutting down 
self-regulatory bodies whilst another was creating them. 
83 It is often confused that the FSA was established in 2001 following the passing of the FSMA 2000 which 
came into effect in 2001. Accordingly, the establishment of the FSA preceded the passing of the FSMA 2000. 
84 The FSA only became fully in force from the 30 November 2001 although it had existed from 1997 following 
the renaming of the SIB, as noted above. 
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future.  These future losses could be translated through accounting rules into current pension 
fund deficits.  It was therefore in the interests of the government as the provider of state 
pensions, as well as the private sector as providers, to create and promote private pension 
schemes which would hide this problem. Since the pension deficits were unsustainable, the 
change was inevitable. Pension funds would be relieved of their problems which would 
materialise as lower returns for pensioners.  As a rule, pensioners would not know they were 
worse off since what they knew was what they had and not what they would have had in a 
different system. In the case of the UK, since both systems co-existed, those who changed to 
the new system could be compared to those who did not change. At this point, it became a 
blame game. It was in the interests of government, employers (public and private) and 
regulators to blame the private sector financial industry.  In that way they could also shift 
their pension fund costs onto the financial market. The blame was personified as “bad 
advice” which was said to be the impetus for regulatory reform. Since some companies 
admitted non-compliance to various other requirements, shifting the blame onto the private 
sector became that much more reasonable and easier, although many of these issues had little 
to do with the inevitable outcome of pensioners being worse off.  
5.6 Supervisory Agencies 
5.6.1 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
As mentioned above, UK regulators joined the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) described by some as the “closest approximation of an international 
insurance regulatory body” (Kochenburger & Salve, 2011). Established in 1994, the IAIS is a 
“voluntary membership organization of insurance supervisors and regulators” that is 
responsible for drawing up standards and developing and assisting in the implementation of 
principles and standards in the insurance sector worldwide (IAIS, 2014). The globalisation of 
the insurance business has created the need for a regulatory body which operates through an 
international perspective (Kochenburger & Salve, 2011). According to its mission statement, 
the IAIS undertakes to “promote effective and globally consistent supervision of the 
insurance industry in order to develop and maintain fair, safe and stable insurance markets for 
the benefit and protection of policyholders and to contribute to global financial stability” 
(NAIC, 2014a). The IAIS has no regulatory power, binding ability or legal authority, 
however it can be credited with influencing national and regional regulators through various 
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means (NAIC, 2014a). These include the publication of supervisory principles, the provision 
of training and support and its endeavour to advance the latest developments in international 
regulation (NAIC, 2014a).  
In December 1999, the IAIS published a set of “Principles for the Conduct of Insurance 
Business”. In particular, said principles were expected to improve insurer, intermediary and 
consumer relationships and thereby strengthen consumer confidence and protection. 
According to the IAIS principles, insurers and intermediaries should: 
• Act at all times honestly and in a straightforward manner; 
• Act with due skill, care and diligence when conducting their business activities; 
• Conduct their business and organise their affairs with prudence; 
• Pay due regard to the information needs of their customers and treat them fairly; 
• Seek from their customers information which might reasonably be expected before 
giving advice or concluding a contract; 
• Avoid conflicts of interest; 
• Deal with their regulators in an open and cooperative way; 
• Support a system of complaints handling where applicable; and 
• Organise and control their affairs effectively. 
By this time, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) had already come into existence with a 
number of insurance companies becoming members thereafter85. According to the 
Association of British Insurers (2014), their role, amongst other things, is to publish research 
reports and policy documents, support a competitive insurance industry and promote best 
practice, transparency and the highest standards of customer service. The ABI has 
                                                 
85  Up to date, 300 companies, accounting for 90% of the UK’s insurance market are members of the ABI (see 
ABI, 2014). 
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endeavoured to achieve the latter by publishing a sequence of best practice guidelines. 
Member companies are required to comply with these codes of conduct. 
According to the ABI’s ‘General Insurance Business Code of Practice for all Intermediaries’, 
an intermediary shall: 
• As an overriding obligation, conduct business at all times with utmost good faith and 
integrity; 
• Explain all the essential provisions of the cover afforded by the policy (including any 
restrictions and exclusions which apply) so as to ensure that the potential 
policyholder understands the cover being purchased 
• Avoid influencing the prospective insured; and  
• Ensure as far as possible that the policy proposed is suitable to the needs of the 
prospective policyholder. 
5.6.2 Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) 
Government introduced tighter regulation by virtue of the 1995 Pensions Act which 
established a new authority, the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA), and 
which superseded the Occupational Pensions Board (OPB) in 1997 (Sullivan, 2004; Taylor-
Gooby, 2005). 86 The latter however applied only to the occupational pensions sector and 
accordingly, OPRA was responsible for the supervision of occupational DB pension schemes 
only. OPRA had the authority to remove, suspend and impose fines on employees or trustees, 
wind up and terminate schemes, impose injunctions and interdicts and establish minimum 
funding requirements. Since OPRA did not appear to have had any role in regulating the 
market conduct of occupational pension schemes, it would be superfluous to continue with 
any further and more comprehensive discussion.87 
                                                 
86 The life of OPRA was however short-lived. 
87 In April 2005, OPRA was replaced by a new “Pensions Regulator” (See Department for Work and Pensions, 
2005; Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, 2006). 
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5.6.3 Applicability of economic theories of regulation 
The basis of the economic theory of regulation is that individuals (or classes of individuals) 
can and will use legislation to their own advantage.  In line with Stigler’s (1971) theory of 
regulatory capture, industries can capture regulators in order to use regulation to the 
industry’s advantage.  In the theory of Public Choice, it is argued that politicians promise 
legislation which would benefit their constituencies. In return, politicians are elected. 
Politicians personally gain in return for these benefits. The exchange is votes for benefits.    
The rise of “independent” supervisory agencies can be explained on the same basis of self-
interest.  Legislation does not originate from parliament.  Regulation is sent to parliament for 
approval from government departments and agencies. In terms of the theory of self-interest, 
the possibility exists that this legislation benefits the agencies which include the employees 
within these agencies. That is the case and becomes self-evident when recent supervisory 
legislation is examined. These agencies, in particular, tend to be self-funding. That is, the 
agency imposes a levy on the regulated industries.  This is taxation without the consent of the 
payer of the levy. However, unlike taxes, parliament does not approve the levies. 
Furthermore, the agencies are increasingly issuing their own “laws”. Likewise, these laws do 
not go through parliament. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Over the course of the past three centuries, the insurance market in the UK has witnessed 
extensive regulatory developments and reform. Regulators or supervisors are new institutions 
having been established after 1986, the date of the passing of the Financial Services Act. 
Since this date, the supervisory structure has grown, now extending to international 
committees.  This has replaced the system of self-regulation which traditionally governed 
financial institutions.  
In the 17th century, following the establishment of the Office (Chamber) of Assurances in the 
Royal Exchange, certain good insurance orders developed so as to put London on the map as 
a highly regarded and emerging insurance market. Thereafter, both the Lloyd’s market and 
friendly societies came into existence, each with their own regulatory systems often described 
as self-regulatory in nature.  
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This section has identified and discussed the three most fundamental and recent 
developments that have changed the shape of insurance regulation in the UK with particular 
attention to the progress of market conduct regulation. As mentioned above, the most notable 
market conduct events include: i) the development of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) regulation in 1957 and the UK’s accession thereto (to be discussed in the succeeding 
section) ii) the introduction of the Financial Services Act of 1986 amid various investment 
firm collapses and iii) the passing of the Financial Services and Market Act of 2000 which 
established a far more sophisticated approach to regulation.  
Upon reflection of the history of regulation in the UK, one can argue that the British system 
of market conduct regulation started in 1986 and developed further in the early 2000s with 
the passing of the FSMA giving credence to the defunct 1986 Act. Market conduct regulation 
in the UK is structured on the basis of: i) Primary legislation (including the Consumer 
Contracts Regulations of 1999 and FSMA 2000), ii) regulatory rules and guidance contained 
in various handbooks, iii) regulatory interpretations of rules that are issued by the regulators 
themselves and iv) the outcomes of decisions made by the Financial Ombudsman Service 
(FOS). 
One can deduce that the early regulatory developments that have taken place in the UK were 
largely reactive in nature (in response to a number of scandals and collapses). In particular, a 
large majority of the more recent regulatory developments, as discussed above, were in 
response to a number of investment scandals and collapses and not insurance ones. 
Notwithstanding this, the pension mis-selling scandal in the early 1990s has had a 
considerable impact on the insurance regulatory framework, especially on the distribution of 
insurance products which hence is impacting on intermediaries.  
The pension mis-selling scandal is said to have been the result of a complex interaction of a 
multitude of factors, some of which included inadequate management supervision, inadequate 
training of salesmen, commission structures and ineffective compliance officers. This 
represented a major regulatory failure by both regulators and firms. This eventually saw the 
establishment of the FSA, replacing the earlier Securities and Investment Board (SIB) and the 
founding of a set of principles of good practice and a collection of conduct of business rules. 
Collectively, although different events, the global financial crisis and the collapse of the 
Equitable Life company further exposed several weaknesses in the UK’s financial sector 
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regulatory regime. The latter has culminated in the eradication of the FSA and its 
replacement with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA) which together comprise the ‘contemporary’ Twin Peaks of regulation. In 
terms of this arrangement, the PRA is largely responsible for micro-prudential regulation 
while the FCA is generally responsible for the conduct of business and market functions of 
all financial institutions.  
The UK’s regulatory system includes the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) and the 
implementation of the revised ‘Conduct of Business Sourcebook’ which has been ushered in 
to improved the quality and suitability of advice given. RDR is clearly market conduct 
regulation as its objective is to protect concumer insterests. Notwithstanding this, the 
Financial Advice Market Review (FAMR) may see further regulatory reform and in 
particular, a number of key aspects of the RDR may be truncated, which once introduced 
seriously limited advice to the lower end of the market. Goverments and supervisiors are 
therefore increasingly becoming more involved in insurance regulation. The current position, 
developing from 1986 onwards, is in stark contrast to the traditionl, historical self-regulatory 
approach that was underpinned by the Lockean framework. 
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PART III: EURPOEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EUROPEAN UNION) 
6 EUROPEAN ECOMOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)  
As mentioned above, the development of the EEC and more recently, the European Union 
(EU), has had a significant influence on the UK’s regulatory system. In particular, it has been 
suggested that European legislation has been a significant driver of much of the regulatory 
reform that has taken place in the UK and therefore the UK’s accession to the EEC (EU) was 
the catalyst for more intensive and intrusive regulation, as it is known today (Noussia, 2011). 
Although the preceding sections have focused on the various market conduct events that have 
resulted in the implementation of market conduct regulation, it is important to bear in mind 
the various EU Directives that have also resulted in the implementation of market conduct 
regulation in the UK. As such, a discussion of the EU and its directives form an integral part 
of the regulatory narrative. 
6.1 Formation of the EEC 
The EEC was founded in 1957 following the signing of the Treaty of Rome. The EEC is 
currently referred to as the EU. The purpose of its formation has been to create a single, 
integrated and liberalised market, including the insurance market, by coordinating the 
economic policies of its member states (Hogan, 1995; Hess & Trauth, 1998). This endeavour 
has seen three generations of directives, namely: i) The Freedom of Establishment, ii) The 
Freedom of Services and, iii) The Single Licence, Home Country Control and the 
Deregulation of Supervision.88 This framework for insurance regulation throughout the EU 
took some 28 years before its full implementation was realised in 1994 (Hogan, 1995). In 
order to achieve this, a total of 21 insurance regulatory directives have been adopted to ensure 
that insurance firms can compete freely whilst maintaining an adequate level of financial 
soundness and consumer protection (Hogan, 1995:337). 
The UK joined the EU in 197389 (and recently decided to exit) thereby acceding itself to a 
series of initiatives to achieve a homogenous regulatory system across member states (Ford, 
                                                 
88 Consult Hess & Trauth (1998:91) for a more comprehensive an analysis of each generation of directives. 
89 The founding members of the EU are Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg and West 
Germany. Demark, Ireland and the UK joined in 1973 (Hogan, 1995). 
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2011). However, by 1973, a number of directives had already come into force. These are the 
First Non-Life Insurance Directive and certain other insurance edicts (1964 Reinsurance 
Directive and the 1972 Motor Insurance Directive) had been implemented (Hogan, 1995; 
Ford, 2011). The 1973 Non-Life Directive sought to establish a common solvency regime “to 
underpin mutual recognition of supervisory systems” (Daykin & Cresswell, 2001:3).  In order 
to continue to write business, insurance firms were required to maintain an adequate excess 
of assets over liabilities, referred to as the solvency margin90 (Daykin, 2001:3). In the event 
that assets over liabilities fell below the required minimum solvency margin, the so-called 
‘host country supervisor’ could impose its own requirements such as requiring the 
preparation and implementation of a plan to restore the firm to a sound financial position 
(Daykin & Cresswell, 2001). It makes sense that when insurance companies operate across 
international and state borders, that the solvency requirements be governed by the “home” 
country or state.  On the other hand, it also makes sense that market conduct be regulated 
within each state.  In the global village in which society now operates, it also makes sense to 
have international standards to obviate the having of hundreds of different standards to which 
the international company ought to comply. 
EU directives require that member states incorporate directives into their national regulatory 
systems and laws within a specified time frame (Hogan, 1995:331). Furthermore, EU 
directives often allow member states to implement ‘super equivalent’ or higher standards 
through their domestic legislature91 (Smethurst, Heukamp, Goodliffe & Miller, 2011). As 
such, and under the terms of their accession, the UK was required to implement said 
directives into its domestic legislative framework. This was done in the first instance by 
virtue of regulations made under the European Communities Act of 1972 prior to it becoming 
a member state (Ford, 2011:262). Accordingly, the impetus for the 1972 Act was the need to 
implement the First Directive into the UK’s regulatory regime, in terms of which national 
safeguards were to be harmonised in order to protect both members and third parties (Farrar 
& Powles, 1973). In particular, Section 2(1) of the UK’s European Communities Act reads:  
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to 
time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and 
procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in 
                                                 
90 For a more comprehensive review of minimum margins of solvency, see Daykin and Cresswell (2001). 
91 This is often referred to as ‘gold-plating’ the directive. Member states may not however implement lower 
standards than those set by the respective directive (See Smethurst et al., 2011). 
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accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal 
effect or used in the United Kingdom, shall be recognised and available in 
law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression 
“enforceable Community right” and similar expressions shall be read as 
referring to one to which this subsection applies. 
In addition to this, Section 2(2) provides that any designated Minister or department may, for 
the purposes of implementing EU obligations, make orders, rules, regulations or secondary 
legislation.  This is further emphasised in Section 3(1) of the 1972 Act which states that in 
order to incorporate EU directives into the national regulatory system, “a Minister of State 
may make regulations for enabling Section 2 of this Act to have full effect”. As a result of 
this, government had willingly accepted some “enhanced regulation to the extent necessary to 
make the [EU’s] market liberalising measures effective” (Ford, 2011:251). The Insurance 
Companies Act of 1981 and the “consolidating” Insurance Companies Act of 1982 thereafter 
“transposed the First Life Directive of 1979 into UK law” (Ford, 2011:262).  
Smethurst et al. (2011:363) note that EU directives are the source of much conduct of 
business rules. In particular, the Directive on misleading advertising (84/450/EEC), the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), the Investment Services Directive 
(93/22/EEC), the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC), the Consolidated 
Life Assurance Directive (2002/83/EC), the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC) and 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC) have further applied a number 
of ‘conduct of business’ rules to the insurance market. These directives are discussed below. 
6.2 European Union directives 
6.2.1 Directive on misleading advertising 
According to Article 1 of the Directive on misleading advertising, the object of said Directive 
is to “protect consumers, persons carrying on a trade or business or practising a craft or 
profession and the interests of the public in general, against misleading advertising and the 
unfair consequences thereof”. According to the Directive, misleading advertising can be 
defined as: 
Any advertising which in any way, including its presentation, deceives or is 
likely to deceive the person to whom it is addressed or whom it reaches and 
which, by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely to affect their economic 
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behaviour or which, for those reasons, injures or is likely to injure a 
competitor. 
As such, Article 4(1) of the Directive requires that Member States ensure that adequate and 
effective mechanisms exist for the control of misleading advertising in the interests of 
consumers as well as competitors and the public in general. Such sentiments were thereafter 
further echoed in the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive (2006/114/EC) in 
terms of which promotions should be fair, clear and not misleading. 
6.2.2 Unfair Contract Terms Directive  
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive nullifies any unfair contract terms and further requires 
that they be drafted in plain and intelligible language (European Commission, 2014a). In fact, 
Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that “unfair terms… shall… not be binding on the 
consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is 
capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms”. This provision is supported by a 
list of terms that could be regarded as unfair to the consumer. A list of these terms is included 
in Annexure 1. 
However, this principle of “Treating Customers Fairly” had already been adopted into the 
UK’s legislative framework prior to the implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive. That is, the UK’s Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 sought to limit the extent of 
civil liability for breach of contract, negligence or other breach of duty which could be 
avoided by means of contract terms and otherwise. Nonetheless, said legislation excluded 
insurance contracts from its scope and was criticised for its numerous inadequacies and its 
inaccurate title and accordingly, the implementation of the Directive provided an opportunity 
to deal with these shortfalls (Dean, 1993).  Accordingly, the Directive was thereafter further 
transposed into the UK’s regulatory framework by virtue of the Consumer Contracts 
Regulations of 1999 and later by way of Principle 6 under the FSA’s conduct of business 
rules.  
6.2.3 Services Directive 
The EU’s Investment Services Directive (ISD) intended to provide “certain guiding 
principles for [the] adoption of conduct-of-business rules by the host state” and for that 
reason the Directive never developed a common, specific and detailed set of minimum 
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conduct of business rules. Rather, in lieu of specific and detailed rules, the Directive provided 
seven principles which member states were required to incorporate into their national 
frameworks (Warren, 1995: 206). According to the Directive, a firm must: 
• Act honestly and fairly when conducting its business activities and in the best 
interests of its clients and the market; 
• Act with due skill, care, and diligence; 
• Employ the resources and procedures necessary for the proper performance of its 
business activities; 
• Obtain from its clients information as to their financial position, investment 
experience and objectives; 
• Make adequate disclosures of relevant material information in its dealings with 
clients; 
• Avoid conflicts of interest and, when they exist, ensure the clients' fair treatment; and 
• Comply with all regulatory requirements applicable to its conduct of business. 
Furthermore, according to Article 11 of the ISD, member states were required to implement 
rules of conduct that at least incorporated the principles listed above. This, however, resulted 
in varying and fragmented systems across member states and accordingly, gave rise to a 
“compliance nightmare” (Avgouleas, 2000). Steel (1993 as cited in Warren, 1995) pointed 
out that firms struggled to familiarise themselves with the different rules of various member 
states and consequently, this warranted the need for a harmonised set of conduct of business 
rules. In fact, the Forum of European Securities Commissions (2001:6) noted that: 
The present diversity of conduct of business regimes may hinder not only the 
freedom which investment firms have to provide services throughout Europe 
but also the provision of an adequate level of protection to European investors. 
It is therefore necessary to undertake a process of convergence in this field, 
both to ensure a level playing field for investment firms and to foster public 
confidence in the operation of the single market in financial services. 
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As a result of these difficulties and the defects with the ISD, the EU legislator was forced to 
re-evaluate the “old minimum harmonization measure” (Cherednychenko, 2011). The latter, 
culminated in the adoption of a ‘conduct of business rules’ type directive (Warren, 1995: 
207). This came in the form of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) which 
replaced the ISD and provided a comprehensive set of conditions regulating the relationship 
between a firm and its client (Schoenmaker, 2013). This framework comprises a set of 
conduct of business rules, best execution and client order handling requirements, regulations 
regarding inducements and conflict of interest provisions (Schoenmaker, 2013:361). The 
MiFID will be discussed in greater detail later. 
6.2.4 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive provides common rules that will provide 
consumers with protection against “unfair practices and rogue traders” (European 
Commission, 2007). This includes misleading advertising and sales practices, aggressive 
marketing behaviour and unfair claims handling (European Commission, 2007). In fact, the 
Directive defines a number of prohibited “sharp practices” namely, pressure selling, 
misleading marketing and unfair advertising (Mäntysaari, 2010:127).  
6.2.5 Life Assurance Directive 
The Consolidated Life Assurance Directive provides certain minimum conduct of business 
requirements that ought to be transposed into national legislative frameworks (Smethurst et 
al., 2011:363). According to the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee 
(2010:5), the Life Assurance Directive aims to protect consumers by enabling them to make 
informed choices. This appears to be the case since the Directive requires that should a 
consumer “profit fully from a wider and more varied choice of contracts, they must be 
provided with whatever information is necessary to enable them to choose the contract best 
suited to their needs” (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee, 2010:5). 
6.2.6  Mediation Directive 
The Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD/IMD1) which replaced the Insurance Intermediaries 
Directive (77/92/EEC), provides certain minimum standards that ought to be adhered to by 
insurance intermediaries. In particular, these standards apply to a number of insurance 
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mediation activities, such as, sales transactions, dealings with and/or for clients, advice and 
assistance with claims (Smethurst et al., 2011: 363). According to Article 4 of the Directive, 
a registered intermediary must: i) meet standards of knowledge and ability, as determined by 
domestic law, ii) be of good repute, with a clean police record and not have been previously 
declared bankrupt and iii) carry professional indemnity insurance. Furthermore, the IMD1 
stipulates a number of obligations regarding: the quality and the nature of advice given, the 
provision of information to customers, disclosure requirements and the steps to be taken to 
identify, prevent, manage and disclose conflicts of interest (Merkin & Stuart-Smith, 
2004; Braunwarth, Buhl, Kaiser, Krammer, Röglinger & Wehrmann, 2009; Norton Rose 
Fulbright, 2012). More specifically, the Directive asserts that: 
Prior to the conclusion of any specific contract, the insurance intermediary 
shall at least specify, in particular on the basis of information provided by the 
customer, the demands and the needs of that customer as well as the 
underlying reasons for any advice given to the customer on a given insurance 
product. 
In addition to this, an independent intermediary is required to give independent advice based 
on an analysis of a sufficiently large number of insurance products available in the market 
(Domaradzka, 2012). This Directive was eventually implemented into the UK’s national 
legislation by virtue of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as discussed above. 
Harmonisation difficulties, similar to those encountered under the ISD were also 
characteristic of EU mediation regulation.  This was accompanied by large-scale negativity 
surrounding the insurance industry prior the financial crisis, the revelation of a number of 
unfair business practices in the insurance sector (namely the provision of improper advice 
and an insufficient disclosure of information to customers) and controversies regarding 
brokers’ commissions, which collectively cast light on undesirable business practices and 
potential conflicts of interest (Domaradzka, 2012:21; European Commission, 2014b). 
Furthermore, the regime introduced under IMD and IMD1 “lacked clear and efficient conduct 
of business and conflict of interest rules and thus could not ensure transparent selling 
processes and prevent [the] mis-selling of products” (Domaradzka, 2012:21). Moreover, the 
European Commission (2014b) has pointed out that since the Directive is applied differently 
among member states, a fragmented EU market and significant inconsistencies have ensued. 
As a result of this, a number of consumers have frequently been sold unsuitable insurance 
products. The most widespread example of this is the UK’s pension mis-selling scandal. 
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Consequently, the EU legislature has been urged to revise the current IMD1 regime. This has 
been achieved following the implementation of the MiFID but subsequent proposals for 
IMD2 have also been made. Said proposal was tabled in July 2012, and pointed out that 
IMD2 would endeavour to expand the scope of consumer protection. A number of the 
provisions recommended under the draft directive are modelled on various provisions that are 
set out by the MiFID, as discussed below. In fact, the European Parliament requested that 
IMD2 meet the same consumer protection standards as MiFID in order to achieve “cross- 
sectoral consistency”92 (Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Insurance Mediation, 2012).  
IMD2 seeks to upgrade consumer protection by establishing a common set of standards 
concerning the sale of insurance products and the provision of proper advice. More 
specifically, the proposal for the new directive noted that the IMD2 would aim to achieve the 
following improvements: 
• Expand the scope of application of IMD1 to all distribution channels (including the 
direct sale of insurance products by insurers that are not covered under IMD1) 
• Identify, manage and mitigate conflicts of interest;  
• Raise the level of harmonisation  
• Enhance the suitability and objectiveness of advice;  
• Ensure sellers' professional qualifications match the complexity of products sold; and 
• Simplify and approximate the procedure for cross-border entry into insurance markets 
across the EU. 
The Proposal further provides that Chapter VI of the new directive will not only restate 
several disclosure requirements that appear under IMD1 but will also set out numerous 
additional information requirements and conduct of business rules, some of which include: 
                                                 
92 This appears to be the case since although MiFID applies to the financial sector as a whole, insurance 
business remains regulated largely by IMD. 
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• A general principle for intermediaries who should act honestly, fairly and in the best 
interest of their customers; 
• A requirement to disclose the basis and amount of the remuneration/commission to 
insurance intermediaries;  
• A requirement to disclose the amount of any variable remuneration (i.e. sales 
incentives) received by the sales employees of insurance undertakings and 
intermediaries;  
• A mandatory 'full disclosure' regime for the sale of life insurance products and an 'on–
request' regime (i.e. on customer's demand) for the sale of non-life products; and  
• An obligation on insurance undertakings and intermediaries to give the customer, 
prior to the conclusion of a contract, sufficient information about the insurance 
product to allow him to make an informed decision. 
The object of the above mentioned draft provisions is to: i) achieve higher consumer 
protection, ii) offer higher transparency in terms of the nature, structure and the amount of the 
intermediary's remuneration as compared to IMD1, iii) ensure suitable, cost-efficient 
products and intermediary services for consumers, iv) drive competition in insurance 
distribution (since consumers will have greater information on products and costs, as well as 
possible conflicts of interest because of the proposed information disclosure requirements) 
and, v) enable consumers to compare insurance covers and prices between products sold 
through different distribution channels. 
At the time of writing, the proposed IMD2 has yet to be implemented.93 In fact, the most 
recent development on the proposed new IMD2, took place on 7 November 2014 at which 
time the EU Council confirmed its acceptance of the general approach to IMD2. The draft 
directive will soon see its first reading.  
                                                 
93 It has been cited that IMD2 may be incorporated into EU legislation at some point in 2014 and thereafter 
transposed into Member States’ domestic legislature in 2016. 
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6.2.7 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 
As mentioned above, the “compliance nightmare” associated with an un-harmonised EU 
regulatory system under ISD, eventually led to dramatic and large-scale reforms as part of the 
EU’s  ‘Financial Services Action Plan’ (Cerini, 2011). This resulted in the implementation of 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) (Moloney, 2014). Said Directive 
introduced a comprehensive and harmonised strategy toward conduct of business regulation 
and, in doing so, introduced a number of ‘conduct of business’ provisions. 
Article 11(6) of the ISD required that investment firms avoid conflicts of interest, however 
when such conflicts of interest cannot be avoided, firms should ensure that their clients are 
treated fairly (van der Haegen, 2004). This obligation was very broad and lacked the 
necessary detail. As a result of this MiFID reinforces this duty by virtue of Article 18 which 
reads: 
(1)  Member States shall require investment firms to take all reasonable steps 
to identify conflicts of interest between themselves, including their managers, 
employees and tied agents, or any person directly or indirectly linked to them 
by control and their clients or between one client and another that arise in the 
course of providing any investment and ancillary services, or combinations 
thereof. 
(2)  Where organisational or administrative arrangements made by the 
investment firm in accordance with Article 13(3) to manage conflicts of 
interest are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that risks of 
damage to client interests will be prevented, the investment firm shall clearly 
disclose the general nature and/or sources of conflicts of interest to the client 
before undertaking business on its behalf. 
In order to ensure uniform application of the principles listed above, the Commission 
adopted a number of measures to: 
(a) Define the steps that investment firms might reasonably be expected to 
take to identify, prevent, manage and/or disclose conflicts of interest when 
providing various investment and ancillary services and combinations thereof; 
and 
(b) Establish appropriate criteria for determining the types of conflict of 
interest whose existence may damage the interests of the clients or potential 
clients of the investment firm. 
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In addition to this, MiFID has introduced several other ‘conduct of business’ 
responsibilities as set out in Article 19 of the Directive. In terms of Section II, Article 
19, a firm is required to: 
• Act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its 
clients  
• Provide all information, including marketing communications, addressed by the 
investment firm to clients or potential clients in a fair, clear and non-misleading 
manner  
• Provide appropriate information in a comprehensible form to clients or potential 
clients so that they are reasonably able to understand the nature and risks of the 
investment service and of the specific type of financial instrument that is being 
offered and, consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis 
• Obtain the necessary information regarding the client's or potential client's knowledge 
and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or 
service, his financial situation and his investment objectives, to be done when 
providing investment advice or portfolio management so as to enable the firm to 
recommend to the client or potential client the investment services and financial 
instruments that are suitable for him. This is the so-called “suitability assessment” 
• Ask the client or potential client to provide information regarding his knowledge and 
experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service 
offered or demanded so as to enable the investment firm to assess whether the 
investment service or product envisaged is appropriate for the client. The latter is 
referred to as the “appropriateness assessment”. Should the product or service be 
deemed inappropriate for the client or potential client, the investment firm shall warn 
the client or potential client 
• Establish a record that includes the document or documents agreed between the firm 
and the client that sets out the rights and obligations of the parties, and the other terms 
on which the firm will provide services to the client 
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Article 21 of the Directive strengthens the ‘best execution rule’ and requires that firms 
execute orders on terms that are most favourable to the client. In doing so, member states are 
required to take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible result for their clients taking 
into account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any 
other consideration relevant to the execution of the order. This should be done in a prompt, 
fair and expeditious manner, according to Article 22 of the Directive. 
In October 2011, the European Commission tabled proposals to revise MiFID and thereby 
proposed MiFID II and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR). It was 
cited in the proposal for the new regime that the financial crisis had exposed several 
weaknesses in the regulatory system and accordingly that “previously held assumptions that 
minimal transparency, oversight and investor protection… [are] more conducive to market 
efficiency no longer hold”. In addition to this, the rapid innovation and growing complexity 
in financial instruments has emphasised the importance of up-to-date, high levels of investor 
protection. Accordingly, the revision of MiFID has signalled that EU’s intention to create a 
safer, sounder, more transparent, integrated, efficient and competitive EU financial market. 
According to Article 23 of the proposed new Directive, a firm is required to take all 
appropriate steps to identify and to prevent or manage conflicts of interest between 
themselves, (including their managers, employees and tied agents, or any person directly or 
indirectly linked to them) and their clients in the course of providing any investment and 
ancillary services, or combinations thereof. Moreover, Section 2 of the recommended new 
Directive sets out a number of provisions to ensure investor protection. In terms of these 
provisions, a firm is required to:  
• Act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its 
clients 
• Ensure that financial instruments are designed and manufactured to meet the needs of 
an identified target and that the strategy for distribution of the product is compatible 
with the identified target market 
• Understand the financial instruments they offer or recommend, assess the 
compatibility of the financial instruments with the needs of the clients and ensure that 
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financial instruments are offered or recommended only when this is in the interest of 
the client 
• Provide appropriate information in good time to potential clients on matters 
concerning the product, proposed investment strategies and all other related costs and 
charges  
• Disclose whether or not the advice given is provided on an independent basis and on a 
broad or a more restricted analysis of different types of financial instruments 
• Provide appropriate guidance and warnings on the risks associated with products 
offered or in respect of particular investment strategies associated thereto 
• Provide information in a comprehensible form in such a manner that potential clients 
are reasonably able to understand the nature and risks of the investment service and of 
the specific type of financial instrument that is being offered and, consequently, to 
take investment decisions on an informed basis  
• Assess a sufficiently large range of financial instruments available on the market 
which must be adequately diverse with regard to both their type and product providers 
to ensure that the client’s investment objectives can be suitably met. The latter applies 
where a firm informs a client that the investment advice is provided on an 
independent basis 
• Disclose to a client the existence, nature and amount of the commission payable in a 
manner that is comprehensive, accurate and understandable, prior to the provision of 
the relevant service 
• Ensure that it does not remunerate or assess the performance of its staff in a way that 
conflicts with its duty to act in the best interests of its clients. In particular, it shall not 
make any arrangement by way of remuneration, sales targets or otherwise that could 
provide an incentive to its staff to recommend a particular financial instrument to a 
retail client when the investment firm could offer a different financial instrument 
which would better meet that client’s needs 
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• Ensure that persons giving advice or information to clients on behalf of the 
investment firm possess the necessary knowledge and competence to fulfil their 
obligations (and the requirements discussed hereunder) 
• Obtain the necessary information regarding the client’s or potential client’s 
knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of 
product or service, that person’s financial situation including his ability to bear losses, 
and his investment objectives including his risk tolerance so as to enable the 
investment firm to recommend to the client or potential client the product that is 
suitable for him and, in particular, that is in accordance with his risk tolerance and 
ability to bear losses 
• Ask the client or potential client to provide information regarding his knowledge and 
experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service 
offered or demanded so as to enable the investment firm to assess whether the 
investment service or product envisaged is appropriate for the client. Where the 
investment firm considers, on the basis of such information received, that the product 
or service is not appropriate to the client or potential client, the firm shall warn the 
client or potential client.  
• Provide the client with a statement on suitability specifying the advice given and how 
that advice meets his preferences, objectives and other characteristics. 
• Take all sufficient steps to obtain, when executing orders, the best possible result for 
their clients taking into account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and 
settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the 
order. 
• Execute orders on behalf of clients in a prompt, fair and expeditious manner 
• Monitor the activities of their tied agents so as to ensure that they continue to comply 
with this Directive when acting through tied agents 
In addition to the provisions listed above, MiFIR sets out various disclosure and reporting 
requirements, the object of which is to further enhance transparency in the market. A 
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discussion of these provisions is however beyond the scope of this paper.94 According to 
the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (2014a), it is believed that MiFID II and MiFIR 
will be implemented into national legislative frameworks by January 2017.  
6.3 Conclusion   
This section maps out the history of the EU directives insofar as they concern market conduct 
or conduct of business regulation. It has been argued that many of the regulatory 
developments that have taken place in the UK have been in an effort to transpose a number of 
significant EU Insurance Directives into the national legislative framework following its 
accession to the EU in 1973.  
Of the 21 insurance directives that have been adopted over a 28 year period in order to 
achieve a homogenous regulatory system across member states, six have been the source of 
many conduct of business rules. These include the Directive on misleading advertising 
(84/450/EEC), the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), the Investment Services 
Directive (93/22/EEC), the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC), the 
Consolidated Life Assurance Directive (2002/83/EC), the Insurance Mediation Directive 
(2002/92/EC) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC). These 
Directives have collectively attempted to ensure that i) adequate and effective mechanisms 
are in place, ii) unfair trade practices are eliminated, iii) firms conduct their businesses in the 
interests of consumers (and thus conflicts of interests are avoided), iv) insurance 
intermediaries deal fairly and honestly with consumers and v) the best advice is provided and 
certain disclosures are made. These objectives largely attempt to ensure that an adequate 
degree of consumer protection is achieved and that consumers are treated fairly.  
As noted above, the abovementioned EU directives that are market conduct in nature have 
had a strong bearing on the development of market conduct regulation in the UK. For 
example, the noteworthy MiFID’s provisions have been enshrined in the UK’s conduct of 
business rules and regulations by virtue of FSMA 2000. Therefore, and as mentioned earlier, 
the UK’s accession to the EU has been pivotal in the history of the British insurance market 
                                                 
94 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0600 for a list of reporting 
requirements. 
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regulatory regime and has fundamentally influenced the nature of financial services 
regulation, including that which is market conduct in nature.  
The proposal for the new regime, in terms of MiFID II and MiFIR, has largely been in 
response to the financial crisis which exposed several weaknesses in the current regulatory 
system. The need for up-to-date rules and regulations in response to global changes and the 
increasing need for improved investor protection have therefore largely been reactive in 
nature. Time only will tell what impact the proposed new MiFID II and MiFIR will have on 
the domestic legislative framework and the insurance market alike. Notwithstanding this, EU 
Directives have been promulgated in an effort to achieve harmonisation. One can argue that 
the benefits derived therefrom may be in the public interest in general. 
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UNITED STATES 
7 UNITED STATES 
The development of the insurance market in the US95 dates back to the late 16th century after 
which time insurance regulation began to emerge.  The development of insurance regulation 
in the US can be divided into three broad periods which have been divided by landmark 
events in regulation. These periods include: 
i. Pre-1944: developments before the South-Eastern Underwriters Association  
(SEUA) decision; 
ii. 1944-1947: developments since the SEUA decision and the passing of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act; 
iii. Post-1947: developments subsequent to the passing of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act  
Each period and their various regulatory landmarks are discussed in detail below, with a 
specific focus on market conduct regulatory-type developments. In addition to this, a brief 
history of the American insurance market and its early regulatory landscape are discussed 
in order to provide a comprehensive narrative. The South African insurance market and 
its regulatory systems largely have been unaffected by the development of insurance 
regulation in the US. It is for this reason that a shorter discussion of the US market is 
sufficient.  
7.1 Pre-1944 regulatory developments 
7.1.1 Rise of the insurance market in Colonial America 
In 1730, a major fire erupted in Philadelphia which threatened to engulf the entire city and 
which destroyed numerous shops and homes (Athearn, 1981). The city was entirely 
unprepared to fight the persistent danger of fires and accordingly, the risk of a massive and 
citywide inferno remained. Following another fire, a letter was sent to the Philadelphia 
                                                 
95 Colonial America prior to 1776. 
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Gazette in February 1735 which contained advice and reforms in terms of fire prevention and 
extinguishing methods and which recommended the formation of a "society of active men 
belonging to each fire engine, whose business is to attend all fires whenever they may 
happen” (White, 1998:1). It was on the basis of this advice, that the city formed its first fire-
fighting organisation (Block, 2004). It would soon turn out that the author of the letter was 
Benjamin Franklin who, amongst other things, would go on to establish America's first 
organised fire brigade, the Union Fire Company, in 1736 (Warheit, 1970). 
Despite the fact that Franklin had made significant progress in fire prevention and on the 
methods of extinguishing them, he acknowledged that not all fires could be prevented and as 
such, citizens could still sustain property damage and loss (White, 1998). In a meeting of the 
Union Fire Company, Franklin therefore proposed the idea of forming an insurance company 
to provide for such a contingency (White, 1998). A fund was thereafter raised “for an 
Insurance Office to make up the damage that may arise by fire among this Company" (White, 
1998:2). In terms of this approach, members of the fire company would be indemnified in the 
event of property damage or loss caused by fire. The insurance programme was a year, 
thereafter extended beyond the fire company members, to all citizens of Philadelphia. In 
particular, a notice appeared in Franklin’s Gazette in 1751 as follows: 
All persons inclined to subscribe to the articles of insurance of houses from 
loss of fire, in or near this city, are desired to appear at the Court House, where 
attendance will be given, to take their subscriptions, every seventh day of the 
week, in the afternoon, until the 13th of April next, being the day appointed by 
the said articles for electing twelve directors and a treasurer.  
The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insurance of Houses from Loss by Fire therefore 
became the first mutual American property insurer which was incorporated under a royal 
charter from the Crown in 175296 (Porter, 2008). Notwithstanding this, ‘The 
Contributionship’, as it is known today, remained the nation’s only fire company between 
1752 and 1784 (White, 1998). The idea of insurance took some time to mature and was 
therefore a relative latecomer to the American financial landscape (White, 1998).  
                                                 
96 At the time of this formation, insurance companies had to obtain a royal charter in order to legitimately write 
insurance business since America was still under British colonialism. 
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7.1.2 State regulation of the insurance market 
America declared its independence in the July of 1776, resulting in the War of Independence, 
at the end of which America gained its independence as a Constitutional Republic.  The 
powers resided within the states from which insurers received charters in which they operated 
(Harrington, 2000; Schneider, 2007). The republic which emerged from the war was arranged 
on a federal basis with most of the powers residing with the states. In 1792, Pennsylvania 
became the first state to charter insurers after which, in time, most other states followed suit 
(Porter, 2008).97  As a result of this, a number of chartered insurance companies came into 
existence. It was at this time, during the early years of the US that states occasionally 
endorsed insurance regulation which sought to address various problems concerning 
competition, consumer protection and solvency (Wachter, 2013). In particular, by the early 
1800s, states had begun to feel the pressure to protect their domestic insurers from foreign 
insurers, particularly British insurers who were entering the US domestic insurance market, 
and who were competing by charging lower rates than local insurers (Porter, 2008). In 
response to this, some states passed laws which prohibited such foreign insurers from writing 
business in the state (Porter, 2008). 
In addition to this, US domestic insurers themselves were subject to the regulation of the 
states in which they obtained their charters and in which they conducted their business. Such 
state regulation was thus conducted through corporate charters which placed certain 
limitations and restrictions on insurers’ operations (Harrington, 2000; Stempel & Knutsen, 
2016). These charters therefore served as the primary legislative device by detailing what an 
insurer could and could not do regarding policies, risks and investment activity, among other 
things (Klein, 1998; Stempel & Knutsen, 2016:46). It appears as if such regulation was in 
response to a number of problems in the property insurance and life assurance markets. In 
particular, owing to the high concentration of risk and the occurrence of a number of major 
fires, periodic shakeouts and insurance failures plagued the property insurance market (Klein, 
2009:32). Furthermore, life assurers became known for “high expenses, shaky finances and 
abusive sales practices” (Klein, 2009:32). 
                                                 
97 The Insurance Company of North America became the first state-charted company by Pennsylvania (Stempel 
& Knutsen, 2016) 
169 
 
By the mid-1800s, there was a trend toward “less specific charters” and a greater drive 
toward regulation by state statutes and/or regulation by judicial decision (Stempel & Knutsen, 
2016:46). As a result of this, the early years of insurance regulation were conducted by 
corporate charters, state legislatures and judicial decisions (Mayhall, 2011). In addition to 
this, various officers within state governments were tasked with overseeing insurance 
regulation (Porter, 2008).  Notwithstanding this, albeit that various regulatory mechanisms 
existed during this time, US domestic insurers were in fact subject to little regulatory 
supervision (US Treasury Department, 2008). As such, over time, these early regulatory 
mechanisms eventually proved inadequate and as the number of insurance companies 
escalated, the need for greater oversight became apparent (Klein, 1998). This led to the 
formation of state insurance commissions98 in the mid-1800s (Klein, 2009; Stempel & 
Knutsen, 2016).  America thus anticipated the UK by over a century with the appointment of 
bureaucratic supervisors. 
A more comprehensive regulatory system thus emerged with the development of state 
insurance commissions, to oversee the insurance industry within each state (Stempel & 
Knutsen, 2016). Since the US is a federal system this was inevitable since insurers would 
operate across state lines encountering problems other countries only began to encounter 
when insurers attempted to operate across country boarders. The first state commissioner of 
insurance was appointed in New Hampshire in 1851 and the state-based insurance regulatory 
system quickly grew (Mayhall, 2011). In particular, Massachusetts and Vermont followed 
suit in 1852, New York in 1859 and Rhode Island in 1865 (US Treasury Department, 
2008:62). These state insurance commissions soon became the first dedicated regulatory 
agency to oversee insurance regulation. Broadly speaking, the major activities that are 
regulated by the state insurance department are set out in table 1 below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Also known as a state insurance department. 
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Table 1: Overview of regulated activities by state insurance commissions over the 
years99 
Activity Description Regulatory 
Pillar 
Licencing 
of insurers, 
agents/ 
brokers 
This entails the granting, renewal, and revocation of licences to conduct 
business to ensure that the applicant has adequate financial resources 
(i.e. a minimum level of capital and reserves) and those office bearers 
have the minimum level of competencies and trustworthiness. 
Furthermore, insurance agents and brokers must be licenced in order to 
sell insurance and must comply with various state laws and regulations 
which govern their activities. This is done to protect insurance 
consumer interests in insurance transactions. 
Market 
conduct 
regulation 
Insurer 
solvency 
Solvency monitoring by state insurance departments includes the 
development of capital and financial reporting requirements, investment 
regulations, holding company regulations and guarantee funds. 
Prudential 
regulation 
Rates Regulators endeavour not only to ensure that policy benefits are 
commensurate with the premiums charged to ensure fair treatment of 
consumers but also ensure that premium rates are adequate in order to 
reduce the risk of insolvency. Historically, many states have subjected 
premium rates to the “prior approval” system. As it stands today, some 
states use a more competitive rating approach. 
Prudential 
regulation 
Content of 
policy 
forms 
State insurance departments enforce legislation dealing with market 
conduct and unfair trade practices to ensure consumer protection. In 
doing so, state regulators endeavour to ensure that insurance policy 
provisions comply with the relevant state law, are reasonable and fair, 
and do not contain major gaps in coverage that might be misunderstood 
by consumers and which may leave them unprotected. 
Market 
conduct 
regulation 
Insurer 
sales 
practices 
and 
Regulation of sales practices through state insurance department 
enforcement of market conduct / unfair trade practices legislation; 
required disclosure of price information; production and dissemination 
of information about prices and quality by regulators. 
Market 
conduct 
regulation 
                                                 
99 As extracted from Harrington (2000) and NAIC (2011). 
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information 
disclosure 
Consumer 
assistance 
State regulators have established toll-free hotlines, internet sites and 
special consumer services units to receive and handle complaints 
against insurers and agents in order to ensure consumer protection. 
Market 
conduct 
regulation 
 
Over the years, insurance commissions’ mandates and their responsibilities grew in scope and 
complexity as the insurance industry evolved (Klein, 2009). Insurance commissions were 
therefore (and for the most part still are) tasked with, amongst other things, the licencing of 
insurance companies and their agents, the regulation of policy forms, the setting of reserve 
requirements, the regulation of insurers’ investments and the administration of financial 
reports (Klein, 1998:173).  
Insurance commissions generally have “broad, legislatively delegated powers to enforce state 
insurance laws, [to] promulgate rules and regulations, and [to] conduct hearings to resolve 
disputed matters” (Randall, 1999:629). In other words, and as per the state insurance 
commission mandate, state insurance departments have the authority to implement legislative 
directives (as set out in the state insurance code) and to establish rules and procedures that 
governed the purchase and sale of insurance (Harrington, 2000; Harrington & Niehaus, 
2003). The aforementioned regulatory activities can be divided into two primary regulatory 
categories. These include prudential or solvency regulation, which seeks to protect 
policyholders from the risk that an insurer will go insolvent and be unable to meet future, 
potential financial obligations, and the more recently introduced market conduct regulation 
which aims to ensure fair and reasonable prices, products and trade practices (Klein, 1995: 
368).  
Of particular relevance to this research, is a discussion of the various market conduct 
regulatory systems that have existed in the market. The regulation of policy rates and contract 
wordings falls typically within the realm of market conduct regulation, and hence warrants 
further discussion. It is this early regulation of premium rates and policy wordings by state 
insurance departments that signals the early development of market conduct regulation in the 
market. For chronological purposes, however, these developments are discussed in section 
7.2 below. 
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7.1.3 State versus Federal regulation debate 
Owing to the federal nature of the US, insurance is essentially a state matter.  It was accepted 
that the federal government had a very limited mandate to regulate insurance. In recent years 
there have been attempts to move insurance regulation from states to federal government.  
The tension between the federal government and state government departments over 
insurance regulation began to emerge during the mid-1800s (Grace & Klein, 2000). A 
number of insurers requested increased federal intervention in the insurance regulatory realm 
because of alleged favouritism (or localism) by some state departments (Stempel & Knutsen, 
2016). In addition to this, state insurance regulation varied with degrees of regulatory 
authority, as state insurance departments developed their own set of insurance regulations and 
rules (US Treasury Department, 2008; Mayhall, 2011). As a result of this, multi-state 
insurance companies who were operating across state lines were subjected to different 
regulatory systems across states (Mayhall, 2011). Accordingly, the insurance industry and 
various other stakeholders “joined a growing movement for federal insurance regulation” 
which was presumed to be weak in order to avoid burdensome multiple state regulations 
which tended to be more aggressive (Mayhall, 2011: para 3: Randall, 1999).  
In response to this, a number of Bills were introduced to the US Congress in the 1860s that 
sought to create a federal agency that would regulate insurance matters (Harrington, 2000). 
Although none of these Bills were ever enacted, the drive toward federal encroachment on 
the state based regulatory system continued (Harrington, 2000; Mayhall, 2011). Although at 
the time there was some support for federal regulation, this was not the prevailing view. 
These efforts for federal superiority were however thwarted by the US Supreme Court’s 
decision in Paul v Virginia 1869 75 US 168 which addressed the rivalry between state–based 
regulation and federal regulation of the insurance market. The Paul v Virginia case was 
therefore a seminal development in the federal-state regulatory debate that has been 
characteristic of the regulation of the US insurance market. The facts of the aforementioned 
case are set out below. 
7.1.3.1 Paul versus Virginia (1869) 
Several New York based insurance companies hired Samuel Paul as an intermediary to place 
their business and to represent them as an agent in the state of Virginia. Thus the issue was 
one of cross border insurance. Virginia law required that a licencing bond be paid in order to 
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transact insurance business in the state. Virginia state legislation applied also to Mr Paul, 
since he wanted to place insurance in the state of Virginia and accordingly although he was 
an out of state agent for a group of New York fire insurers, he was required to be licenced by 
Virginia and to pay a security deposit. Despite this however, Mr Paul and the several New 
York insurers, refused to pay the deposit. To do so, would mean paying a deposit in each 
state where they placed business. Consequently, Mr Paul was denied a licence to sell 
insurance in the state but nevertheless continued to operate in the state. He was charged 
criminally and was consequently convicted of violating Virginia state law and fined. The 
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and echoed the sentiments that Mr Paul had 
violated Virginia statue. In response to this, Mr Paul argued that Virginia’s laws violated the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause (as prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment) in the US 
Constitution and further contended that the sale of insurance across borders constituted 
interstate commerce and was therefore, by virtue of the Constitution, subject to federal laws 
and not state laws. In short, the argument was that insurance was a federal and not a state 
matter. 
The matter went to the US Supreme court, which had to decide if insurance formed part of 
interstate commerce which would therefore make insurance subject to federal legislation. The 
US Supreme Court held that the “issuing of insurance was not a transaction of commerce”  in 
terms of the Commerce Clause in the Constitution and accordingly that insurance was a state 
matter and as such state licencing restrictions did not violate the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment (Stempel & Knutsen, 2016). Insurance was 
therefore a state matter, to be regulated by state laws. Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision 
placed the jurisdiction of insurance regulation directly on the states, much to the 
disappointment of parts of the industry, which as mentioned before, were calling for greater 
and a more consistent federal regulation (Randall, 1999). 
Albeit that further attempts sought to amend the Constitution by permitting the federal 
government to regulate the insurance industry, these efforts were thwarted and the Supreme 
Court maintained its position that insurance regulation was a state matter (Randall, 1999). 
Despite this however, state regulators themselves began to acknowledge the “national nature 
of insurance business” and because of this, considerations of regulatory efficiencies were 
underpinned by talk of federal regulation (Randall, 1999:632). In particular, Elizur Wright 
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(1865 as cited in Robbins, 1939:321), often referred to as the “Father of [American] 
Insurance Regulation” noted that  
Insurance, being of widespread interest, should be secure against the adverse 
operation of local causes-that simplicity required a national bureau, and that a 
state could probably not protect itself as well with reference to insurance of 
other states as it could be protected by the federal government. 
In response to the ever-growing concerns of individual state regulation, George W. Miller in 
1871 and as the New York superintendent of insurance, called all state insurance 
commissioners to attend a meeting to discuss insurance regulation (Randall, 1999). This 
would mark the beginning of the National Insurance Convention (NIC) and the start of efforts 
to coordinate regulatory systems among state departments to ensure uniformity and harmony. 
7.1.4 National Insurance Convention (NIC)  
As mentioned above, by the mid-1800s, a number of insurers were operating across state 
lines, and as a result of this were required to comply with varying state demands and 
regulatory requirements. In response to these issues and in a reaction to the Paul v Virginia 
case, regulators acknowledged the value and necessity of coordinating the regulatory systems 
of various state departments, with the outcome of a uniform regulatory system specifically in 
mind (Randall, 1999). As such, and under the direction of George Miller, the regulatory 
representatives from nine states collaborated to form the NIC in 1871 (to become the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, hereon referred to as the NAIC), which, 
by its second session, had taken a number of actions (Outreville, 1998). In particular, over 
time the NAIC i) developed a set of goals and objectives to be achieved by regulators, ii) 
designed a uniform annual accounting statement form, iii) adopted taxation guidelines for 
insurance companies and iv) drafted and adopted the first model law on insurance regulation 
(Porter, 2008; Outreville, 1998). By virtue of these steps, the commissioners noted that they 
were  
Fully prepared to go before their various legislative committees with 
recommendations for a system of insurance law which shall be the same in all 
states-not reciprocal, but identical; not retaliatory, but uniform. That repeated 
consultation and future concert of action will eventuate in the removal of 
discriminating and oppressive statutes which now disgrace our codes, and that 
the companies and the public will both be largely benefited, we have no 
manner of doubt. 
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Accordingly, a system was found, outside of federal regulation, to achieve nationwide 
harmonisation of insurance regulation.  The history of the NAIC demonstrates the 
association’s dual and often competing commitments to achieving both uniformity of 
regulation whilst ensuring the preservation of state regulation. In other words, the goal of 
uniform and nationalised regulation is inconsistent with the preservation of autonomous state 
regulation (Randall, 1999:635). This tension is reflected in early proceedings where the 
NAIC developed the association’s objectives and purposes. In particular, the associated noted 
that 
The object of this association shall be to promote uniformity in legislation 
affecting insurance; to encourage uniformity in departmental rulings under the 
insurance laws of the several states; to disseminate information of value to 
insurance supervisory officials in the performance of their duties; to establish 
ways and means of fully protecting the interest of insurance policyholders of 
the various states, territories and insular possessions of the United States; and 
to preserve to the several states the regulation of the business of insurance. 
The NAIC's current Constitution, which was adopted in 1980, almost a century after its 
establishment, reinforced the longstanding tension which had existed between the NAIC’s 
commitment to the preservation of state regulation and its objective to create a uniform 
insurance system for multistate insurers. In particular, the Constitution provides that  
The objective of this body is to serve the public by assisting the several State 
insurance supervisory officials, individually and collectively, in achieving the 
following fundamental insurance regulatory objectives: (1) Maintenance and 
improvement of state regulation of insurance in a responsive and efficient 
manner; (2) Reliability of the insurance institution as to financial solidity and 
guaranty against loss; (3) Fair, just and equitable treatment of policyholders 
and claimants. 
Item 3 is a clear reference to market conduct regulation.  It can thus be argued that the US 
predated the UK in pursuing market conduct objectives by recognising such a consumer 
protection ideal. This also reflects the fact that supervisory institutions were introduced 
earlier in the US, owing to the inter-state insurance transactions, as pointed out earlier. 
Notwithstanding this, the NAIC’s Constitution sets out the basic goals of insurance 
regulation. In particular, the Constitution notes that the NAIC should endeavour to ensure the 
solvency of insurers and to protect policyholders. As such, the NAIC itself has also 
recognised the two important facets of regulation, namely prudential and market conduct 
176 
 
regulation. It is the latter that is far more acute to this research report. A brief discussion of 
NAIC market regulatory model laws and standards follows in section 7.3 below. 
7.1.5 Rating Bureaus and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
The conclusion that insurance is a state matter was reconsidered because of the Federal 
Antitrust agenda of the late 1800s; this itself was a product of the US Progressive movement 
of that period. The history of the US property insurance market and, in particular, fire 
insurance rating and regulation is unequivocally characterised by noncompetition and was 
dominated by cartels, or tariff committees in the UK terminology (Joskow, 1973). The 
development of cartels or cooperative fire rate-making bureaus extends as far back as the 
early nineteenth century when the Salamander Society was formed in 1819 (Wagner, 2000). 
By this time, the practice of setting rates in concert (through tariff committees) was well 
established in England. Almost half a century later in 1866, the National Board of Fire 
Underwriters was established to “maintain uniform premium rates and to control agents’ 
commissions” in order to stabilise the market by preventing competition-induced insolvencies 
(Joskow, 1973:392). Despite the fact that the Board was established by insurers themselves, 
over time insurance companies began to violate their membership agreements and engaged in 
price undercutting (Joskow, 1973). Furthermore, since membership was voluntary, mass 
participation in bureau rates was difficult (Joskow, 1973). It was these problems which 
proved the National Board to be unsuccessful and thus this countrywide bureau was 
discontinued in 1877 (Wagner, 2000). 
However soon after 1877, local and regional rating organisations began to emerge which may 
possibly have been spurred on by the numerous insurer insolvencies as a result of 
catastrophic fires in Boston and Chicago (Joskow, 1973; Harrington, 2000). As a result of 
this, greater attention was focused on regulating rates, not only to ensure that they were not 
unfair, but also to ensure that the rates being charged were in fact adequate to reduce the risk 
of insolvency (Harrington, 2000). As a result of this, a number of state insurance departments 
permitted and/or encouraged the establishment of rating bureaus which would set rates to be 
charged by companies (Harrington, 2000). The latter is clearly of a prudential regulatory 
nature. These rating bureaus, although they differed in their approach, internalised a number 
of functions of their predecessor (Wagner, 2000). These rating organisations were however 
evolving during a time of public dissatisfaction with anti-competitive practices and 
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monopolies (Joskow, 1973; Wagner, 2000). As a result of this, Congress passed the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890 which prohibited anticompetitive practices. The passing of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act gave a number of states the impetus to pass their own antitrust legislation which 
ultimately prohibited the making of rates in concert.  
By 1913, twenty three states had enacted anticompetitive laws to combat price fixing and by 
implication, rating bureaus soon became illegal (Wagner, 2000). Despite this, it has been 
alleged that state antitrust legislation did little to deter rate setting (Wagner, 2000). More 
specifically, insurers are alleged to have agreed to uniform rates over dinner at “social clubs” 
and would shun employees of non-complying insurers (Wagner, 2000). Accordingly, such 
legislation appears to have been countered. 
In 1910, the New York legislature appointed a Joint Legislature Committee, known as the 
Merritt Committee, to investigate problems in fire insurance rate making (Joskow, 1973). The 
Committee concluded that competition exacerbated “rate wars” which were not in the 
public’s interest (Wagner, 2000). As a result of this, the Committee argued that insurers 
should be able to set rates collectively in order to reduce the expenses incurred in making 
rates separately (Wagner, 2000). Furthermore, the Committee noted that insurers ought to be 
able to pool their premium and loss information in order to make credible and appropriate 
rates (Wagner, 2000). It was upon this basis that the Committee had provided a justifiable 
rationale for insurers to be exempt from antitrust legislation.  
Based on the findings of the Committee, New York passed a law in 1911 which provided for 
the setting of non-discriminatory fire insurance rates but required rating bureaus to file such 
rates with the Superintendent of Insurance (Joskow, 1973). A number of states conducted 
their own investigations (in line with the Merritt Committees findings), after which time, 
general support developed for the setting of rates subject to state regulation (Wagner, 2000). 
The NAIC also supported this movement to reinstate rating bureaus in order to combat 
“destructive competition” and to ensure adequate rates (Porter, 2008). Accordingly, states 
began to repel their antitrust laws and rating bureaus soon began to re-emerge. The relative 
tranquillity of the bureau system which prevailed after this time would however be dealt a 
blow in 1944. 
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7.2 Regulatory developments between 1944-1947 
7.2.1 South-Eastern Underwriters Association and the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
Following the repeal of state antitrust laws, the number of rating bureaus increased.  One 
such bureau that emerged was the the South-Eastern Underwriters Association (SEUA). 
During the SEUA’s early existence, fire insurance rate setting was subject to state regulation 
and was exempt from federal laws, including antitrust laws. This position was however 
challenged in 1942 when the Missouri attorney general filed a complaint with the Antitrust 
Division of the US Department of Justice and required that they conduct an investigation into 
the activities of the SEUA (Harrington, 2000). A federal investigation therefore followed 
which subsequently resulted in a number of criminal indictments against the SEUA for 
alleged violations of the federal Sherman Antitrust Act.  The charges included “restraining 
and monopolizing commerce, fixing prices and agents' commissions, attempting to force 
buyers to buy from member insurers, denying non-member insurers access to reinsurance 
from member insurers, and refusing to transact with agents who represented non-member 
insurers” (Harrington, 2000:24). 
The SEUA argued that not only were their practices beneficial but also that according to Paul 
v. Virginia, insurance was not commerce in terms of the US Constitution and therefore was 
not subject to federal legislation (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003). The SEUA therefore 
contended that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to insurance. A US District Court 
agreed and dismissed the case on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Paul v. 
Virginia (Harrington, 2000). On appeal in 1944, the Supreme Court delivered the proverbial 
fatal blow to the defence when it overturned its 1869 Paul v. Virginia decision by holding 
that insurance is commerce and that it is interstate commerce in terms of the US Constitution 
when it takes place across state lines (Harrington, 2000). In particular the Court held that 
No commercial enterprise of any kind that conducts its activities across state 
lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory powers of Congress 
under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception for the business of 
insurance. 
By implication, the Court therefore held that the activities of rating bureaus were subject to 
the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act and that practices which are designed to fix rates are in 
violation of the Act (Joskow, 1973). 
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The 1944 decision created tremendous uncertainty since the state-based system of insurance 
regulation which had long prevailed was now in question. Uncertainty prevailed as to the 
legitimate scope of state regulation and the legality of industry-operating procedures based on 
state regulation, particularly those of rating bureaus (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003). In 
addition to this, the decision threatened state jobs and the insurance market soon became 
perturbed by this uncertainty (Wagner, 2000). As a result of this, both the insurance industry 
and state regulators, with the support of the NAIC, sought clarity on these issues from the US 
Congress which quickly reacted by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act and thereby restoring 
the legitimacy of state regulation (Harrington, 2000). The most prevalent sections of the 1945 
Act are summarised in table 2. 
The implications of the McCarran-Ferguson Act were twofold. First, states regulators would 
continue to have primary authority for insurance regulation,100 however the federal 
government could enact legislation to regulate insurance if state regulation was found to be 
deficient (Harrington, 2000). Secondly, rating bureaus although collusive in nature, would 
not be subject to federal antitrust laws, provided they were regulated by the states and did not 
involve boycott, coercion, or intimidation (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003:103). In 1946 and in 
response to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the NAIC drafted two model Bills which sought to 
…preserve the business and regulatory status quo and to demonstrate that rate- 
making, in particular, bureau rate-making, would be quite explicitly 'regulated' 
by the states. This approach was designed to provide a state regulatory 
umbrella under which cooperative rate-making by bureaus would be exempt 
from the Federal antitrust laws. 
Most states revised their regulatory systems to conform with the NAIC’s model bills 
(Joskow, 1973). This was done in order to provide greater oversight of rating bureaus so as to 
stay clear of federal regulation (Harrington, 2000). As such, a number of state laws therefore 
required that insurance companies receive prior approval of their rates before transacting in 
the market (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003).  
                                                 
100 This was further reaffirmed in 1999 following the passing of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 
1999 (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) which provided that states would continue to regulate the business of 
insurance and hence that the McCarran-Ferguson Act remained in effect. Congress however called for state 
reform in order to allow insurers to compete more effectively (See NAIC, 2011). 
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Table 2: Excerpts from the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, Chapter 20 (Regulation of 
Insurance)  
Section Description 
1011 Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several 
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the 
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation 
or taxation of such business by the several States  
1012 (a) State regulation: The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, 
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or 
taxation of such business.  
(b) Federal regulation: No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, 
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless 
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 
30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the 
Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of 
September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended [15 
U.S.C. 41 et seq.], shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that 
such business is not regulated by State Law.  
1013 (a) Until June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the 
Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton 
Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission 
Act [15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.], and the Act of June 19, 1936, known as the Robinson-
Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to 
acts in the conduct thereof.  
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act 
inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, 
coercion, or intimidation.  
Such state laws typically required that premium rates were not excessive or unfairly 
discriminatory (Klein, 1995).  Regulating premium rates and contract conditions appears to 
be market conduct in nature.  Initially however, as indicated above, the rationale from an 
insurer’s perspective in terms of colluding on premium rates was to counter “destructive 
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competition”; this being a solvency issue.  What appears to be market conduct on the one 
hand can also lead to prudential considerations.  It is however accepted that the regulation of 
premium rates and contract terms and conditions at state level are illustrative of market 
conduct regulation.  It can thus be accepted that market conduct regulation existed in the US 
at a very early date.  State appetite for regulation premium rates has been waning.  Beginning 
in the mid-1960s, a large number of states regulators have been discarding the prior approval 
regulatory system in favour of more competitive rating laws (Harrington & Niehaus, 
2003:103). 
Similarly, policy forms were also subject to some form of prior regulatory approval to ensure 
fair trade practices, a market conduct issue (Klein, 1995). In particular, regulators sought to 
ensure that policy provisions were reasonable and fair and did not contain major gaps in 
coverage that may have been misunderstood by consumers (Klein, 1995: 374). It therefore 
follows that during this early period, there was some recognition of consumer protection and 
market conduct issues by state insurance commissions.  
The historical evolution of insurance market conduct regulation in the US continued to 
develop in the late 1940s when the NAIC adopted various model laws pertaining to unfair 
methods of competition, unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance 
which all exhibited market conduct regulatory undertones. This was a second albeit more 
delayed response to the McCarran-Ferguson Act (Wallison, 2000; NAIC, 2011). According 
to Section 1 of the Act, the purpose is to 
…regulate trade practices in the business of insurance in accordance with the 
intent of Congress as expressed in the McCarran-Ferguson Act by defining, or 
providing for the determination of, all such practices in this state that 
constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined 
As such, the Act sets out various activities which are deemed to cause unfair competition or 
which may amount to deceptive and unfair trade practices. These activities, as specified in 
Section 3, include: 
• Misrepresentation and false advertising of insurance policies 
• False information or misleading statement 
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• Defamation (including those statements which may be derogatory to the financial 
condition of any insurer) 
• Boycott, coercion and intimidation (similar to that which is intended by the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890) 
• False entries 
• Unfair discrimination 
• Rebating 
Following the promulgation of the model bill by the NAIC, most states enacted legislation 
which mirrored a number of the provisions noted above and which dealt with unfair trade 
practices by insurers. Although such state legislation has been amended over the years, the 
core feature of these laws continues to reflect the ethos of the model bill and its objectives 
that were set in the late 1940s. A discussion of each state’s laws in this regard is however 
beyond the scope of this report. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the antitrust drive in the 
US resulted in state regulators introducing a wide range of market conduct regulation matters. 
7.3 Regulatory developments post-1947 
Historically, insurance regulation in the US has dealt with solvency regulation and market 
conduct which is often referred to as consumer protection regulation. The evolution of 
insurance regulation, however, has primarily focused on prudential regulation. Over time, and 
as indicated above, market conduct issues were also regulated.  State insurance departments 
in the 19th century regulated premium rates and policy wording to ensure fair trade practices. 
The NAIC drafted model laws pertaining to unfair competition, and deceptive practices.  
Amid concerns about the variability of regulatory oversight, the NAIC commissioned 
McKinsey & Company in 1971 to “review the financial and market conduct surveillance of 
insurance companies”. Following the review, the McKinsey report recommended the 
establishment of a separate and distinct program of market conduct surveillance which ought 
to endeavour to: 
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• Focus on companies engaging in unfair business practices; 
• Identify unfair practices through a review of complaints, an examination of company 
materials and specific transactions, and interviews of agents and company personnel; 
• Document the results of market conduct examinations should be done well in a 
timely, action-oriented report; 
• Conduct examinations by specially trained staff, who should understand the 
applicable laws and regulations for the type of insurance that is the subject of the 
examination. 
In response to the aforementioned recommendations, the NAIC undertook a number of 
initiatives to improve market conduct regulation. Among other things, this included the 
establishment of the NAIC Market Conduct Subcommittee and Market Conduct Task Force 
to review market conduct regulation and make recommendations for improvements through 
the development of model laws. It can therefore be argued, that although market conduct 
regulatory attempts had already been made, market conduct regulation only consciously 
entered the regulatory agenda in the early 1970s when the NAIC undertook its first 
investigation of market conduct surveillance. It is these two developments which therefore 
played a significant role in the evolution of market conduct regulation in the US.  
Following their investigation, the NAIC established the Market Conduct Surveillance 
Handbook Task Force whose mandate was to develop market conduct standards. This 
eventually culminated in the Market Conduct Surveillance Handbook which i) developed a 
model for market conduct regulatory activities, ii) provided guidance in terms of market 
conduct examinations and review processes and iii) facilitated the sharing of information 
across states. Since its adoption in 1975, the handbook (which was later renamed the Market 
Conduct Examiners Handbook) has been updated and expanded in line with the various 
market changes that have taken place. Most recently, the handbook was consolidated into the 
Market Regulation Handbook which serves as a compilation of market conduct examination 
standards. 
Several states adopted their own handbooks which reflected the state’s regulatory philosophy 
and which were in line with the NAIC’S recommendations (NAIC, 2013). Furthermore, 
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following the recognition of proper consumer protection mechanisms by the NAIC, a number 
of state regulators responded and passed their own legislation in line with NAIC model laws 
and regulations.  However, in 1999, a follow up study on market conduct oversight was 
commissioned where it was found a “lack of coordination and communication between states 
continued to hamper market conduct oversight, and that activities varied significantly from 
state to state” (NAIC, 2013:12). This was further compounded by the 2003 report by the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) that again raised concerns about market conduct 
oversight activities. Although the GOA acknowledged that the NAIC had made efforts to 
improve market conduct regulatory oversight, the progress in implementing these efforts was 
slow (NAIC, 2013). Accordingly, in response to the report, the NAIC renewed and re-
prioritised its efforts to improve market conduct oversight and to develop uniform 
standards.101 
Once again, state regulators responded and it was upon NAIC model laws, regulations and 
guidelines that most states’ legislations and regulations have been designed and developed.   
A summary of the historical development of the most significant NAIC model laws, 
regulations and guidelines with a strong consumer protection focus are set out in table 3 since 
a discussion of each state’s laws and regulations is superfluous to this report. 
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, Congress passed the Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 which is more commonly referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act. At the 
outset, it appeared as if the Act would once again bring the federal versus state debate to the 
fore, specifically in terms of insurance regulatory matters. That is, the Act created the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) which, to a large degree, adopted many of the 
market regulation and consumer protection functions that had developed over time (NAIC, 
2011).  
Despite the fact that the CFPB was to assume these functions for the financial services sector 
in its entirety, Congress eventually decided to specifically exclude the regulation of insurance 
from the wide range of duties and powers of  the agency (NAIC, 2011; Kochenburger & 
Salve, 2011; Kemp, 2015). That is, as per the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB has no jurisdiction 
over the business of insurance and accordingly, market conduct regulation of the insurance 
market remains under state authority (American Bankers Association, n,d.).  
                                                 
101 This first step in doing so was through the establishment of the NAIC’s Modernization Plan in 2003. 
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Table 3: Summary of significant NAIC model acts, regulations and guidelines with a 
strong consumer protection focus 
                                                 
102 Market Conduct Examiners Handbook 
Date Model law Description 
1948 Unfair Trade 
Practices Model 
Act 
To regulate trade practices in the business of insurance by 
defining all such practices that constitute unfair methods of 
competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices and 
prohibiting such practices. In broad terms, the Act prohibits 
misrepresentation and false advertising, defamation, coercion, 
and unfair discrimination by insurance companies. The Act 
also requires insurers to maintain complaints, claims, rating, 
underwriting and marketing records in a manner that is 
retrievable for examination by state insurance regulators. 
1956 Model Law on 
Examinations 
To establish an effective, efficient system for examining the 
activities, operations, financial condition and affairs of all 
persons transacting the business of insurance by authorising 
the state insurance commissioner to conduct examinations 
whenever it is deemed necessary. 
1972 Unfair Claims 
Settlement 
Practices Model 
Act 
To set forth standards for the investigation and disposition of 
claims. This Act requires insurance companies to promptly 
investigate claims and settle claims in good faith by 
effectuating prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims 
submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear. 
1975 Market Conduct 
Surveillance 
Handbook102  
To reflect established practices and to assist each jurisdiction 
in developing its own market conduct examination procedures. 
1987 Long Term Care 
Model Act 
To protect applicants for long-term care insurance from unfair 
or deceptive sales or enrolment practices, to establish standards 
for long-term care insurance, to facilitate public understanding 
and comparison of long-term care insurance policies, and to 
facilitate flexibility and innovation in the development of long-
term care insurance coverage. 
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1988 Producer 
Licensing Model 
Act 
To govern the qualifications and procedures for the licencing 
of insurance producers and provides 
specific guidance regarding the causes for which a state 
insurance department may place on probation, suspend, revoke 
or refuse to issue or renew an insurance producer’s licence or 
levy a civil penalty. 
1995 Improper 
Termination 
Practices Model 
Act 
To protect policyholders from improper terminations of 
insurance coverage and to set forth standards for the regulation 
and disposition of terminations of policies or certificates of 
insurance. 
1995 Life Illustrations 
Model Regulation 
To provide rules for life insurance policy illustrations that will 
protect consumers and foster consumer education. The 
regulation provides illustration formats, prescribes standards to 
be followed when illustrations are used, and specifies the 
disclosures that are required in connection with illustrations. 
The goals of this regulation are to ensure that illustrations do 
not mislead purchasers of life insurance and to make 
illustrations more understandable. 
2000 Privacy of 
Consumer 
Financial and 
Health 
Information 
Regulation 
To govern the treatment of non-public personal health 
information and non-public personal financial information 
about individuals by all licensees of the state insurance 
department.  
2004 Market Conduct 
Surveillance 
Model Law 
To establish a framework for Insurance Department market 
conduct actions. 
2006-2016 
(Updated 
annually) 
Market 
Regulation 
Handbook 
To serve as a compilation of the market conduct examination 
standards, including standards pertaining to operations 
management, complaint handling, marketing and sales, 
producer licencing, policyholder service underwriting and 
claims rating  
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Notwithstanding these limitations, the CFPB has been granted authority over insurance 
companies in the event that amongst other things they i)  provide a “consumer financial 
product or service” including financial advisory services, loans to  policyholders and 
insurance premium financing, or (ii) are operating as a “service provider” to a  “covered 
person”, such as where an insurance industry participant operates as a debt protection 
contract  administrator (Kemp, 2015). 
In addition to this, the CFPB has authority to take action against any insurance company if  it 
deems that the insurer has engaged in “unfair deceptive and abusive acts and practices” 
(Kemp, 2015). The CFPB not only has the ability to determine what constitutes unfair, 
deceptive and abusive acts and practices, but also has the authority to penalise insurers for 
such violations (Kemp, 2015).  
As it stands today, insurance regulation and specifically that which regulates market activities 
continues to develop in order to achieve a uniform, balanced and effective system. This is 
largely in response to the changing nature of the insurance market. Notwithstanding this, it 
has been suggested that it is unlikely that state regulatory systems will ever achieve the 
optimal balance of diversity and uniformity in the absence of federal intervention (Biggs & 
Richardson, 2014). The state versus federal power struggle is therefore likely to endure. 
7.4 Economics of US insurance regulation 
The point of departure in terms of the economic theory of regulation is self-interest.  In a 
legislative context, legislation can be captured. In other words, legislation may not be passed 
in the public interest but can benefit the regulated party.  Economists approached this from 
the point of supply and demand.  On the demand side, it can be argued there is demand by the 
public for regulation. That is, public may demand regulation for a better regulated market 
which may achieve various consumer protection ideals. On the supply side, regulators 
provide the demanded regulation.  The evolution of the US regulatory system as set out above 
demonstrated the early emergence of market conduct regulation.  Initially it was clear that 
regulation was demanded not by the public but by the insurance market itself.  The insurance 
market adopted collusive policies to ensure higher premiums in order to combat destructive 
competition which may lead to insolvency. In this respect, such efforts were of a prudential 
nature.  
188 
 
On the other hand, there appears to be little evidence to support the idea that industry has 
demanded regulation in terms of which the modern extensive regulatory system has evolved.  
What is clear is that, over the years, the drafting of legislation has come from the model laws 
promulgated by the NAIC and not from individual elected state legislators.  Elected state 
legislators have tended merely to adopt the NAIC model laws for well over a century.  The 
NAIC is a committee of bureaucratic regulators who are not elected legislators.  This would 
point to the danger that much of the legislation is exposed to regulatory capture by the 
regulators themselves.  That is, regulators themselves capture the regulatory process for the 
benefit of themselves. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The establishment of state insurance commissions, the first of which was founded in 1851 in 
New Hampshire, brought with it the regulation of a number of market conduct activities. 
These included the licencing of insurers and agents/ brokers, the regulation of premium rates 
and policy forms, the provision of consumer assistance and the oversight of insurer sales 
practices and information disclosures. 
Regarding the history of market conduct regulation, the Unfair Trade Practices Act by the 
NAIC in 1947 is an important development. In terms of this model law, certain activities 
relating to unfair and deceptive practices were prohibited. The latter falls within the scope of 
market conduct regulation and therefore signalled a greater regulatory cognisance and more 
focused approach to consumer protection and market conduct regulation. It is for this reason 
that one may argue that the genesis of market conduct regulation in the US can be traced back 
to the mid-1900s, largely in response to the state-federal tug of war. 
Notwithstanding these efforts, in the early 1970s, state regulators were accused of focusing 
almost exclusively on prudential regulation. Although market problems had been identified 
by state regulators, the McKinsey report concluded that market conduct oversight was 
inadequate and unorganised. It was for this reason that the review committee recommended 
the establishment of a distinct and more focused market conduct regulatory programme. Both 
the NAIC and state regulators responded to these recommendations. Accordingly, although 
market conduct regulation developed in the mid-1900s, a greater and more focused awareness 
of market conduct regulatory oversight developed after this time. This culminated in a 
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number of NAIC model laws, regulations, standards, guidelines and handbooks, most of 
which were transposed in state regulatory systems. 
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SOUTH AFRICA 
8 SOUTH AFRICAN INSURANCE MARKET 
As mentioned earlier, following the global financial crisis, regulators around the world have 
demonstrated a propensity for greater intrusive, proactive financial regulation and oversight. 
South Africa is no different and similarly, the motivation for greater regulatory supervision is 
rooted primarily in the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. This is somewhat surprising since 
the South African financial services market emerged largely unscathed by the global financial 
crisis,103  
The financial services regulatory landscape in South Africa is in a state of change, largely in 
response to global trends and in an attempt to keep abreast with international best standards, 
which have arguably been influenced by the global financial crisis. At present, there are a 
number of new, amended and proposed regulations for the financial market as South Africa 
begins to embrace the Twin Peaks regulatory model. Said regulatory developments are 
discussed in the section below, in addition to a brief outline of the history of insurance and 
insurance regulation in South Africa. 
8.1 Historical overview of the South African insurance market 
The development of the insurance market in South Africa is naturally linked to the 
development of the country and accordingly, both the latter and the former ought to be looked 
at in conjunction (MacGregor, 2012). For centuries, historians have regarded the arrival of 
Europeans in the southern region of Africa as the starting point of South African history104 
(South African History Online, n.d.). Furthermore, it appears that the arrival of Jan van 
                                                 
103 South Africa is said to have experienced little financial upheaval owing to its various policy components. 
This includes i) a sound framework for financial regulation and well-regulated institutions, ii) appropriate and 
conservative risk management practices at domestic banks, iii) limited exposure to foreign assets, iv) a robust 
monetary policy framework, v) a countercyclical monetary policy, and vi) a proactive approach to dealing with 
bank credit risks (National Treasury, 2011). 
104 Although the history of South Africa can be traced as far back as 6-8million BCE when the early hominids 
populated South and East Africa (Johnson, 2004). 
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Riebeeck in April 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope marked the beginning of permanent 
European settlement in the region and as such, this will be the point of departure henceforth. 
In 1651, Jan van Riebeeck, an employee of the Dutch East India Company (VOC105) set off 
on a journey from the Netherlands to establish a permanent station at the Cape of Good Hope 
(Turton, 2009). The Cape station would serve as a refreshment station and “general 
rendezvous” for the large VOC fleets that would travel from Europe to the Far East (Ross, 
2014). In addition to this, the station would be a means of “procuring vegetables, meat, water 
and other needful refreshments and by this means restore the health of the sick” (Ross, 2014: 
243). Over the next century, the Europeans continued to settle in the Cape and began to fulfil 
a number of urban functions which meant that the Cape Colony began to develop into a 
modest town106 (Ross, 2014). More specifically, Van Riebeeck began to establish a 
rudimentary judicial system, which largely remained unchanged until the end of the Dutch 
administration in 1795 (Fagan, 1996). Notwithstanding this, the Cape remained 
predominantly rural and agricultural and as such, there was very little need for insurance 
between 1662 and 1795 (MacGregor, 2012). It is therefore not surprising that during this time 
there existed no South African insurance market.  
In July 1795, a British fleet under Admiral Keith Elphinstone and Major-General James Craig 
sailed into False Bay, a harbour which the VOC had failed to fortify (Worden, Van 
Heyningen & Bickford-Smith, 2004; Bray, 2008). Following failed negotiations, a regiment 
of Khoikhoi107 soldiers were sent by the Dutch to carry out their masters’ business (Bray, 
2008). The latter is well known as the Battle of Muizenberg. Soon thereafter, the regiment 
retreated and the town subsequently surrendered (Bray, 2008). The British took control of the 
Cape Colony from 1795-1803 during the Napoleonic wars and after these wars, returning it to 
the Dutch (under the rule of the Dutch Batavian Government) for a brief period108, finally 
conquered the Cape Colony and thereafter took permanent occupation in 1806 (Electoral 
Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, 2011).  
                                                 
105 The Dutch Acronym for Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie. 
106 During this time the Khoikhoi embarked on “an unsuccessful series of armed resistance” against the Dutch 
invasion that would continue for one hundred and fifty years (South African History Online, n.d.). 
107 Also known as the “Khoe”, the Khoikhoi occupied portions of Southern Africa, including what is now 
referred to as the Namib Desert, the Kalahari Desert and the Karoo (Turton, 2009). 
108 In terms of the treaty of Amiens. 
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British insurance companies soon began to follow the movements of British citizens to the 
Cape Colony and began to set up business (Spyrou, 1955; Verhoef, 2012).  The first 
insurance agents in the Cape Colony were appointed by the Phoenix Assurance Company of 
London on the 6th of August 1806 (Verhoef, 2012). Thereafter, between 1826 and 1844, five 
British insurers entered the Colony (Verhoef, 2012). On the 14th March 1831, the first 
indigenous South African insurance company, the South African Fire and Life Assurance 
Company, was established by Mr Thomas le Breton (Vivian, 1996). Soon thereafter, in 1835 
the Zuid-Afrikaansche Brand en Levensversekering Maatschappij was also founded in the 
Cape Colony (Verhoef, 2012).109  Table 4 below provides a summary table of such 
developments. 
In 1838, some thirty years after the British reclaimed the Cape, a large group of Afrikaans-
speaking Boers, the majority of which were Dutch and French immigrants, left the Cape and 
founded their own Boer Republics in the Natal, Orange River Colony110 and Transvaal 
provinces to eradicate the British control over themselves111 (Johnson, 2004). However, this 
was short-lived. Following the discovery of diamonds and gold in 1867 and 1886 
respectively, the influx of foreigners escalated and the British soon claimed administrative 
control of Natal (Johnson, 2004). By 1861 more than twenty insurance companies operated in 
the Cape and following the mineral discoveries in the late 1860s, the number of insurers 
operating in the Colony escalated dramatically (Verhoef, 2012). This appears to have been 
owing to the growing urban population and the high risks associated with the mining industry 
(Verhoef, 2012).  
                                                 
109 Thereafter the South African Mutual Life Assurance Society (1845), the Equitable Marine (1849) , the 
Colonial Assurance Company (1874),  the South African Mutual Life Assurance Company (1891), the Southern 
Life Association (1891), and the Industrial Life Assurance Company of South Africa (1894) were established. 
110 Today known as the Orange Free State and hereafter referred to as such. 
111 This movement is well known as the Groot Trek (The Great Migration) by the Voortrekkers. 
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Table 4: Summary of the early developments of the insurance industry in South Africa 
Date  Name of Insurance Company 
1806 Phoenix Assurance Company of London 
1826 United Empire and Continental Life Assurance Association 
1826 The Alliance British and Foreign Life and Fire Assurance Co 
1831 South African Fire and Life Assurance Company 
1835 Cape of Good Hope Fire Insurance Co 
1835 Zuid-Afrikaansche Brand en Levensversekering Maatschappij 
1838 The Cape of Good Hope Marine Insurance Company. 
1844 Equitable Fire and Life Assurance Trust Co 
1845 South African Mutual Life Assurance Society 
1849 Equitable Marine  
1853 Guardian Assurance and Trust Co. of Port Elizabeth 
1856 Commercial Marine and Fire Assurance Co 
1874 The Colonial Assurance Company 
1891 The South African Mutual Life Assurance Company 
1891 The Southern Life Association 
1894 The Industrial Life Assurance Company of South Africa 
The Voortrekkers once again attempted to assert their independence and two wars 
subsequently ensued (Verhoef, 2012). The first Anglo-Boer War112 ended in 1881 with a 
resounding victory for the Afrikaners following the Battle of Majuba (Wilcox, 2007). The 
British refused to accept that they could simply be defeated by what were “essentially farmers 
and very much part-time soldiers” and accordingly, the second Anglo-Boer war was 
inevitable and took place between 1899 and 1902 (MacGregor, 2012: 141). The latter ended 
in victory for the British thereby “completing the long imperial conquest of Southern Africa” 
(Nasson, 2000: 149). This victory thus signalled Britain’s domination of the sub region and 
was the catalyst for the integration of the Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, and 
Transvaal into the Union of South Africa in 1910 (Verhoef, 2012). It was also during this 
time that British insurers began to dominate the fire insurance market (Verhoef, 2012). 
                                                 
112 Also known as the South African War and/or the Boer War. 
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By early 1900s, the poor white problem113 had long been recognised and the white Afrikaners 
began to engage in a process of upliftment. In particular, the Afrikaners, aware of their 
disadvantaged position, established the South African National Trust and Assurance 
Company Limited (Santam) in the May of 1918 (MacGregor, 2012; Benfield, 2013). A 
month later the Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Lewens Assuransie Maatskappy (Sanlam)114 
opened its doors with the specific purpose of “mobilizing Afrikaner savings to promote 
economic growth out of which they would be lifted out of poverty” (Verhoef, 2010; 
MacGregor, 2012:142).  
Although the second Anglo-Boer war ended in a decisive victory for the British, numerically 
the English were always outnumbered by the Afrikaners (MacGregor, 2012). For that reason, 
following the 1948 general election, the popular vote placed the Afrikaners in the dominate 
position and the National Party (NP) won the ballot (Southall, 1994).115 In 1961, the Union 
gained its independence and became known as the Republic of South Africa (Beck, 2014). By 
that time, the economy was expanding and so too was the insurance market. 
8.2 Development of insurance law and regulation in South Africa  
8.2.1 Roman Dutch and English Law 
After colonisation by the British, the Roman Dutch common law which was brought by the 
Dutch settlers in 1652 was retained but over time was naturally influenced by English law 
(Fagan, 1996). More specifically, soon after 1806, British merchants complained about the 
Roman-Dutch procedures, the voluminous yet inaccessible body of Roman-Dutch insurance 
law, the inconvenience of the Dutch language and the incompetence of the local courts (van 
Niekerk, 1996). The British government in turn considered replacing the Roman-Dutch law 
with English law but instead opted to await the gradual infiltration of English law into the 
local legal system (van Niekerk, 1996:439). 
                                                 
113 After roughly 150 years of European domination, the Europeans in South Africa had failed to build a 
sustainable economy. As a result of this, as the white Afrikaner farming population began to expand, the 
population exceeded the numbers which could be supported on the farms and poverty ensued. By the late 1880s 
and early 1900s the the poor white problem was at its worst (see Fourie, 2007; MacGregor, 2012). 
114 Now known as the English equivalent- the South African Life Assurance Company. 
115 The Afrikaner Nationalist Party remained in power until 1994 when the African National Congress (ANC) 
won the vote and became the ruling party. 
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Towards the latter half of the nineteenth century, the application of Roman Dutch law to 
insurance matters was being questioned. In particular, John Henry De Villiers (as cited in 
Van Niekerk, 1996:445), Chief Justice at the Cape from 1873 until 1910, commented that  
The enormous development of commerce in recent times requires a 
corresponding development of mercantile law, so that it becomes impossible 
rigidly to apply the rules obtained in Holland in the beginning of the present 
century to questions which arise out of customs of a later growth.  
Accordingly, by 1878 there was a widespread acknowledgement that in many instances, 
Roman-Dutch law and English law could not always be reconciled and as such, there were 
calls for the abolition of Roman-Dutch law and its replacement with English law (Van 
Niekerk, 1996).116 English insurance law was formally introduced into the Cape Colony in 
1879 in terms of the General Law Amendment Act No. 8 of 1879.117 The preamble to the 
1879 Act wrote that  
The existing general law of the Colony is in several instances unsuited to the 
advancing trade and altered circumstances of the country… many portions of 
such law are uncertain, and partly, if not entirely obsolete… it is desirable to 
alter and amend such laws as are in conflict or inconsistent with modern 
principles of legislation. 
The introduction of this Act established an important point with respect to insurance 
regulation; English insurance law and practice were being followed in South Africa.  It is not 
unusual for countries to follow “best international practice”.  The important point is that the 
motivation for much of the insurance regulation is not founded in South Africa but in 
England even if justified or rationalised in South Africa.  Following the annexation of the 
Orange Free State in May 1902, the Roman-Dutch common law continued to be applied in 
the colony (Millard, 2013). However, shortly thereafter, the General Law Amendment 
Ordinance 5 of 1902 was enacted which essentially mirrored the General Law Amendment 
Act which had been passed earlier in 1879 in the Cape Colony (Van Niekerk, 1996). English 
law was thus formally introduced into the Orange Free State at that time. Although English 
law was never formally introduced in Natal and the Transvaal, said courts nevertheless relied 
on English precedents and accordingly, English law principles infiltrated nationwide 
                                                 
116 The case of Smith v. Davis (1878) 8 Buch 66 seems to have been the catalyst for this notion. 
117 The General Law Amendment Act of 1879 mainly concerned maritime and mercantile law (van Niekerk, 
1996). 
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(Millard, 2013). The formal introduction of English law as the binding authority in the Cape 
and Orange Free State was not, however, beyond criticism. 
In 1977, the General Law Amendment Act of 1879 and the General Law Amendment 
Ordinance of 1902 were “at last repealed” in terms of the Pre-Union Law Revision Act No. 
43 of 1977 (van Niekerk, 1996). In terms of the 1977 Act, English law was no longer the 
binding authority in the Cape and Orange Free State. This meant that the application of the 
Roman-Dutch law of insurance was restored. As it stands today, albeit that English law is no 
longer the binding authority in South Africa, its principles are still adhered to in many parts 
of the nation (Ten Insurance Services Ltd, 2014). That is, English law is so well entrenched 
in South African precedent that although the courts are no longer inclined to follow old 
English law (but rather Roman-Dutch law) they are also not compelled to abandon precedent 
simply because it has English origins. As a result of this, the South African common law on 
insurance retains its international character (Kuschke, 2011). 
8.2.2 Life Assurance Act No 13 of 1891 
The first piece of insurance legislation to be enacted was the Life Assurance Act No 13 of 
1891118 passed by the eighth parliament of the Cape of Good Hope (Actuarial Society of 
South Africa, 2013). Up until this point, the law of insurance applied in the land was merely 
included in the general mercantile law at the time, with English Insurance Law being applied 
in cases which came before the courts in the Cape and Natal, whilst Roman Dutch Law was 
employed by the courts in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal (Benfield, 1997: 263). 
This Act aimed at “encouraging persons to insure” and at “protecting persons assured”, and 
further called for an investigation into the financial conditions of a company by a qualified 
actuary every five years. As such, the financial condition of companies was to be investigated 
by a qualified actuary to ensure that the companies working practices were in order (Ten 
Insurance Services Ltd, 2014). Thereafter, said report was to be deposited with the Treasury 
in a prescribed format (Benfield, 1988).  
Prior to the passing of the Act, Hansard (May, 1891 as cited in Benfield, 1997:264) reported 
that "the aim of the Bill [was] to compel companies to give proper statements to the 
                                                 
118 In terms of the Companies Act No. 22 of 1892, the provisions of said Act did not apply to Insurance 
Companies where such provisions were inconsistent with the earlier 1891 Act (Scrutton, 1911). 
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Government of their business" and that "the Bill principally means further protection of 
policyholders". Between 1892-1908, a number of brief statutes were passed in the Cape 
Colony, Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State (Benfield, 1988). More specifically, in all 
four provinces, the legislation that was passed generally required the payment of a deposit, 
the protection of both policies and the interests of policyholders and the making of financial 
disclosures (Benfield, 1997). This indicates regulation for consumer protections objectives. 
8.2.3 Council of Fire Insurance Companies 
As mentioned above, during the late 1800s and early 1900s, English insurance companies 
continued to dominate the insurance market in the Union, particularly with respect to fire 
insurance (Verhoef, 2012). As a result of this British influence, it is not surprising that the 
South African industry began to follow the British tariff system as discussed above. In 1894, 
the Cape Town Fire Tariff Committee was established and some years later, the 
Johannesburg Fire Tariff Association was formed (Borscheid, 2012). By 1898, tariff 
associations had been formed not only in Cape Town and Johannesburg, but also in Port 
Elizabeth, East London, Durban, Bloemfontein and Pretoria (Verheof, 2012). By the turn of 
the century, plans were put in place to establish a central body which would organise the 
countrywide fire insurance associations that had emerged throughout the 1800s (Vivian et al., 
2016c). This was achieved by the Council of Fire Insurance Companies which was formed in 
1907 and which was modelled on the UK FOC (Verhoef, 2015; Borscheid, 2012).119  
It does not appear that any of the original documents concerning South African tariff 
committees or the Council have survived, except for possibly some records held by the 
Mutual and Federal Insurance Company (Vivian et al., 2016c).  The loss of historical 
documents is unfortunate and accordingly, literature on the history of these bodies is thin. 
Notwithstanding this, it has been suggested that upon reflection, the Council appears to have 
played a somewhat consumer protection and market conduct regulatory role since the Council 
“promoted uniform and sound practices in fire business throughout the country, and 
contributed to the development of a sound market, good underwriting standards, sound 
insurance practices and procedures, and general engineering standards, modelled on the 
British associations” (Verhoef, 2012: 327).  
                                                 
119 The South African Insurance Association, as it stands today has its roots in the Council of Fire Insurance 
Companies which was formed in 1907 (South African Insurance Association, 2013). 
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Soon after the tariff system was disbanded in the UK in the 1970s, the South Africa industry 
followed suit. This, however, created several problems in the South African market. In 
particular, the demise of the tariff system introduced price competition with which the South 
African market was unacquainted. By the late 1980s, there was growing concern with regards 
to the stability of the market owing to great unease since a number of companies’ solvency 
ratios were perceived to be substandard (Vivian et al., 2016c). It was anticipated that because 
of this, there may be a market meltdown (Vivian et al., 2016c).  The then registrar of 
insurance therefore called on insurers to find solutions in order to instil discipline in the 
market (Vivian et al., 2016c). This was done in terms of the market accord whereby insurers, 
with the consent of the registrar, agreed that they would not quote against one another unless 
their quote would be considerably less than the prevailing price (Vivian et al., 2016c). In fact, 
this would only be allowed if the competing insurance company was able to offer a 10 per 
cent reduction in premiums (Vivian, 2016). Insurers thereby began to operate successfully 
without the tariff. 
In addition to this, following the demise of the tariff, model policy wordings no longer 
existed. Over time, insurers were increasingly being called upon by brokers to approve 
specific policy wordings which became particularly tedious and time consuming (Vivian et 
al., 2016c). In addition to this, it was almost impossible to compare benefit packages between 
policies, since policy wordings were vastly different (Randmark40, n.d.). The inconsistences 
of policy wordings also had an impact on reinsurance capacity (Randmark40, n.d.). In 
response to these problems, the insurance market suggested the establishment of a working 
committee (consisting of both brokers and insurers) who would collectively agree on a model 
policy wording (Vivian et al., 2016c). This culminated in the creation of the MultiMark series 
of policy wordings, the first of which was produced in 1987 (Randmark40, n.d). These 
MultiMark policies appeared to have been strikingly similar to the tariff model wordings 
which had preceded its birth (Vivian et al., 2016c). As it stands today, the MultiMark series 
of policy wordings have been abandoned for fear that they may have been anti-competitive 
and thus infringe on the Competition Act of 1998 (Vivian, 2007). 
8.2.4 Insurance Act No 37 of 1923 
During the first half of the twentieth century, a vibrant insurance market began to develop in 
the Union and insurance regulation began to emerge (Verhoef, 2012). The Insurance Act No 
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37 of 1923 was the first example of this, and accordingly, was the first piece of insurance 
legislation passed by the parliament of the Union of South Africa. The Act was passed some 
13 years post Union and for that reason, it was argued that either there was “no great 
urgency” in the making of insurance legislation or that the provincial laws prior to the 
unionisation had been adequate (Benfield, 1988). However this was not the case. In fact, 
upon examination of various parliamentary debates, it was noted by the Minister at the time 
that such a piece of legislation had been worked on for several years prior to the formation of 
the Union (i.e. over the last twenty years) and specific reference is made to the British 
Assurance Act of 1906.  
The 1923 Act undertook to “consolidate and amend the laws in force in several provinces in 
the Union relating to insurance”. The South African regulatory system therefore pursued the 
Churchill legacy by having one regulatory system for one market. The Act further sought to 
create the role of Chief Office and Principal Officer in the Union and further stipulated that 
no insurance company (more specifically no life office) may transact business in the Union 
unless it was registered, licenced and had made the necessary deposit120 in accordance with 
the provisions of the Act. Moreover, the Act concerned itself primarily with registration and 
licencing provisions in addition to setting out the form, method and extent of the various 
disclosure requirements (Benfield, 1997). In fact, it has been cited that the 1923 Act had 
enshrined the principle of “freedom with publicity”, a principle which had been derived from 
the 1909 UK Assurance Companies Act121 as discussed above (Benfield, 1997). In terms of 
this approach, insurers were granted wide discretion and a freedom to conduct their affairs 
without prescription provided that all activities and financial results were fully disclosed and 
available for public inspection (Benfield, 1988). In addition to this, the 1923 Act endeavoured 
to protect policyholders in the case of an insurer’s insolvency. 
8.2.5 Insurance Act No 27 of 1943 
Throughout the 1930s, Professor Arndt criticized the 1923 Act for its numerous inadequacies 
and shortfalls. In particular, Arndt (1934: 274) commented that  
[The 1923] Act contains many loopholes which can be of the greatest value to 
promoters and vendors, at the expense of the innocent public. According to the 
                                                 
120 A deposit of £25 000 was to be deposited with the Treasury.  
121 The 1923 Act therefore followed the British System in terms of the 1909 Act. 
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Act, the Registrar of Companies would appear to be no more than a routine 
registering robot, who has no discretion or can pass no judgment on what he 
registers as long as the documents formally comply with the letter of the 
law… The powers to exercise his [Registrar of Companies] discretion and to 
pass judgment, within prescribed limits, should go a long way towards 
protecting many innocent but inexperienced small savers and investors who 
are at present paying unnecessarily heavily for their inexperience.  
Arndt (1934:279) further expressed that 
Insurance companies are the small man’s savings institutions... the small man 
[has to] entrust the management of his savings to others who, in the interest of 
the community as a whole and in view of their trustee function, should be 
required by the State to observe certain minimum standards… More 
constructive legislation regarding the investments and their distribution would 
therefore seem to be imperative. 
As such, Arndt questioned the "control and supervision" of financial institutions122 and 
thereafter called for direct requirements relating to the investment policies of insurers, since 
according to his argument, too great a discretion posed an unreasonably high risk to 
policyholders (Benfield, 1997; Verhoef, 2012). The Insurance Act No 27 of 1943 was 
therefore subsequently passed, largely on the basis of Arndt’s criticisms and 
recommendations (Benfield, 1997). 
The 1943 Act governed the conduct of insurance business in the Union and accordingly set 
out the regulatory framework within which insurers conducted their business (le Roux, 
Penfold & Webber Wentzel Bowens, 1998). The 1943 Act introduced a number of direct 
statutory prescriptions in terms of which a number of provisions were stipulated. These 
included: 
• The registration of insurers 
• The appointment of a Registrar of Insurance (under the control of the Minister of 
Finance) for the administration, supervision and control of the insurance industry 
• The manner in which business ought to be conducted by Lloyd’s underwriters 
operating in the South African market 
                                                 
122 Arndt (1934) had further argued that the depository amounts prescribed by the 1923 Act did not bear any 
relationship to the volume of business conducted. In other words, he argued that the deposits made to the 
Treasury were of no consequence whatsoever and afforded no conceivable protection to the policyholders. 
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• The appointment of an auditor and a valuator 
• The respective duties of both the auditor and the valuator 
• The submission of returns to the Registrar of Insurance 
• The holding of assets (specifically what fixed proportions of assets were to be held in 
prescribed securities known as statutory designated investments i.e. compulsory 
investments in Government bonds) and what  proportion was discretionary) 
Once again, in retrospect, it appears that the 1943 Act sought to protect the public from 
unauthorised conduct and in doing so, was an early form of consumer protection regulation.  
The 1943 Act further provided for the first time, the appointment of a Registrar of Insurance 
to whom appeals under the Act would be made (Benfield, 2013:89). George Beak, an actuary, 
would become the first Registrar of Insurance and soon established the Financial Institutions 
Office (FIO) which sat in Pretoria (Benfield, 2013).  The day-to-day administration of the Act 
was performed by the then newly created FIO (Benfield, 1997).  
8.2.6 Commission of enquiries  
The statutory regulation of the insurance industry remained unchanged in principle until 
1973123 when the Franszen Commission issued the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy (Verhoef, 2012:336). In terms of the report, the Commission 
advised that no foreign controlled company with more than a 10 per cent shareholding in 
foreign stocks should operate in the South African insurance market. Said recommendation 
was duly transposed into the South African legislative framework by virtue of the Companies 
Act No 76 of 1974 in terms of which insurers had to both register and comply with the 
statutory requirements for “locally incorporated companies” (Verhoef, 2012:338). It was 
during this time and particularly between 1965 and 1980, that the financial services sector 
was heavily regulated (Botha & Makina, 2011).  
                                                 
123 This appears to be South Africa’s first independent regulatory steps since South Africa had become a 
Republic in 1961. 
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Deregulation of the financial sector only started to take place in the late 1980s following the 
appointment a Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and Monetary Policy in 
South Africa in 1987 (Botha & Makina, 2011). The Commission, eventually known as the De 
Kock Commission, noted that institutional regulation, specifically in the banking sector, had 
resulted in over-regulation and a number of inefficiencies (Botha & Makina, 2011). The 
Banking Act No 94 of 1990 was passed soon thereafter to provide for the regulation and 
supervision of public companies taking deposits from the public. The 1990 Act further 
applied to any registered insurer (as defined in section 1 of the Insurance Act of 1943) who 
accepted a premium in respect of any policy. It was at this time that the South African 
regulatory structure, by virtue of the Banking Act of 1990, began to coordinate its legislation 
with international criteria and principles. That is, prior to the 1980s, South Africa’s regulatory 
landscape “sluggishly” followed international trends and developments owing to its apartheid 
policies and political isolation (Botha & Makina, 2011:32). The 1990 Banking Act was 
therefore South Africa’s first attempt to harmonise its regulatory framework with 
international best standards. 
For roughly half a century, the governing legislation of the insurance industry remained the 
Insurance Act of 1943 which, as mentioned earlier, created the role of a statutory regulator- 
the Registrar of Insurance (Benfield & Vivian, 2003). However, toward the end of the 20th 
century, the South African insurance market was dealing with the aftershock of the collapse 
of the AA Mutual Insurance124 which prompted the government of the day to appoint a 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the reasons for its failure125 (Vivian & Hutcheson, 
2015). The Commission (1988) noted that the collapse of the AA Mutual could not be 
ascribed to a single cause but rather to a multitude of factors, some of which were 
interrelated. Among other things, the Commission (1988) suggested that a shortage of 
capital126, the lack of correct technical reserving, bad management and lack of control, bad 
                                                 
124 The AA Mutual carried out business in both life and short-term insurance. 
125 The Commission of Inquiry (the Melamet Commission I) under the chairmanship of Mr Justice D.A. 
Melamet, was appointed in 1987 and released its report ‘The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
winding-up of the short-term Insurance Business of the AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd’ in 1988. 
126 It has been argued that in fact “the liquidation of the AA Mutual was inappropriate” since in reality the AA 
Mutual was always solvent by having a substantial surplus. In fact, decades after the AA Mutual was wound up, 
there remained a substantial amount of cash in the bank (See Vivian, 2006a). 
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underwriting, the absence of currency matching for overseas liabilities and inadequate 
accounting, collectively culminated in the AA Mutual’s demise.  
At the same time, criticisms were levelled against the FIO127 and its then Registrar, Robert 
Burton, since there was a large backlog in the checking of insurers’ returns (Insurance Times 
and Investments, 1988). In particular, the Commission (1988) noted that the 1980, 1981, 
1984 and 1985 returns submitted by the AA Mutual had not been checked, despite a number 
of warning signs preceding its “collapse”. The Commission (1988) did however suggest that 
the FIO may have been overworked and understaffed and as such, could not perform all its 
duties. The latter sentiments were echoed countless times as van Staden128 (1980 as cited in 
Insurance Times and Investments, 1990) pointed out that  
…the staff position of this Office [had] deteriorated to a point where it [was] 
no longer possible for the Office to perform effectively all the functions that 
[were] required of it by the [1943] Act. The stage [had] now been reached 
where not even the most basic of functions, such as the examination of the 
financial statements and actuarial valuation reports submitted by insurers 
[could] be attended to properly.  
In its report, tabled in Parliament early in the July of 1988, the Commission not only 
presented its conclusions as to why the AA Mutual collapsed, but further recommended a 
number of stricter financial controls for the industry as a whole.129 As a consequence of this, 
the regulatory landscape was reorganised, the supervisory legislation was modified and a 
voluntary ombudsman was appointed (Vivian, 2003:289). That is, in August 1989 the first 
short-term ombudsman was voluntarily appointed by the industry to “provide consumers with 
a free, efficient and fair dispute resolution mechanism”130 (Vivian, 2003). Although the office 
proved to be a success, today it is regulated in terms of the Financial Services Ombud 
Schemes Act No 37 of 2004 so as to be in line with the Pension Funds Adjudicator, a 
statutory body which was established in terms of the Pension Funds Act No. 24 of 1956. 
                                                 
127 The forerunner of today’s Financial Services Board (FSB). 
128 A previous Registrar of Insurance until 1983. 
129 Amongst other things, the Commission suggested the introduction of a policy holders' protection board or the 
establishment of a guarantee fund in addition to the introduction of an ombudsman to deal with queries and 
complaints. 
130 Prior to this, a disgruntled consumer had to resort to an expensive and protracted litigation process to resolve 
a dispute with an insurer. 
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8.2.7 Current regulatory landscape in South Africa  
As mentioned earlier, soon after South Africa's political seclusion ended in the mid-1990s, 
the country’s regulatory system quickly got accustomed to international standards. For this 
reason, the Melamet Commission recommended in 1993 that South Africa adopt a unified 
regulatory system that would be in line with European developments and in particular, one 
which would mirror the UK’s now defunct FSA (Botha & Makina, 2011). However the 
Commission’s recommendations were not accepted and instead a functional approach, with 
three different regulators for the financial market, was preferred and accordingly, each 
regulator continued to regulate its respective industry. As a result of this, currently, the South 
African regulatory and supervisory system consists of a number of different regulators who 
are coordinated through both statutory and the now repealed advisory standing committees131 
(Botha & Makina, 2011:32).  In particular and at present, three main regulatory bodies 
regulate the South African financial services market. These include the Financial Services 
Board (FSB), the South African Reserve Bank and the Council for Medical Schemes.132  
Within the insurance context, the FSB is responsible for the regulation of both the short term 
and long term insurance industry. 
The legislative reforms in South Africa did not cease as the newly elected African National 
Congress (ANC) government began to find its feet and in doing so conducted an extensive 
review of the legislation affecting financial markets (Vivian, 2003:289). This movement was 
further reinforced as the FSB embarked on an wide-spread new legislative programme which 
saw i) the passing of both the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and the Short-term 
Insurance Act 53 of 1998133 (including subsequent amendments to these Acts), ii) the 
enactment of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act 37 of 2002134, 
                                                 
131 Although the regulatory authorities were at one time contemplating the adoption of a unified and integrated 
regulatory system, the global financial crisis exposed a number of weaknesses characteristic of this approach 
and thereby reaffirmed South Africa’s earlier decision not to adopt an integrated regulatory system (See Botha 
& Makina, 2011). 
132 The banking industry is regulated by the South African Reserve Bank,  the regulatory oversight of medical 
schemes are  conducted by the Registrar of Medical Schemes, under the auspices of the Department of Health, 
and remaining financial markets are regulated by the FSB.  
133 Both the Long-term and Short-term Insurance Acts replaced the Insurance Act of 1943. 
134 Furthermore, various Financial Institutions Amendment Acts, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) 
No 38 of 2001, and the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 were also passed. 
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and iii) the promulgation of Policyholder Protection Rules and Clawback of Commissions 
Regulations mainly for the long insurance markets (Benfield & Vivian, 2003: 277). These 
legislation and regulatory instruments support the broader regulation of the insurance market 
since such industry laws have all endeavoured to serve to better protect financial customers 
and to strengthen regulatory action. These developments resulted in significant market 
restructuring, market share changes and regulatory co-operation (Benfield & Vivian, 2003). 
A discussion of the current regulatory landscape in South Africa follows. 
8.2.8 Financial Services Board (FSB) 
Soon after the Melamet Report was published, the Financial Services Board Act No. 97 of 
1990 was passed which culminated in the establishment of the Financial Services Board 
(FSB).135 It is imperative to note at this point however, that despite the overarching consensus 
that the FSB was promulgated following the Melamet Commission Report (1988) and its 
recommendations, upon careful examination, a different view may be argued. In terms of the 
report, albeit that the Commission (1998) was concerned over the need for a “properly and 
adequately staffed” financial institutions board, the report merely discussed and did not 
recommend the idea of a new financial services regulator. More specifically, the Commission 
(1988: 120-123) pointed out that  
In England, Germany and Switzerland, the short-term insurance industry 
contributes financially to the upkeep of the regulatory office… It is [however] 
clear from the attitude of the various short-term insurers in South Africa that 
they would not wish to make financial contributions to the upkeep of the 
regulatory office if they had no say in and control over how such moneys were 
expended…Such a financial contribution does not appear, to the Commission, 
to be an acceptable solution to the problems of the Office of the Registrar. The 
solution would appear to be the creation of an independent body under the 
control of the Minister of Finance, in which both the Central Government and 
the private sector play an active role, and which is financed by contributions 
from both the State and the private sector… What the Commission 
recommends, for consideration by the responsible Ministers, is the creation of 
a national council or board for financial institutions…If regard is had to the 
billions of rands controlled by the various financial institutions, the need for 
such a body drawing on the best available brains in the Government service 
and the private sector is obvious…If the above recommendation finds favour 
with the authorities, it will obviously be necessary for a further commission or 
a working group of experts to work out and consider the detail and 
                                                 
135 The FSB came into operation on the 1st April 1991 under the chairmanship of Mr Justice David Melamet 
who too stood as chairman of the Melamet Commission in 1988. 
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ramifications of such an organisation. The above comments are born of a 
sense of urgency regarding the need to obtain adequate and qualified staff for 
the Office of the Registrar… This would allow for proper policing of the 
industry, and reduce the possibility of a recurrence of the collapse of a short-
term insurer. 
As such, the Melamet Commission recommended only that a commission or working group 
be appointed to consider the creation of a national council or board for financial institutions 
and thus did not itself recommend the actual creation of the FSB. It was in fact the Van der 
Horst Committee (chaired by Dr JG van der Horst) that advocated the establishment of an 
independent institution or “Statutory Board” to supervise and regulate the non-banking 
financial services industry (FSB, 2010). As such, the Melamet Commission may have planted 
the proverbial seed, but it was the Van der Horst report which ran with the idea and 
ultimately made the recommendation upon which the FSB was soon thereafter established 
(Michaels, 2005).  
As mentioned above, the 1990 Financial Services Board Act sought to provide for the 
establishment of a board to i) supervise the compliance of the non-banking financial services 
industry with laws regulating financial institutions; ii) advise the Minister of Finance on 
matters concerning financial institutions and financial services and; iii) promote programmes 
and initiatives to inform and educate users and potential users of financial products and 
services. All financial institutions which were formally supervised by the FIO would now be 
supervised by the FSB- an umbrella body for the supervision of insurance companies, 
pension funds and other financial markets (Benfield, 2013).136 As such, the original 1990 Act 
had in mind that the FSB would become the main supervisory body of financial institutions 
and an advisory committee to the Minister of Finance on all matters concerning financial 
institutions.137 
The FSB supervises and performs its functions not only through its various departments but 
also in terms of 16 Parliamentary Acts (Rossouw, van der Watt & Malan, 2002). These Acts 
entrust numerous regulatory functions to various registrars including the Registrar of Long-
                                                 
136 For all intents and purposes, the FSB performs the ex FIO’s functions although with just 12 members of staff, 
the former FIO does not measure up to the size, power and scope of the FSB today (Sandrock, 2014). 
137 Today the FSB is an institutional body with a net worth over R800 million- something that the original FSB 
Act of 1990 arguably never had in mind. 
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and Short-term Insurance, Friendly Societies, Pension Funds, Collective Investment Schemes 
and Capital Markets, all of which are accountable to the FSB’s Executive Officer.   
The construct of South African legislation often mandates a government functionary body to 
vary the application of the respective Act by means of a plethora of subordinate regulation 
(Sandrock, 2014). It is at this point that an understanding of subordinate legislation and its 
limits is important. The necessary point of departure is therefore the Magna Carta.  
In the early 13th century, a number of government officials were accused of persuing their 
own interests through legislative devices which lead to an abuse of the system and the 
potential for dictatorship (Vivian & van Vuuren, 2016). This is a well-known phenomenon. 
Lord Acton in 1906 pointed out that “this law of the modern world, that power tends to 
expand indefinitely, and will transcend all barriers, abroad and at home, until met by superior 
forces, produces the rhythmic movement of history”. Accordingly, if there is a system that 
allows individuals to enrich themselves through state power, they will do so (Vivian, 2015e).   
King John attempted to do the very latter. In particular, in 1215, King John required that 
wealthy landowners and barons pay “scutage” or money in lieu of military service (Whitton, 
2009). This was essentially a form of arbitrary tax (Vivian & van Vuuren, 2016). The barons 
however pointed out to the King that he could levy no taxes without their consent (Vivian & 
van Vuuren, 2016). Nonetheless, the barons agreed to pay the taxes provided that the King 
would grant them a number of special concessions (Vivian & van Vuuren, 2016). 
Specifically, the barons gathered outside London in the June of 1215 and demanded that the 
King sign a charter (Whitton, 2009). In 1215, King John therefore assented to the Magna 
Carta which endeavoured to ensure that officials were under some control and therefore could 
not dictate laws without limitation (Vivian & van Vuuren, 2016). In particular, officials were 
under the control of an assembly of barons and would have no legislative powers beyond this 
assembly. In terms of this approach, the King’s authority became bound by what the 
assembled barons agreed (Vivian & van Vuuren, 2016). Over time this became known as the 
King’s Council which with the passing of time was referred to as Parliament (UK Parliament, 
nd.).  
Accordingly, laws began to develop from parliament; the laws were what the assembled 
barons, the King, his nobles and later on, the commons, agreed to. As such, over time 
Parliament was recognised as the “sovereign legislative institution” (Vivian & van Vuuren, 
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2016). Today this can be referred to as constitutional democracy in terms of which only 
elected law makers have the authority to make laws that uphold constitutional norms and 
values (Vivian & van Vuuren, 2016).  
As will be discussed, a number of Acts of Parliament have begun to contain provisions which 
enable a minister or some other delegated authority to make regulations.  These regulations 
can be referred to as subordinate legislation. The delegation of powers ought to be limited, 
since if not, parliament is authorising the government to make its own laws and constitutional 
democracy will be replaced with dictatorship (Vivian & van Vuuren, 2016). This is the very 
thing that the Magna Carta outlawed over 800 years ago.  The very distinction between a 
dictatorship and constitutional democracy will be lost.  A legislative representative therefore 
should have no power to delegate his power to another. However the latter appears to be 
exactly the case today. 
The Financial Services Board Act of 1990 is one such example, since it has far-reaching 
powers to decide on a wide scope of matters with little to no consultation with interested 
parties (Sandrock, 2014). For example, the FSB has gained sweeping powers through this 
structure which amongst other things has allowed them to determine their own remuneration. 
According to Section 11 of the original and un-amended Financial Services Board Act of 
1990  
A member or an alternate member of the board or a member of any committee 
of the board who is not in the full-time employment of the State shall be paid 
such remuneration and allowances out of the funds of the board as the 
Minister may determine.  
Furthermore, Section 14 provides that  
the board may pay to the persons in its employment, or provide them with, 
such remuneration, allowances, bonuses, subsidies, pension and other 
employment benefits as the board may, after having obtained such 
professional advice as it may deem fit, consider as being competitive in the 
open market for the manpower concerned. 
As such, the original 1990 FSB Act had envisaged that the FSB would be paid by the state 
and not the private sector. A more significant development however transpired when the 1990 
Act was later amended in terms of which the FSB is to be funded by virtue of a tax levy 
imposed on the financial services industry. More specifically, according to Section 15A(1) of 
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the Financial Services Board Act of 1990, “the board may impose by notice in the Gazette 
levies on financial institutions and may, subject to the provisions of this section, at any time 
in similar manner amend, substitute or withdraw any such notice”.  
As a result of this, “the FSB imposes a tax on financial institutions without consent, without 
Parliament [and] indeed without any safeguards at all” and as such, unelected bureaucrats are 
placing themselves on the private sector payroll wherein the above problem of constitutional 
democracy is being undermined (Vivian, 2015f:65). Simply put, regulators have high-jacked 
the legislative process in order to impose a tax on the private sector which is not moderated 
by parliament at all (Vivian, 2015a). This most certainly contravenes articles 12, 14 and 15 of 
the historic Magna Carta and in doing so, undermines South Africa’s democratic 
organisation. In particular, the Magna Carta famously notes that no taxation ought to be 
imposed without consent (Vivian, 2015e). In other words, tax cannot be imposed on any 
individual unless Parliament explicitly agrees to it138 (Vivian, 2015e). 
Furthermore, since the FSB is financed by the financial services industry itself, with no 
contributions from the state, a number of the Melamet Commission’s earlier submissions also 
appear to have been disregarded (Ennew & Waite, 2007).  In particular, the Commission 
(1988) pointed out that a national council or board for financial institutions should be funded 
by both government and the private sector. Furthermore, the Commission (1988) had 
specifically noted that salaries paid to the regulatory office should not be borne by the private 
sector.  
The FSB has thus been described as a unitary state within a state since it makes law, 
implements and administers said law, polices and enforces that same law, adjudicates 
disputes through various ombudsmen and tribunals and imposes penalties on the basis of this 
                                                 
138 This matter recently gained attention in the case of Shuttleworth v South African Reserve Bank and others 
2014 ZASCA 157. The SA Reserve Bank had imposed an “exit levy” on all funds leaving South Africa. As a 
consequence, Mr Shuttleworth was required to pay R250 million when he decided to take monies out of South 
Africa, which he did so under protest. Mr Shuttleworth subsequently took the matter to court and on appeal the 
Supreme Court of Appeal declared the “exit levy” to be an unlawful taxation. In particular, although the Magana 
Carta was not referenced, the SCA correctly noted that “a founding principle of Parliamentary democracy is that 
there should be no taxation without representation and that the executive branch of government should not itself 
be entitled to raise revenue but should rather be dependent on the taxing power of Parliament, which is 
democratically accountable to the country’s tax-paying citizens.” 
210 
 
adjudication (Louw, 2015; Vivian, 2015e; Vivian, 2015f). One entity therefore has gained a 
number of draconian powers as the executive, the legislature and the adjudicator and this 
renders Parliament and courts of law almost completely redundant. This is problematic and 
violates both the Magna Carta (articles 29, 38, 39 and 48) and the modern Constitutional 
system (in terms of the separation of powers). In fact, the FSB has often been accused of 
acting in a “one-sided and apparently arrogant manner” and in turn, said regulators have 
frequently been accused of undermining constitutional democracy (Sandrock, 2014).  It 
therefore follows that the modern regulator is returning to the position which was outlawed 
800 years ago and therefore violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers  
(Vivian, 2015e; Vivian, 2015f: 67). Furthermore, one can argue that such a regulatory agency 
is undermining the application of the Lockean framework. 
8.2.9 Long Term Insurance Act 
In January 1987, the long awaited Draft Bill “to consolidate and amend the law relating to 
long term insurance and to provide for matters incidental thereto” was published for comment 
(Benfield, 2013). The Bill contained “far-reaching divergences” from previous legislation and 
indeed, did not echo the deregulation policies synonymous with the government of the day 
(Benfield, 2013:98). In fact, a number of “surprising” and “novel” proposals were included in 
the Bill and as a result of these diversions, the Draft Bill was never given effect (Benfield, 
2013). In particular, the 1987 draft Bill had empowered the Minister of Defence (Magnus 
Malan) to dictate the terms of insurance policies (Benfield, 2014). It was also at this time that 
regulators began to consider the Melamet Commission's (1988) report. In particular, the 
Melamet Commission had commented that   
The present Insurance Act [of 1943] and Regulations afford policy holders and 
the general public protection which is, possibly not as full as is desirable, but 
by appropriate amendments the position can be improved considerably… So 
far as South Africa is concerned an amalgamation of the proposed insurance 
legislation for life and short-term business should not cause the Act to be 
lengthened inordinately. It was contended in evidence that it would be a more 
scientific and legalistic approach to the problems of insurance if the 
organisational and functional aspects and the contracts of insurance aspects 
were dealt with separately in legislation. The Commission supports this 
contention… There should be one Act covering both life and short-term 
insurance dealing with the constitution, control and financial stability of 
insurers and a separate Insurance Contract Act dealing with that aspect of 
insurance. 
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Almost a decade after the first Draft Bill was circulated for comment and the Melamet 
Commission’s recommendations were published, a revised Long Term Insurance Bill was 
submitted. The latter would eventually culminate in the passing of the Long-term Insurance 
Act 52 of 1998139 to provide for the registration of long-term insurers; for the control of 
certain activities of long-term insurers and intermediaries; and for matters connected 
therewith.  
Keeping in line with the objectives of this paper, part VII of the Act sets out a number of 
provisions that attempt to ensure policyholder protection and good business practice. More 
specifically, Sections 44-65 of the Act attempt to regulate both the conduct of long-term 
insurance business operations as well as their prudential affairs in order to safeguard 
policyholders. Most notably, section 45 states that “no person shall provide, or offer to 
provide, directly or indirectly, any valuable consideration as an inducement to a person to 
enter into, continue, vary or cancel a long-term policy”. Furthermore, and consistent with the 
consumer protection objective, section 46 notes that a long-term insurer shall not enter into 
any particular kind of long-term policy unless the statutory actuary is satisfied that the 
premiums, benefits and other values thereof are actuarially sound.  
Section 50(1) of the Act is considered to be “the most controversial provision” and has 
attracted widespread criticism (Benfield, 2013). According to this provision, the Registrar140 
may, after consultation with the Advisory Committee (which no longer operates today) and in 
concurrence with the Minister, declare a particular business practice to be undesirable. Said 
provision has been criticised as the Act provides no further definition of what constitutes 
“desirable” and accordingly, opens the way for possible abuses (Benfield, 2013). Section 62 
of the Act further enables the Registrar to propose rules to ensure that policies are entered 
into, executed and enforced in accordance with sound insurance principles and practices and 
in the interests of the policyholders and in the public interest generally. The 1998 Act further 
encumbers the Registrar of long-term insurance business with other far-reaching 
“discretionary controls” and because of this, the Act is often described as “regulation by 
                                                 
139 Later amended in terms of the Insurance Amendment Act No. 17 of 2003. 
140 According to section 2(2) of the LTIA, the executive officer of the FSB shall be the Registrar of all long-term 
insurance business.  
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inclination” (Benfield, 2013). Examples of the latter are contained in, amongst others, section 
9(2)(a), section 10, section 15 and section 22(1). The provisions contained therein are fleshed 
out as per table 5. 
Section 9(2)(a) of the Act (which sets out the various conditions for the “application for 
registration”) provides that the Registrar may grant an application to carry on long-term 
insurance business on such of the conditions as the Registrar may determine. Accordingly, 
the Registrar is given extensive regulatory discretion to impose any such additional 
conditions as he may personally see fit. Furthermore, the conditions of registration as 
contemplated in section 10 of the Act are all to be “determined by the Registrar” and further 
provide that “different conditions may be determined [by the Registrar] in respect of different 
long-term insurers”.  According to Section 15(3), the Registrar may impose a prohibition or 
determine a limitation and a condition on an insurer if it is in the interests of the 
policyholders of a particular long-term insurer or the long-term insurance industry as a whole 
to do so. Once again, the Registrar, at his inclination, is granted extensive powers to stretch 
the conditions imposed on insurers without any legislative constraint or definitive criteria.  
Moreover, Section 22(1) provides that the Registrar may require a long-term insurer to 
terminate the appointment of a director, managing executive, public officer, auditor or 
statutory actuary of that long-term insurer, if the person or firm concerned is not fit and 
proper to hold the office concerned. However, the Act provides no objective guidelines as to 
how such a determination is to be made and accordingly, the Registrar has extensive power to 
determine who is “fit and proper” to hold office.  
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Table 5: Overview of Part VII (business practice, policies and policyholder protection) 
of the Long-Term Insurance Act 
Section Title Sections Section Section Content 
Business practice 44-50 44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Free choice in certain circumstances 
Prohibition on inducements 
Policy to be actuarially sound 
Receipt for premium paid in cash, and validity of 
policy 
Summary, inspection and copy of policy 
Limitation on remuneration to intermediaries 
Undesirable business practice 
Policies 51-61 51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
 
56 
 
57 
 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Policy suspended until payment of first premium 
Failure to pay premiums 
Option for payment of policy benefits in money 
Limitation on provisions of certain policies 
Limitation on policy benefits in event of death of 
unborn or of certain minors 
Voidness of certain provisions of agreements 
relating to long-term policies 
Life policy in relation to person rendering or liable 
to render military service 
Long-term policies entered into by certain minors 
Misrepresentation and failure to disclose material 
information 
Validity of contracts 
Prescription of certain debt 
Policyholder 
protection 
62-65 62 
63 
64 
65 
Protection of policyholders 
Protection of policy benefits under certain long-
term policies 
Option for realisation of protected policies 
Partial realisation of protected policies 
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8.2.10 Short Term Insurance Act 
At the same time as the Long-term Insurance Act was passed, the Short term Insurance Act 
No 53 of 1998 was enacted which took effect on the 1st of January 1999 and replaced the 
1943 Insurance Act in its entirety141.  Although the Melamet Commission (1988) had 
remarked that the 1943 Insurance Act and Regulations achieved little consumer protection 
and that two separate Acts covering both life and short-term insurance separately would be 
desirable, it appears as if regulators had forgotten about the debate which was had in 1993. 
Furthermore, regulators overlooked Churchill’s legacy in terms of which the insurance 
market as a whole should be regulated by a single piece of legislation. Recall that the Burnard 
scandal in the UK in 1902 was the catalyst for a single and holistic system for the entire 
insurance market, and this saw the passing of the 1909 British Assurance Act. Accordingly, 
regulators most likely forgot about the debate about one piece of legislation versus two pieces 
of legislation and so two Acts were passed simply because it is thought to be a “jolly good 
idea”.   
The Short-term Insurance Act of 1998 endeavours to provide for the registration of short-
term insurers; for the control of certain activities of short-term insurers and intermediaries; 
and for other matters connected therewith. As such, the basic objective of the Short-term 
Insurance Act is to avoid abusive business practices and to ensure that insurers conduct their 
business on sound financial lines so that policyholders can confidently rely upon their 
stability (Visser, Pretorius, Sharrock & Van Jaarsveld, 2003: 487). 
The preamble to both the Long-Term and Short-term Insurance Acts are almost identical, 
however the distinction between long-term insurance and short-term insurance is embodied in 
section 1(1) of each respective act, really for administrative purposes only (Visser et al., 
2003). In fact, prior to the passing of both the Long-Term and Short-Term Insurance Acts, the 
Melamet Commission had noted that  
From a cursory examination of both the draft Acts the Commission gained the 
impression that these are divergent only to a 20 % extent, 80 % of the wording 
                                                 
141 It has been cited that the South African legislature did not adequately engage with history before passing two 
separate pieces of Insurance legislation. Prior to the Bernard scandal in the UK, the British parliament had also 
passed separate insurance legislation. Following the scandal, Cuthbert Heath of Lloyd’s noted that once piece of 
insurance legislation should exist for the industry as a whole. British Prime Minister at the time and son-in-law 
to Heath duly acted and the 1909 Act was subsequently passed. 
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and provisions being identical. It appears to the Commission that there is little 
purpose in having two separate Acts. 
In addition to this, each Act requires the appointment of a Registrar of insurance, which 
according to Benfield and Vivian (2003:276), implies that two separate registrars for the 
short-term industry and the long-term industry should be appointed respectively. However, in 
terms of Section 2(1) and (2) of the Short-term Act, the executive officer and a deputy 
executive officer of the FSB shall be the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar of Short-term 
Insurance, respectively. Similarly, according to Section 2(1) and (2) of the Long-term 
Insurance Act, the Registrar of insurance shall be the executive officer of the FSB, while the 
deputy executive officer of the FSB shall be Registrar of Long-term Insurance. Accordingly, 
the CEO of the FSB is in each case the Registrar. Notwithstanding this, South Africa moved 
away from one piece of insurance legislation and instead, two separate acts were passed, one 
dealing with the long-term insurance industry and the other covering short-term insurance 
business.142 Although there is considerable duplication between the two Acts, the most 
significant provisions of the Short-term Insurance Act, to the extent that they relate to 
policyholder protection and conduct of business, are briefly discussed (and appear in table 6) 
so as to avoid redundancy. 
Similar to Sections 44-65 of the Long-Term Insurance Act, part VII of the Short-Term 
Insurance Act stipulates a number of provisions relating to an insurer’s business practices, the 
issuing of policies and policyholder protection. Section 44 of the Act provides that no person 
shall provide, or offer to provide, directly or indirectly, any valuable consideration as an 
inducement to a person to enter into, continue, vary or cancel a short-term policy. As such, 
inducements are specifically prohibited by the 1998 Act in order to ensure that only products 
which are most suitable for a prospective policyholder are recommended and maintained. 
Section 49 of the Short-term Act further prohibits any undesirable business practices, and like 
Section 50(1) of the Long-term Act stipulates that the Registrar may, after the necessary 
consultation and due process declare a particular business practice to be undesirable. Once 
again however, no clear definition of “undesirable business practices” is given and 
accordingly, such a determination is quite subjective. Policyholder protection is specifically 
addressed in Section 55 of the Short-term Act. In terms of this provision, the Registrar may, 
                                                 
142 At present, South Africa appears to be harmonising insurance legislation within the sector. The Insurance Bill 
is currently in its second draft. 
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after proper consultation, propose, vary or revoke rules that aim to ensure that policies are 
entered into, executed and enforced in accordance with sound insurance principles and public 
interest. 
Table 6: Overview of Part VII (business practice, policies and policyholder protection) 
of the Short-Term Insurance Act 
Section Title Sections Section Section Content 
Business 
practice 
43-48A 43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
48A 
49… 
Free choice in certain circumstances 
Prohibition on inducements 
Collection of Premiums by Intermediaries 
Receipt for premium paid in cash, and validity of 
policy 
Copy of policy and inspection of policy records 
Independent intermediaries remuneration 
Binder agreements 
… 
Policies 50-54 50 
 
51 
 
52 
53 
54 
Limitation on policy benefits in event of death of 
unborn or of certain minors  
Voidness of certain provisions of agreements relating 
to short-term policies 
Short-term policies entered into by certain minors 
Misrepresentation and failure to disclose material 
information 
Validity of contracts 
Policyholder 
protection 
55 55 Protection of policyholders 
 
 
“Regulation by inclination” prevails in the Short-term Insurance Act, since once again, the 
Registrar of insurance is granted a number of discretionary powers. Such flexibility can be 
found in Section 3, Section 4, Section 11, Section 12, Section 34, Section 49, Section 55, 
Section 62 and Section 63 of the Short-Term Insurance Act. 
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8.2.11 Policyholder Protection Rules 
In terms of the aforementioned Long and Short-term Insurance Acts, a number of 
policyholder protection rules were also introduced in 2001 to ensure that consumers are 
provided with sufficient and relevant information to make informed choices and in doing so, 
provide a certain amount of consumer protection. According to Part II of the Short Term 
Insurance Act, the objective of these rules is to ensure that policies are entered into, executed 
and enforced in accordance with sound insurance principles so that they are practiced in the 
interests of consumers and the public in general. Accordingly, such rules apply to ensure that 
the parties involved conduct business fairly and with due care and diligence.  
According to Part III of the Policyholder Protection Rules, a direct marketer must, amongst 
other things: 
• render services honestly, fairly, and with due skill, care and diligence; 
• act honourably, professionally and with due regard to the convenience of the 
policyholder; 
• make representations that are factually correct, provided in plain language, and are not 
misleading; 
• disclose to the policyholder the existence of any circumstance which gives rise to an 
actual or potential conflict of interest and take all reasonable steps to ensure fair 
treatment of the policyholder; and 
• disclose commissions, considerations, fees, charges or brokerages that may be 
payable to the direct marketer (if any) by the policyholder or by any other person. 
In summary, the salient features of the above rules, are therefore to ensure i) that consumers 
have all relevant information in order to make informed decisions and ii) that insurers and 
intermediaries act honestly and fairly, with due care and diligence. The Policyholder 
Protection Rules are accordingly designed to ensure professional market conduct and are 
largely reinforced by a system of disclosure (Charter Life, n.d).  
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8.2.12 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act of 2002 
As mentioned earlier, in 1993, the Ministry of Finance began investigating various 
mechanisms for regulating the business conduct of the financial sector (The Banking 
Association South Africa, 2016). Accordingly, there was greater attention on enhanced 
consumer protection and market conduct regulation. At this time, there was also a greater 
awareness that no formal system existed to regulate financial advisors and intermediaries and 
that products were sold purely for high commission purposes with little regard to the needs 
and wants of the consumer (FAIS Credits and Training, 2012). The latter was therefore the 
impetus for the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Bill which eventually 
culminated in the passing of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act of 
2002 to protect consumers of financial products and services.143  
In view of that, the Act regulates the rendering of certain financial advisory and intermediary 
services to clients. Most surprisingly, however, is that the Act also regulates the activities of 
the actual financial service providers themselves. Accordingly, the financial service industry 
is regulated by its own industry laws in addition to the FAIS Act. The main purpose of the 
Act is to protect consumers of financial products and services by i) regulating the selling and 
advice-giving activities of financial services providers; ii) ensuring that the consumers are 
provided with adequate information about the financial product they use and about the people 
and institutions who sell these financial products in a competent and open manner; and iii) 
establishing a properly regulated financial services profession (Financial Services Board, 
n.d.).  
In order to achieve this, the FAIS Act has introduced a principle-based approach to regulating 
the market conduct of Financial Service Providers (FSP) and intermediaries (National 
Treasury, 2014a). This approach has been supported by various rules and Codes of Conduct 
pertaining to the rendering of advice and/or intermediary services. In particular, the Act 
requires that all FSPs are licenced by the FSB, all representatives of all authorised service 
providers are adequately qualified and that financial services are at all times rendered with 
due skill, care and diligence and are in the interests of clients (The Banking Association 
South Africa, 2016). This is further reinforced by Codes of Conduct which set out minimum 
                                                 
143 After a recommendation by the Nel Commission, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act of 
2002 became effective on 15 November 2002. 
219 
 
disclosure requirements, conflict of interest management requirements, requirements around 
needs analysis and advice and requirements pertaining to record taking (National Treasury, 
2014a:83).  
In particular, although not an exhaustive list, the General Code of Conduct for Authorised 
Financial Services Providers and Representatives144 requires that a provider: 
• render financial services honestly, fairly, with due skill, care and diligence, and in the 
interests of clients and the integrity of the financial services industry; 
• act honourably, professionally and with due regard to the convenience of the client; 
• make representations and provide information to a client that is i) factually correct, ii) 
in plain language, iii) avoids uncertainty or confusion, and iv) is not misleading; 
• disclose to the client the existence of any personal interest, or any circumstance which 
may give rise to an actual or potential conflict of interest in relation to such service, 
and take all reasonable steps to ensure fair treatment of the client; 
• take reasonable steps to seek from the client appropriate and available information 
regarding the client’s financial situation, financial product experience and objectives 
to enable the provider to provide the client with appropriate advice;  
• identify the financial product or products that will be appropriate to the client’s risk 
profile and financial needs; and 
• provide a reasonable and appropriate general explanation of the nature and material 
terms of the relevant contract or transaction to a client, and generally make full and 
frank disclosure of any information that would reasonably be expected to enable the 
client to make an informed decision. 
The FAIS Act alone could not itself guarantee adequate consumer protection and 
accordingly, the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act of 2004 was subsequently passed 
which provided for the establishment of a FAIS Ombud. Aggrieved clients historically had 
                                                 
144 The General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and Representatives was 
published under Board Notice 80 of 2003. 
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very little recourse against dishonest advisors and those who felt that they have received poor 
advice had to seek remedy through the formal, costly and often time consuming formal court 
system (FAIS Credits and Training, 2012). The FAIS Ombud therefore plays an integral part 
in the broader consumer protection objectives by resolving consumer disputes relating to the 
rendering of financial services in an efficient and affordable manner145 (Financial Services 
Board, n.d.). Furthermore, consumers may also seek redress if they have been 
unprofessionally or recklessly treated by a financial advisor or provider (National Treasury, 
2014a). In terms of the Financial Ombud Schemes Act, the FAIS Ombud has the power to act 
as the Statutory Ombud and can adjudicate a complaint through mediation or conciliation, 
can issue a binding determination and may order the payment of monetary awards, damages 
and costs (Financial Services Board, 2010). 
The FAIS legislation, its various regulations and Codes of Conduct have all had a strong 
emphasis on consumer protection by ensuring that individuals who give advice in a 
professional capacity are subject to various rules. Despite these endeavours however, the 
FAIS regulatory framework has attracted widespread criticism as concerns remain about poor 
customer outcomes, since it has been argued that practices of inappropriate advice and 
product mis-selling continue (National Treasury, 2014a: 54). As part of the broader customer 
protection objectives, the FSB has therefore undertaken the Retail Distribution Review 
(RDR) to be discussed in section 8.3.4.   
8.2.13 Enquiry on Consumer Credit Insurance in South Africa (Nienaber Enquiry) 
In 2007, a Panel of Enquiry was established to investigate the alleged abuses in the Consumer 
Credit Insurance (CCI) market (National Treasury, 2014b). In particular, this followed media 
allegations that some insurers, active in the CCI market, were persistently contravening 
commission regulations and paying commissions in excess of the permissible maximum rates 
(Report by the Panel of Enquiry on Consumer Credit Insurance in South Africa, 2008). Since 
CCI could be written on either a short term or long term basis, the Life Offices’ Association 
(representing long-term insurers) and the South African Insurance Association (representing 
short term insurers) together coordinated an investigation to “identify and eradicate 
undesirable practices prevalent in the consumer credit insurance market impacting negatively 
on consumers” (Joint Media Release of the LOA and SAIA, 2008).  
                                                 
145 The FAIS Ombud deals only with disputes having arisen after 1 October 2004. 
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The Panel of Enquiry on Consumer Credit Insurance in South Africa (hereon referred to as 
the Nienaber Panel) was tasked with reviewing the CCI market structure, assessing the 
existing policy and regulatory framework for the sector and proposing recommendations to 
reform the policy framework in order to regulate the CCI industry more effectively (National 
Treasury, 2014b). The panel was therefore mandated to undertake an investigation to identify 
and eradicate undesirable practices prevalent in the CCI market that potentially impacted 
negatively on consumers. In doing so, the panel made a number of findings and 
recommendations in terms of its Report (2008). These findings and recommendations are set 
out below. 
In terms of market conduct issues, the panel concluded that although there are various and 
adequate market conduct legislative requirements in place, this does not necessarily ensure 
that said requirements are complied with by industry players. More specifically, the panel 
identified the STIA of 1998, the LTIA of 1998, the FAIS Act of 2000, the FAIS General 
Code of Conduct, various Policyholder Protection Rules and in particular, the National Credit 
Act 35 of 2005, as all having provisions which endeavour to regulate market conduct risks. 
Although these provisions exist, and although the panel acknowledged that insurers try to 
comply with these provisions, the panel pointed out that in practice, compliance is not always 
guaranteed. As such, poor market conduct practices remain.  
The panel noted that among these poor market practices was i) the lack of proper disclosure, 
ii) the pre-sale mis-selling by intermediaries, iii) the lack of awareness by consumers that 
they have in fact signed up for CCI, iv) the fact that CCI policies are often forced upon 
consumers, v) the failure of intermediaries to explain the limitations and exclusions of cover 
and vi) the potential conflicts of interest that may exist in the market. As a result of this, the 
panel recommended proper disclosure structures be affected in order to allow consumers to 
make informed decisions and which should be properly monitored and enforced to ensure 
compliance. The panel noted that although the Life Offices’ Association and the South 
African Insurance Association should establish a composite and permanent standing 
subcommittee to deal specifically with CCI, the National Credit Regulator would be better 
placed and best suited to enforce such market conduct regulation. 
Regarding intermediary remuneration, the panel concluded that the provisions contained in 
the STIA of 1998 and in the LTIA of 1998 which relate to intermediary remuneration were 
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particularly complex and unclear. In particular, the panel noted that a CCI policy could be 
issued by an insurer under either a long-term or a short-term licence. This resulted in a 
discrepancy since the LTIA of 1998 regulates the intermediary remuneration specifically in 
the case of a credit scheme whereas the STIA of 1998 has no corresponding provision.  
Furthermore, the general rates payable under the STIA of 1998 are different to the rates 
payable under the LTIA. The disparate commission structures set out in the two Acts had thus 
resulted in confusion and various anomalies which had caused a “commission arbitrage”. The 
panel therefore recommended that the provisions of both Acts, insofar as they relate to 
intermediary remuneration, should be reviewed and revised in order to ensure clarity.  
Of particular significance however, was the panel’s view on the regulation of commissions 
paid by an insurer to an intermediary for procuring business. The latter is also known as an 
introduction fee. The panel’s view on this point was far less clear as panel members were 
divided on the issue. On the one hand, various panel members advocated deregulation of the 
introduction fee in its entirety. The basis upon which this view was advocated was that 
market forces will ultimately determine the level of the premiums and the amount of 
remuneration payable to intermediaries. Therefore, any commission regulation would be anti-
competitive.  
Contrary to this, advocates of commission regulation pointed out that the deregulation of 
commission payments would cause an increase in premiums, the cost of which is ultimately 
borne by consumers and accordingly, this would be to their detriment.  As such, members of 
the panel who were in favour of maintaining a maximum cap on commissions, believed that it 
is the only effective means of “foiling a recognised mischief, namely, the payment by 
insurers to intermediaries of improper incentives”. Since members of the panel had 
conflicting views, collectively the panel eventually conceded that the level at which 
commission payments ought to be capped, should be determined by various regulators in 
conjunction with both industry and intermediary representatives. The panel therefore noted 
that the issue of regulation or deregulation would be better determined by way of discussions 
between the industry and various regulators. 
Subsequent to the panel’s recommendations, a number of regulatory initiatives have ensued. 
The most notable regulatory response to the panel’s recommendations has been the 
implementation of the Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) framework. In addition to this, and in 
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support of the TCF framework, the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) intends to review the 
intermediary services landscape in South Africa in order to promote appropriate, affordable 
and fair advice to policyholders (National Treasury, 2014b: 51). This project is also being 
supported by the “enhanced future market conduct regulation mandate of the FSB” in terms 
of the Twin Peaks regulatory model (National Treasury, 2014b: 51). A discussion of the 
aforementioned developments is set out in forthcoming sections. 
8.2.14 Consumer Protection Act No 68 of 2008 
Over the years, South Africa’s regulatory framework for market conduct and consumer 
protection has been reinforced and strengthened by a number of consumer protection laws, 
one of which includes the Consumer Protection Act of 2008 (CPA) (National Treasury, 
2011).146 The CPA was enacted as it was thought that preceding consumer protection laws in 
South Africa were outdated, fragmented, and uncomprehensive and founded on principles 
that were contrary to the democratic system (Stoop, 2015:211). The Act therefore provides an 
overarching framework for consumer protection and sets out the minimum requirements to 
ensure adequate consumer protection in South Africa (The South African Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, 2015). Accordingly, where insurance services and instruments are 
excluded from the scope of the other insurance Acts, the CPA will apply first and foremost 
(Kuschke, 2011:770). Furthermore, where other sectoral laws relating to conduct of business 
and consumer protection apply, these will need to be read in conjunction with the CPA in 
order to ensure a consistent standard of consumer protection (The South African Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, 2015). 
According to the Act, such consumer protection legislation is necessary to: 
• promote a fair, accessible and sustainable marketplace for consumer products and 
services; 
• promote and protect the economic interests of consumers; 
• establish national norms and standards relating to consumer protection 
                                                 
146 Various other consumer protection laws have also strengthened consumer protection regulation in South 
Africa. These include the Financial Services Ombuds Schemes Act of 2004, the National Credit Act of 2005 and 
the Financial Markets Act No 19 of 2012 (FMA). 
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• provide for improved standards of consumer information so that consumers are able to 
‘make informed choices according to their individual wishes and needs’; 
• prohibit certain unfair marketing and business practices; 
• promote responsible consumer behaviour; and 
• develop effective means of redress for consumers. 
The Act attempts to achieve the aforementioned objectives by providing a legal framework to 
i) maintain a fair and efficient marketplace for consumers; ii) promote fair business practices 
and; iii) protect consumers against unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, improper and unjust 
trade practices and against fraudulent, misleading, deceptive and unfair conduct (Van 
Huyssteen, Van der Merwe, Maxwell, 2010: 117). The Act provides such a framework in 
terms of various sections that specifically identify various consumer rights. In particular, the 
Act emphasises that the most important consumer rights are: the right to equality, the right to 
choose, the right to privacy, the right to disclosure and information, the right to fair and 
responsible marketing, the right to fair and honest dealing, the right to fair, just and 
reasosnale terms and condisions and the right to fair value, good quality and safety. By 
ensuring that each of these rights is not violated, adequate consumer protection will be 
achieved.  
8.3 Current regulatory developments in South Africa  
As mentioned earlier, the ideal regulatory philosophy is first to identify a specific market 
problem and then to import regulatory measures to address these issues. However, upon 
examination of the international market and specifically the South African insurance market, 
it has been argued that modern regulatory reform is falling short of this ideal. In other words, 
modern regulatory developments are no longer addressing specific market imperfections but 
rather are merely “rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic” (Vivian, 2015a). That is, the 
regulatory environment is simply been reorganised and rearranged and further, no rules-based 
legislation is being implemented as a problem solving tool in response to a market failure or 
problem. What transpires rather is the creation of Centralised Bureaucratic Regulators 
(Vivian, 2015a). It has been argued that the National Treasury is seeking to “rearrange the 
deck chairs on the Titanic” as it calls for a greater regulatory oversight in response to 
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perceived, yet arguably unfounded, shortcomings in the regulatory structure pertaining to the 
insurance market. The journey to the Twin Peaks is evidence of this.  
As noted earlier, “protecting customers and ensuring they are treated fairly by financial 
institutions is the essence of market conduct policy and law” (National Treasury, 2014a: 6). 
Government has gradually been taking steps to transform the regulatory structures that 
govern the financial sector so as to be in line with the objectives stated above. In particular, 
Government’s appetite for greater market conduct regulatory oversight has been witnessed as 
it takes steps toward establishing a dedicated market conduct regulator (National Treasury, 
2014a). This has been in response to both retail-banking problems and in an effort to follow 
global trends.  
National Treasury (2014a) has presented parliament with a number of reasons as to why a 
more complex regulatory regime is needed for the financial sector in general. As already 
mentioned above but worth emphasising again, is the fact that this has not been in response to 
a specific insurance market event but rather in response to perceived malpractices in the 
market. Furthermore, the impetus for regulatory reform is largely owing to banking sector 
problems; not insurance industry problems.  
National Treasury has presented a hypothetical case scenario (based on “Thandi”) in order to 
justify the need for enhanced regulation of the insurance market. Although no real-world or 
practical examples have been presented, the National Treasury has alluded to a number of 
problems in the insurance market, some of which include: i) complex policy provisions, ii) 
misrepresentation of products and iii) the repudiation of valid claims by insurers (Vivian, 
2015d). As such, the National Treasury (2014a) has indicated that consumer mistreatment is 
the basis for a tighter regulatory regime. 
There is however, no evidence that the consumer experiences any mistreatment at the hands 
of insurers.  The short-term industry can be referred to as an example.  About 30 years ago 
the industry set up a voluntary ombudsman scheme to provide independent, inexpensive and 
efficient dispute resolution (Millard, 2014). In the event that any personal lines customer felt 
that their claim had been incorrectly dealt with, the claim could be referred to the ombudsman 
and the industry would abide by the decision of the ombudsman. The 2015 annual report of 
the Office of the Short term Ombudsman indicates that the industry had received 2 980 000 
claims.  Of these, 9119 were referred to the ombudsman. Expressed differently, 0.3 per cent 
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of the total claims received by the industry were referred to the ombudsman.  Of the 9119, 
2 487 received some benefit from the ombudsman. This translates to 0.08 per cent of claims.  
All cases where the ombudsman felt that the consumer should receive benefits were settled 
by the insurer.  This has been the pattern since the ombudsman scheme was introduced.  Thus 
it can be said that there is no known case where a consumer has been treated unfairly.  The 
ombudsman system was designed in an attempt to prevent this from happening.147   
Vivian (2015d) further argues that a number of mechanisms and institutions already exist in 
the market to address the problems noted above. These include the Plain Language Institute, 
the Advertising Standards Authority, the Financial Services Board’s ombud and various other 
policyholder protection rules as discussed above. Accordingly, existing laws, regulations and 
regulatory agencies are equipped to deal with these potential issues. Nonetheless, although no 
insurance market event has specifically been identified, Government has maintained its call 
for enhanced regulation and has issued the National Treasury Policy Document148 which sets 
out a number of proposals to strengthen the financial regulatory system (Botha, 2011). 
Government has also maintained that a better customer experience in a financial market 
promotes a stronger financial sector which in turn, results in stronger economic participation 
and growth (National Treasury, 2011). Accordingly, a well regulated market that promotes 
consumer confidence in the market and thereby encourages consumer participation in the 
market is necessary to achieve broader economic objectives. Government has therefore 
endeavoured and continues to endeavour to strengthen market conduct regulation in the 
financial sector in general. In doing so Government has had a greater focus on implementing 
market conduct initiatives and programmes that minimise the potential for customer abuse.  
Government’s desire to establish a market conduct regulator has also been part of their 
attempts to implement the Twin Peaks model of regulation which is said to be formally 
implemented should the Financial Sector Regulation (FSR) Bill be assented to.  Following 
the 1993 Melamet Commission, South Africa originally opted for a single regulator of the 
financial services sector. It made the same decision in the early 2000s when once again the 
idea of two different centralised regulators arose (National Treasury, 2011). However, 
                                                 
147 The number of investment linked complaints received by the ombudsman may warrant the need for a more 
complex regulatory system; however it would be unsuitable to include the insurance market in such an 
assessment.  
148 Issued in February 2011. 
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following the global financial crisis however, there has been a global shift away from the 
single regulator approach towards the Twin Peak regulatory model, which South Africa also 
intends to adopt. The implementation of the Twin Peaks regulatory system provides 
regulators with an opportunity to “modernise” the current market conduct regulatory 
framework (Nation Treasury, 2014). Notwithstanding this, a greater emphasis on market 
conduct regulation has been on the Government’s agenda long before its decision to 
implement the Twin Peaks system of regulation. These developments are set out below.  
8.3.1 Competition Commission Banking Enquiry Panel (Jali Enquiry) 
In 2008, the ‘Jali Enquiry’, appointed by the Competition Commission, investigated a range 
of public concerns including high bank charges, the market power of the four biggest banks, 
access to financial services, and whether banks had contravened the Competition Act (du 
Preez, 2014). The panel subsequently made 28 recommendations, falling into five categories; 
three of which specifically addressed market conduct issues (BusinessDay, 2012). In 
particular, the Banking Enquiry Report to the Competition Commissioner (2008: 6) 
highlighted the “poor treatment of customers in the retail-banking sector” 149 since “there was 
an absence of market conduct regulation throughout the banking industry”. The Enquiry had 
thus identified a major gap in the market conduct regulatory regime of the retail banking 
sector which meant that banking customers were exposed to the risk of unfair treatment (du 
Preez, 2014). The National Treasury (2011) therefore strongly advocated the establishment of 
a dedicated banking services market conduct regulator within the FSB who would be 
responsible for regulating all market conduct issues pertaining to the retail banking sector. 
Accordingly, Government’s appetite to transform the financial sector by establishing a 
dedicated market conduct regulator was first given impetus by the work of the Jali Enquiry. 
The journey continued therefrom. 
                                                 
149 As mentioned before, it has been various problems in the banking and investment sector that has called for 
such regulatory reform and not insurance problems. Notwithstanding this, the regulatory developments taking 
place in South Africa are affecting the insurance industry in its entirety. 
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8.3.2 Treating Customers Fairly 
In 2011 FSB began implementing its Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) approach to 
supervision after publishing the TCF Discussion Document in April 2010.150 This was the 
FSB’s endeavour to pursue a TCF programme similar to that which had been implemented in 
the UK (Financial Services Board, 2010).151 The FSB (2011) noted that amongst other things, 
the asymmetry of information that exists between a retail financial services consumer and a 
financial institution often means that a consumer is vulnerable to unfair treatment. The FSB 
also argued that this problem is exacerbated by low levels of basic and financial literacy in 
South Africa which in turn, increases the risk of consumer exploitation (2011). Accordingly, 
the FSB pointed out that greater consumer protection was warranted.  
The FSB’s vision therefore was to create a market conduct framework that will ensure that 
customer needs are appropriately met through a sustainable industry by i) improving 
customer confidence in the market, ii) ensuring that appropriate products and services are 
supplied and, iii) enhancing transparency and discipline in the industry (2011: 7). The latter 
was to be achieved through the TCF approach. 
The TCF programme is therefore a regulatory initiative in terms of which firms are required 
to consider their treatment of customers at all stages of the product life-cycle (Financial 
Services Board, 2011). This includes the design, marketing, advice, point-of-sale and after-
sale stages of any product (Financial Services Board, 2011). The approach is to focus on the 
six outcomes that underpin the TCF programme: 
• Outcome 1: Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with firms where the 
fair treatment of customers is central to the corporate culture.  
• Outcome 2: Products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are designed 
to meet the needs of identified consumer groups and are targeted accordingly.  
                                                 
150 The FSA however first began studying the TCF programme in 2000, published its first paper on the TCF 
programme in 2001, and officially launched the programme in 2005 (FSB, 2010). It therefore follows, that the 
FSB had long eyed the UK’s TCF programme.  
151 The FSB’s Market Conduct Strategy (MCS) Unit is responsible for facilitating the implementation of market 
conduct regulatory and supervisory frameworks for the FSB including the TCF programme. 
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• Outcome 3: Consumers are provided with clear information and are kept 
appropriately informed before, during and after the point of sale.  
• Outcome 4: Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable and takes account 
of their circumstances.  
• Outcome 5: Consumers are provided with products that perform as firms have led 
them to expect, and the associated service is both of an acceptable standard and what 
they have been led to expect.  
• Outcome 6: Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers to changing 
product, switching provider, submitting a claim or making a complaint. 
There has been no specific single "launch date" planned for TCF implementation. Instead, the 
FSB has adopted an incremental approach to applying the TCF framework (Financial 
Services Board, 2013). Furthermore, and as will be discussed below, there will be a specific 
inclusion of TCF principles into the potential future, new and over-arching legislation to be 
introduced with the adoption of the Twin Peaks regulatory model (Financial Services Board, 
2013). Although existing legislative and regulatory frameworks already require the 
application of TCF principles (one such example being the FAIS Act of 2002)152 the 
regulatory reform to come will see TCF principles explicitly appearing in legislation. 
8.3.3 Twin Peaks 
In February 2011, the National Treasury published a policy document entitled “A safer 
financial sector to serve South Africa better” in terms of which it proposed various 
mechanisms to strengthen the financial sector regulatory system. The National Treasury 
(2011) noted that inadequate financial sector regulation, or “light touch” regulation had 
resulted in the proliferation of products such as subprime mortgages which ultimately caused 
the crisis. As such, the National Treasury (2011) maintained that a system of self-regulation 
                                                 
152 In particular, section 16(1)(b) of the 2002 Act states that financial services providers "must act with 
circumspection and treat clients fairly in a situation of conflicting interests". Further examples can be found in 
the Act where numerous provisions and requirements specifically provide for such outcomes. Accordingly, it 
can be argued that TCF principles are not new but rather have been applied for more than a decade following the 
passing of the FAIS Act in 2002. (See Millard & Maholo, 2016). 
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had lost credibility and that government was now forced to reconsider their approach to 
financial sector regulation.  
The policy document further highlighted the various market conduct malpractices which may 
have contributed to the crisis and went further to emphasise the role of market conduct 
regulation in complementing prudential regulation objectives. National Treasury (2011) thus 
proposed a number of improvements which seek to strengthen both the market conduct and 
prudential regulation of the financial regulatory system in South Africa. These reforms are 
guided by the following principles: 
• Principle 1: Financial service providers must be appropriately licenced or regulated.  
• Principle 2: There should be a transparent approach to regulation and supervision.  
• Principle 3: The quality of supervision must be sufficiently intense, intrusive and 
effective.  
• Principle 4: Policy and legislation are set by government and the legislature, 
providing the operational framework for regulators.  
• Principle 5a: Regulators must operate objectively with integrity and be operationally 
independent, but must also be accountable for their actions and performance.  
• Principle 5b: Governance arrangements for regulators and standard-setters must be 
reviewed, so that boards perform only governance functions. 
• Principle 6: Regulations should be of universal applicability and comprehensive in 
scope in order to reduce regulatory arbitrage.  
• Principle 7: The legislative framework should allow for a lead regulator for every 
financial institution that is regulated by a multiple set of financial regulators.  
• Principle 8: Relevant ministers must ensure that the legislation they administer 
promotes coordination and reduces the scope for arbitrage.  
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• Principle 9: The regulatory framework must include responsibility for macro 
prudential supervision.  
• Principle 10: Special mechanisms are needed to deal with systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs). 
• Principle 11: Market conduct oversight must be sufficiently strong to complement 
prudential regulation, particularly in the banking sector.  
• Principle 12: Financial integrity oversight should be effective to promote confidence 
in the system.  
• Principle 13: Regulators should be appropriately funded to enable them to function 
effectively.  
• Principle 14: Financial regulators require emergency-type powers to deal with a 
systemic financial crisis, requiring strong and overriding legislative powers.  
• Principle 15: All the above principles are reflected in international standards like 
Basel III and standards set by the International Association of Industry Supervisors 
(IAIS) and International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO). To the 
extent that there are any contradictions or inconsistencies in the above principles, the 
international standards will apply.  
Given the policy’s priority to strengthen both prudential and market conduct regulation153, 
South Africa is moving toward the Twin Peaks regulatory model which recognises that 
financial soundness and TCF objectives are better achieved by two separate regulators 
                                                 
153 This appears to be somewhat counter-intuitive since the very same policy document acknowledges that the 
South African financial sector did not experience significant financial upheaval as a result of strong policies. 
Although South Africa has sound macroeconomic fundamentals, National Treasury (2011) notes that over one 
million jobs were lost in South Africa and as such, government has a renewed focus on maintaining financial 
stability, strengthening consumer protection and ensuring that financial services are appropriate, accessible and 
affordable. Furthermore, National Treasury (2011) maintained that prior to the financial crisis, regulatory reform 
was already on the agenda because of the existence of a number of “market failures” in the financial services 
sector. National Treasury (2011) maintained that these market failures stemmed largely from the presence of 
asymmetric information between consumers and firms. 
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(National Treasury, 2014a). This transition will therefore most likely see the passing of the 
FSR Bill (to become the Financial Sector Regulation Act) which will create the Financial 
Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) as the new market conduct regulator and the Prudential 
Authority (PA)154 (within the South African Reserve Bank) which will take on the role of 
macro prudential regulator (National Treasury, 2014a). The FSCA will therefore become the 
dedicated regulator for market conduct in the financial services sector to ensure that good 
customer outcomes are delivered155 (National Treasury, 2014a). It therefore follows that the 
current FSB will be dissolved and replaced with the FSCA.  
The FSR Bill provides “extensive, flexible, and where necessary intrusive powers” to the 
FSCA and sets out various objectives for the FSCA (National Treasury, 2014a:25). These 
objectives include: 
• Fair treatment of financial customers 
• Efficiency and integrity of the financial system 
• Financial literacy and capability 
The FSR Bill further provides that the FSCA may set conduct standards for firms in order to 
promote the objectives stated above and these standards are to be consolidated into a single 
and comprehensive handbook (National Treasury, 2014a). The latter is similar to that which 
has been published in the UK. The TCF approach, as discussed above, continues to support 
government’s market conduct strategies and accordingly will remain an important foundation 
for the new FSCA (National Treasury, 2014a). 
The implementation of the Twin Peaks model and the subsequent strengthening of market 
conduct policy frameworks will most likely see a reform of the South African financial 
                                                 
154 The PA will be responsible for ensuring that a firm has sufficient capital to meet future obligations (claims). 
155 The FSCA will need to work closely with other consumer protection watchdogs to ensure that market 
conduct problems are identified quickly and that necessary interventions are implemented timeously. Such 
bodies include the relevant ombuds, the National Credit Regulator, the Competition Commission and the 
National Consumer Commission. Furthermore, regulatory coordination between the SARB and the FSCA will 
be achieved through two committees including the Financial Stability Oversight Committee which will 
coordinate financial stability issues and the Council of Financial Regulators which will coordinate market 
conduct regulatory efforts. 
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services legal landscape. This includes revising and consolidating various regulatory and 
supervisory components. That is, a key feature of the reform is a proposed Conduct of 
Financial Institutions (CoFI) Act which will potentially consolidate all existing sector laws on 
conduct of business into a single piece of legislation (National Treasury, 2014a). More 
specifically, current market conduct laws and provisions156 will be repealed and replaced 
with an overarching piece of conduct legislation.157   
Such reform will come at a cost and the cost of such regulation will most likely be borne by 
the consumers of the product and not by the taxpayer (Vivian, 2015b). In fact, Vivian, 
MacGregor and van Vuuren (2016d) note that the Twin Peak system will cost the public 
approximately R6 billion per annum. The question then arises as to whether or not the public 
will derive any benefit from this cost; is this legislation in the public interest? A Socio-
Economic Impact Assessment (SEIA) of the Bill notes that the system will produce “a stable 
and more inclusive financial sector” (National Treasury, 2016: 2). The need for stability 
specifically refers to the 2008 world banking crisis, as noted above (National Treasury, 
2016). To begin with, the banking crisis, as the name suggests, refers to a banking problem 
and not an insurance one. It therefore follows that the system will produce no benefit to the 
insurance industry since the existing system has produced a stable short term insurance 
market already (Vivian et al., 2016d). Furthermore, and as discussed above, no evidence 
exists which suggests that the short term insurance market is not treating its customers fairly. 
One can therefore argue that consumers will not benefit from a more stringent market 
conduct watchdog.  
In addition to this, the banking crisis originated in other countries and it therefore appears 
illogical to suggest that a South African system will prevent another, potential, overseas 
problem. The R6 billion per annum cost of the Twin Peaks system is thus a deadweight cost 
as insurance consumers will get little benefit for their contributions. On this basis, the 
justification for Twin Peaks does not appear to be in line with public interest theory, a 
principle which has received much acclaim following Stigler’s (1971) seminal work, as 
                                                 
156 These include, amongst others, the Long Term Insurance Act of 1998, the Short Term Insurance Act of 1998, 
the Pension Funds Act of 1956, the Friendly Societies Act of 1956 and the Financial Advisors and 
Intermediaries Act of 2002. 
157 However, it is anticipated that the National Credit Act will operate alongside this single piece of conduct 
legislation. 
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mentioned above. This regulatory development may therefore be better explained by capture 
theory or perhaps more appropriately, by the theory of public choice; bureaucrats and 
regulators appear to be demanding this legislation and regulation for their own benefit. 
In addition to the cost of such regulation, upon reflection on the impact results witnessed in 
various other countries, a number of other adverse outcomes may ensue as a result of tighter 
regulation. These may manifest in South Africa if the Twin Peaks model is adopted and 
include: 
i) The destruction of innovation 
ii) The creation of standardised products which are expensive 
iii) The marginalisation and prejudice of consumers at lower ends of the market as a 
result of increasing costs 
It appears that South Africa is aiming to fit the UK model of regulation into a framework 
with the different circumstances of a developing country which should rather encourage 
entrepreneurs and not stifle innovation (Cranston, 2015). Stifled innovation is always an 
unintended consequence of greater regulation (Cranston, 2015).  
Winston Churchill said “the farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to 
see”. It appears however as if South Africa may be ignoring the historical developments that 
have taken place internationally, specifically within the UK. In particular, the South African 
regulatory system intends to place the prudential regulation of the entire financial market 
under the auspices of the SARB when the very same system failed in the UK.  Market 
conduct and prudential regulation should therefore operate together, since both regulatory 
systems are not mutually exclusive (Vivian, 2015c). Legislatively, this appears to work better 
than a complex and fragmented system.  The latter is supported by the fact that between 1906 
(when the Life Assurance Act was passed) and 1986 (when the Financial Services Act was 
passed), the insurance market was holistically regulated which worked particularly well. This 
also conforms to Nobel Laureate Jan Tinbergen’s philosophy that one policy should be 
implemented in terms of one instrument and thus the two regulatory peaks should not be 
separated (Vivian, 2015c). South Africa should therefore maintain Churchill’s legacy of a 
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single, integrated and holistic system for each industry, as it has done since 1923. The history 
books bear testament to the success of such a system. 
It is anticipated that the draft legislation and market conduct policy framework will be 
submitted to Cabinet for approval and tabling to Parliament in 2016 with possible 
implementation to follow in 2017 (National Treasury, 2014a).  
8.3.4 Retail Distribution Review 
Although the FAIS Act has introduced a number of provisions to improve intermediary 
professionalism and disclosure requirements, concerns remain as it is alleged that practices of 
mis-selling and inappropriate advice continue (National Treasury, 2014a). In particular, the 
FSB has noted that it still has significant concerns that customers are being sold inappropriate 
products that do not meet their needs and that there is a large degree of sales bias since some 
intermediaries are tied to a specific provider (KPMG, 2015). More specifically, it has been 
cited that where an intermediary provides advice to policyholders but is paid a commission 
by the insurer, this may affect the financial advisor’s incentives to act independently and in 
the interests of the prospective client (National Treasury, 2011). Furthermore, the practice of 
“churning” by intermediaries has been identified by the FSB as a particular concern that 
warrants further reform.158 As a result of this, the FSB has undertaken the Retail Distribution 
Review (RDR) which forms part of the broader TCF objectives as detailed above.  
It has also been suggested that the FSB has eyed out this distribution model review in order to 
follow international developments and as such, concerns regarding market conduct issues 
arising from distribution and advice in the financial services sector are not unique to South 
Africa (Financial Services Board, 2014). South Africa has specifically ogled a number of 
developments that have taken place in the UK. It is therefore not surprising that such a review 
is underway since the UK undertook its own distribution review back in 2012. 
In November 2014, the FSB published a discussion document which proposed a number of 
reforms to the current regulatory framework. In fact, a total of 55 proposals were released to 
be rolled out in three phases and which would endeavour to support fair customer outcomes 
                                                 
158 Churning refers to the practice whereby financial advisors advise consumers with existing insurance cover to 
change insurance company (often to the detriment of the consumer) in order to earn a new commission all over 
again. 
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(Financial Services Board, 2015). The sheer numbers of proposals have attracted widespread 
commentary and criticism and one can describe the vast number of proposals as being 
unworkable and lacking in focus. A discussion of each proposal is superfluous to this 
research report, however the proposals are centred on three core issues, including: i) the types 
of services provided by intermediaries, ii) the relationships between product suppliers and 
intermediaries and the sharing of responsibilities between the two, and iii) intermediary 
remuneration models. Table 7 elaborates on the three core issues identified above. 
The RDR and the potential regulations to flow from it therefore aim to improve the ways in 
which products are sold, the manner in which advice is given to consumers and the means 
through which intermediaries are remunerated in order to ensure that products are distributed 
in ways that support TCF outcomes (National Treasury, 2014a:54).  
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Table 7: Summary of the RDR proposals 
Proposals relating to 
the types of services 
provided by 
intermediaries 
Services provided by an intermediary include: 
• Financial planning 
• Upfront product advice 
• Ongoing product advice 
• Sales execution 
• Ongoing maintenance and servicing of product 
(post sales servicing) 
• Premium collection 
• Referrals 
Proposals 
A-J 
Proposals relating to 
the relationships 
between product 
suppliers and 
intermediaries 
 
A customer should understand in what capacity the 
intermediary is acting, in order to evaluate the advice 
given and what potential incentives the intermediary 
may have to provide such advice. An intermediary 
providing such advice or financial planning may only 
do so in one of the following three capacities: 
• Independent financial adviser (‘IFA’)  
• Multi-tied financial adviser  
• Tied financial adviser 
Proposals 
K-GG 
Proposals relating to 
intermediary 
remuneration 
The remuneration of intermediaries should, amongst 
others, meet the following criteria:  
• Should not contribute to conflicts of interest  
• Should be reasonable and commensurate with 
the actual services rendered 
• Cannot be paid twice for same service  
• Must be motivated, disclosed and explicitly 
agreed to by customer, and should be readily 
comparable   
Proposals 
HH-CCC 
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In particular, the RDR seeks to ensure that distribution models (Financial Services Board, 
2014):  
• Support the delivery of suitable products and provide fair access to suitable advice for 
financial customers;  
• Enable customers to understand and compare the nature, value and cost of advice and 
other services intermediaries provide; 
• Enhance standards of professionalism in financial advice and intermediary services to 
build consumer confidence and trust; 
• Enable customers and distributors to benefit from fair competition for quality advice 
and intermediary services, at a price more closely aligned with the nature and quality 
of the service, and; 
• Support sustainable business models for financial advice that enables adviser 
businesses to viably deliver fair customer outcomes over the long term.  
One of the most significant developments to flow from the RDR is the potential banning of 
commission payments to intermediaries. As discussed above, the FSB has cited the potential 
conflicts of interest inherent in the current commission model as the impetus for reform. It 
was noted in the FSB’s discussion document (2014) that the tripartite legal relationship 
between the insurer, the intermediary and the prospective client is vulnerable to potential 
conflicts of interest. In particular, the temptation to provide biased product advice, if the 
intermediary is offered better remuneration by one product supplier or in respect of one 
product type rather than another, means that the commission led bias can undermine the 
quality of the advice offered (Financial Services Board, 2014: 21).   
In order to avoid these potential conflicts of interest in terms of the advice rendered, the RDR 
proposes that the remuneration that an intermediary receives for providing advice should not 
be influenced by the product supplier. As a consequence of this, intermediaries should not 
receive a commission from the insurer but should rather receive a fee that has been agreed 
between the intermediary and the prospective client (Financial Services Board, 2015). 
Intermediaries should therefore remain “product neutral” and advise only those products that 
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meet the needs of the consumer irrespective of the product supplier-intermediary relationship 
(Financial Services Board, 2014).  
It has also been suggested that the banning of commission payments may address the mis-
selling of products where commission payments are based on a percentage of the premium 
payable. In particular, it has been argued that such commission structures create perverse 
incentives for intermediaries to recommend products with the highest premiums or with 
unrealistic premium escalations (Financial Services Board, 2014). The commission payable 
therefrom is often not commensurate with the actual cost of the service provided by the 
intermediary and in many cases, is proportionally too high. The banning of commission 
payments therefore ensures that suitable advice is provided at a price that is more closely 
aligned with the nature and quality of the service provided (Financial Services Board, 2014). 
As mentioned above, the implementation of RDR proposals is set to take place in three 
staggered phases. To begin with, the implementation of ‘phase 1 proposals’ was envisioned 
to take place between the close of the period for comment on the RDR (March 2015) and the 
effective date of the FSR Act (Financial Services Board, 2015). The effective date of the FSR 
Act was anticipated to take place in late 2015 as Cabinet approved the Bill in November 2015 
(National Treasury and Financial Services Board, 2016). However this timing has shifted as a 
revised version of the FSR Bill was tabled in Parliament in October 2015 (National Treasury, 
2015). The Bill is expected to be passed in late 2016 with the aforementioned RDR proposals 
being implemented around this time (Financial Services Board, 2015). Notwithstanding this, 
it will be interesting to await the potential effects (if any) that the UK’s Financial Advice 
Market Review (FAMR) will have on South Africa’s implementation of RDR proposals.  
As noted above, the UK’s FAMR may see radical reforms to regulation which may roll back 
key aspects of the current RDR regulations in order to boost access to advice (Selby & Sands, 
2016). This has been in response to a number of issues that have affected the distribution 
landscape following the implementation of such RDR regulations. In particular, broker 
numbers fell following RDR implementation which subsequently resulted in the advice gap 
(HM Treasury, 2015). The question therefore remains; in South Africa’s determination to 
pursue international trends, will it learn anything from the adverse developments and impact 
results that have ensued thereafter? 
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8.4 Conclusion 
The South African insurance market developed throughout the 1800s, during which time a 
number of insurance statutes were passed. The first of these statutes was the 1891 Life 
Assurance Act (Cape), which was a copy of the UK Act.  This was not surprising since UK 
insurers dominated the SA insurance market and practice. This Act, like many others which 
followed it, was essentially prudential regulation concerned with various audit, financial 
reporting, deposit and financial disclosure requirements all having a prudential regulation 
flavour. Prudential regulation continued to develop in South Africa largely to keep abreast 
with international developments and standards of best practice.  Thus the current SAM 
proposals are based on Europe’s Solvency II.  Very little motivation or justification comes 
from within South Africa, other than to follow overseas practice. 
Historically and particularly during the early stages of regulation, the approach adopted was 
to identify a specific market problem and then to apply remedial measures directed at the 
problem. These by nature were prudential.  In particular, following the collapse of the AA 
Mutual and the so-called inefficiencies of the FIO, a number of administrative changes were 
introduced. This eventually culminated in the passing of the FSB Act of 1990 and the 
creation of the FSB, a substantial administrative change. Unlike the UK, usually followed by 
South Africa, intermediaries were not regulated.  By the 1990s, it was decided to regulate 
financial advisors and intermediaries in particular, and advice in general.  At the time, the 
justification for this legislation was the high lapse rate of life insurance products.  The latter 
was the catalyst for the 2002 FAIS Act which, for the first time in South Africa, signified the 
development of market conduct regulation.  However as indicated above, market conduct 
regulation had been implemented in the US from the early 1900s and in the UK possibly from 
the passing of the Financial Service Act of 1986 but clearly became well entrenched with the 
passing of the FSMA 2000.  The FSA morphed into the FCA in the UK.  In placing more 
focus on market conduct, South Africa is once again doing what it has always done- it is 
following the UK and international practice.  The origin of market conduct in South Africa is 
thus the desire to follow overseas practice. 
This approach however loses sight of the historical approach to regulation; a response to 
known problems.  In the short-term market, for example, the existing systems have ensured 
that there are virtually no known incidents of consumers being treated unfairly.  Recent 
legislation is no longer directed at a specific and identified problem and this has resulted in 
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no clear idea as to how the new legislation will solve the problem which has not been 
correctly identified in the first place. The proposed introduction of the Twin Peaks regulatory 
system in 2011 is an example of this. No clear market problem has been identified as the 
catalyst for this reform.  South Africa is simply following the UK which has dismantled its 
single peak model to introduce the earlier rejected Twin Peaks model.  Instead of actual 
problems, regulators have attempted to justify the new and expensive R6 billion system on a 
number of fictitious scenarios to illustrate the importance of the new system. One may 
therefore argue that much of the legislations and regulations to follow may not necessarily be 
in the public interest. This may indicate the application of regulatory capture as a justification 
for such regulations. Notwithstanding this, the Twin Peaks system will most likely be 
implemented, and likely will see substantial changes to the South African regulatory 
landscape.  
Insofar as market conduct regulation in South Africa is concerned, it can be concluded that it 
is of fairly recent origin. Furthermore, its origins have been the result of the desire to emulate 
predominantly UK regulatory developments.  
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9 CONCLUSION 
The objective of the study was to establish the origins, development and nature of market 
conduct regulation. To achieve this objective, four insurance markets were examined. In 
doing so, the study posed the following research questions: i) when did market conduct 
regulation originate?  ii) how has market conduct regulation developed over time? iii) does 
public interest theory apply to regulatory developments that have taken place during a 
particular period? iv) does the theory of regulatory capture apply to regulatory developments 
that have taken place during a particular period? v) what is the nature of the market conduct 
regulatory developments? i.e., to what extent did the Lockean framework (the due process of 
the law and the law of contract) apply during these periods? The latter was done specifically 
with reference to sporadic regulatory developments from which broader conclusions were 
developed. 
In order to address these research questions, to begin with, the research has traced the 
development of insurance regulation in four pre-selected markets in order to then distil and 
plot the development of market conduct regulation. This has been done since limited 
literature is available which discusses the details of market conduct regulation. It has been 
noted that although market conduct issues arose as early as the 16th and 17th centuries, market 
conduct regulation originated in the UK from 1986 onwards and continued to develop 
throughout the early 2000s. It was pointed out that the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995 
highlighted the failures of the complex systems introduced by the 1986 Act, as a prudential 
regulatory system. Recall, the FSA regulatory body was ill-equipped to deal with the 
prudential regulatory aspects of the British bank failures, a task that had rested with the Bank 
of England for almost 300 years.  As a result of this, the system created by 1986 Act was 
abandoned and a new single peak regulatory system was created; the centre piece of which 
was the FSA.  The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated that the FSA, as a prudential regulator, 
was a failure.  It had ignored the prudential regulation of banks and acquired a life of its own 
as it morphed into a market conduct regulator.   
The research findings indicated that, historically, insurance regulatory reforms in the UK 
were initially driven by specific corporate failures or market events. The collapse of the 
Albert Life resulted in the passing of the 1870 Life Assurance Act, the collapse of both the 
Fire, Auto and Marine Insurance Company and the Vehicle & General spurred the 1973 
Insurance Companies Act and the 1975 Policyholders Protection Act, and various other 
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scandals provided the impetus for further regulatory reform.  Governmental intervention was 
thus reactive and so a regulatory philosophy emerged in terms of which regulatory measures 
were adopted in response to specific market problems.  The UK’s 1986 Financial Services 
Act did not follow this approach.  It was not in response to any market event.  The Act 
created a complex and unworkable regulatory and administrative system, something America 
had done decades before.  Contemporary regulatory developments continue in this direction.  
With the collapse of Barings Bank, a new single peak system was introduced.  Furthermore, 
following the 2008 world financial crisis the Twin Peaks system was introduced.  Each crisis 
produced a new administrative system.  The research has therefore argued that modern 
regulatory developments are simply “rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic” since no 
specific market corrective action is specified.  Presumably the view is that once the new 
regulatory system has been set up the corrective action will come from the new system. 
In the UK market conduct has emerged out of this milieu; almost by default.  The FSA 
morphed into a market conduct regulator, as prudential regulation of banks and other 
institutions was transferred to the Bank of England leaving the FSA, now renamed FMCA, to 
become a market conduct regulator. 
The research has also traced the development of insurance regulation in the US in order to 
discover the origins of market conduct regulation in this market. It was noted that during the 
mid-1800s, there were calls for the development of consistent and homogenous regulatory 
systems since a number of insurers operated across state lines and were therefore subject to 
varying state demands and regulatory requirements. This eventually culminated in the 
establishment of the NIC in 1871, today is known as the NAIC, in order to achieve such 
nationwide harmonisation of insurance regulation. It was noted that the NAIC’s Constitution 
made a clear reference to its market conduct regulatory objectives. In particular, the fair, just 
and equitable treatment of policyholders and claimants, as enshrined in the NAIC’S 
Constitution, indicates the commitment to market conduct regulation. On the basis of this 
finding, it can be argued that the US predates the UK when it comes to market conduct 
regulation. Although traces of market conduct regulation can be found at earlier periods in 
the UK, the conscience drive toward achieving market conduct regulatory goals is more 
evident in the US at an early stage.  
In tracing the development of South African insurance regulation, it was noted that the 2002 
FAIS Act which regulated financial advisors and intermediaries, signified for the first time 
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the development of market conduct regulation in the South African market.  Following this 
development, South Africa has largely followed international best practices and more 
specifically has been guided largely by UK regulatory steps. The origin of market conduct in 
South Africa, therefore, has been underpinned by the desire to follow overseas practice. 
The question arises as to why have these regulatory developments taken place.  To answer 
this question, this study draws on the economic theory of regulation, especially the theory of 
regulatory capture.  In particular, the research argues that various regulatory developments 
have been driven by parties who have an interest in the regulatory process.  Regulators 
themselves have an interest in the system.   
There is very little evidence that market conduct regulation is in the public interest, a reason 
usually given for introducing regulation.  In the short-term market in South Africa for 
example, 0.08 per cent of consumers benefit from the ombudsman system, a figure which is 
far too low to result in consumer demand for improved regulation.  This is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, evidence of regulatory capture can be found at various periods 
throughout the 16th and 17th centuries in the UK and further examples can be found thereafter. 
This research has referred to such examples to illustrate that regulatory capture is a more 
plausible theory to justify the “need” for regulation. 
This research has also highlighted that historically, the market conduct relationship between 
the insurer and the insured was governed by the rule of law. This encompasses the law of 
contract and the due process of the law.  These ideals were articulated by John Locke in the 
17th century and therefore are referred to collectively as the Lockean framework. In terms of 
the Lockean framework, the obligations of both contracting parties are agreed to in terms of 
the contract and ought to be enforced by the courts in terms of the rule of pacta sunt 
servanda. Increasingly however, and particularly with reference to the UK financial market, 
market conduct regulators are imposing obligations that far exceed what was agreed to in 
contract. More specifically, expanding obligations are progressively being placed on 
insurance companies for equity purposes and consumer protection considerations. This can 
become particularly devastating since an insurance company cannot then be sure of its 
potential future liabilities. The near collapse of the Lloyd’s market in the 1990s was referred 
to in order to demonstrate this problem. 
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Similarly the collapse of the Auction Alliance demonstrates how the modern market conduct 
regulator through various rules and regulations ignored the age old Lockean framework and 
the clear law of contract which has typically governed the relationship between consumers 
and service providers. Accordingly, modern consumer protection rules and regulations have 
confused clear and well entrenched common law practices. It therefore follows that when 
market conduct regulators impose obligations beyond what was agreed to in contract (or 
ignore the law of contract all together), the relationship between the insured and the insurer is 
no longer exclusively governed by the rule of law and the law of contract; the Lockean 
framework is no longer applied.  
With reference to various, sporadic, UK market conduct regulatory developments, the 
research has demonstrated that throughout the almost 500 year history of the global insurance 
market, the Lockean framework was upheld and applied until 1986 when the first 
bureaucratic centralised managerial system was established, in the form of the FSA. Since 
this date and the birth of market conduct regulation coincide, it can then be argued that the 
market transitioned away from the Lockean system to a new system after this time. As such, 
contemporary market conduct regulation is not underpinned by the Lockean system but rather 
by a new system. If this is the case, the question arises as to what then is the framework that 
underpins the new system of market conduct regulation. It is not clear what the legal position 
is in modern times – it appears to be confusion. 
As such, since this new framework is in its early form, the study has not attempted to define 
nor critique this framework although it has stressed that no other system should replace the 
law of contract when it comes to governing the interrelationship between two contracting 
parties. The former may nevertheless lend itself to further research. Furthermore, this 
research has not assessed the nature of all market conduct regulatory developments, which 
may be a further avenue for more focused future research. This may encompass an analysis of 
the impact and/or implications of market conduct regulation on insurance markets, an area 
that this study has not pursued. 
In addition to this, the study was limited to only the four pre-selected markets, namely, the 
UK, EU, US and South Africa. This aspect of the study could be expanded in order to trace 
the origins and development of market conduct regulation in other countries. This will 
naturally provide a more comprehensive analysis. Similarly, the study focuses exclusively on 
the short-term insurance market in South Africa. Further research ought to be performed in 
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order to trace the development of the long-term (life assurance market) in order to provide a 
more coherent and thorough picture. 
Notwithstanding the above, this study provides insights into the history and details of market 
conduct regulation and in doing so, provides an original and theoretical contribution to the 
limited body of knowledge on the subject matter at hand. An increased awareness regarding 
the particulars of market conduct regulation will hopefully provide a valuable contribution to 
National Treasury, Parliament, policymakers, academics and the like. 
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10 ANNEXURES 
10.1 Annexure 1- List of Terms as per the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
Unfair terms include those terms which have the object or effect of: 
a) Excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the death 
of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission of that 
seller or supplier;  
b) Inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the 
seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations, 
including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any 
claim which the consumer may have against him;  
c) Making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by the 
seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realisation depends on his own will 
alone;  
d) Permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter 
decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer 
to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the 
latter is the party cancelling the contract;  
e) Requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately 
high sum in compensation;  
f) Authorising the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis 
where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the seller or 
supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the 
seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract;  
g) Enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration 
without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so;  
h) Automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does not 
indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express this desire not 
to extend the contract is unreasonably early;  
i) Irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of 
becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract;  
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j) Enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a 
valid reason which is specified in the contract;  
k) Enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any 
characteristics of the product or service to be provided;  
l) Providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing a 
seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without, in both cases, 
giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is 
too high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded;  
m) Giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or services 
supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right to 
interpret any term of the contract;  
n) Limiting the seller's or supplier's obligation to respect commitments undertaken by his 
agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular formality;  
o) Obliging the consumer to fulfil all his obligations where the seller or supplier does not 
perform his;  
p) Giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations 
under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, 
without the latter's agreement;  
q) Excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other 
legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to 
arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available 
to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, 
should lie with another party to the contract.  
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